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This thesis deals with the utilitarian tendencies in the
moral philosophy of Miskawayh by comparing them with
some aspects of utilitarianism in the philosophies of
Hume, Paley and Mill. It first sets a critical back¬
ground of the works of Miskawayh and works written on
the philosophy of Miskawayh.
Then it presents an exposition of three modes of utilit¬
arianism, namely: the discussion of the role of reason
in the moral philosophy of Hume; the religious approach
in the utilitarian philosophy of Paley; and the social
aspect of Mill's utilitarianism.
The utilitarian tendencies in the moral philosophy of
Miskawayh are then examined in the light of this tri¬
partite understanding of utilitarianism. The thesis goes
into the details of comparisons and contrasts between
each of these aspects and its counter-part in the phil¬
osophy of MiskawayhjfThe justification for the comparis¬
on being the multi-faceted philosophy of Miskawayh which
represents an encyclopaedic attitude to knowledge in
general and to philosophy in particular.
The thesis ends up with the conclusion that there are
utilitarian tendencies in the moral philosophy of Miska¬
wayh and that these tendencies are not uncommon or pecul¬
iar to his philosophy, since it has a Platonic, Arist-
otlelian and Neo-Platonic background, which is a common





In this thesis works referred to in the footnotes are
given in full in the bibliography with their date of
publication and place of publication.
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ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations have been used, both some¬
times in the text and in the footnotes.
A.U.: Act-Utilitarianism.
F.A.: Al-Fawz Al-Asghar.





All references to T.A. by Miskawayh are to the translat¬
ion by Zurayk unless otherwise indicated.
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TRANSLITERATION
In this thesis, I have used the system of transliterat¬
ion followed in the Department of Islamic Studies,
Edinburgh University.
I have also followed the system of transliterating the
written Arabic rather than the way it is pronounced.
This means that for the purposes of transliteration the




The quest for a reason ;iforbeing moral or justifying
moral reasoning has always been a problem in moral in¬
quiry. Utilitarian thought is a mode of reasoning to¬
wards finding a solution to that problem. The argument
for utilitarianism is that the rightness or wrongness
of actions is determined by their consequences. But with¬
in this main argument there are different justifications
for different ends, e.g., there is act-utilitarianism
in which the consequence of the action pertains to par¬
ticular actions, and also there is rule-utilitarianism,
in which the consequence of action pertains to a group
of actions or rules, universal rules (pertaining to all
mankind) and particular rules pertaining to the moral
agent himself, i.e., the individual.1
There are also differences between act and rule utilit¬
arianism; the former is described as hedonistic, egois¬
tic and universalistic, i.e. it can be directed towards
individual happiness (hedonistic) based on the interest
of the individual agent, i.e. selfish-interest motivates
the agent to work towards the interest of others because
it helps in bringing about his own desires and ends
(egoistic). The latter (rule - utilitarianism) , however,
a
involves altruistic, universalistic and, rational bene-A
volence approach to moral reasoning.
1. Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, V.8, p.206.
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Utilitarian thought can also be divided into normative
and descriptive. The normative ethics deal with prob¬
lems of how we ought to behave, while the descriptive
ethics describe how we actually behave. 1
Miskawayh is a Muslim philosopher, a historian and a
learned man, who lived in the 10th century. He does not
write utilitarian or non-utilitarian morality, neither
is it the aim of this research to make him a utilitar¬
ian. The aim of the research, however, is to find out
the utilitarian tendency in his philosophy and compare
it with three chosen authors in British utilitarianism.
The ethics of Miskawayh is, in general, a normative
religious ethics. It tends to prescribe what ought to
be done as a criterion for human behaviour, i.e. actions
pertaining to human perfection, which is the essence of
human nature. His aim is that moral behaviour should be¬
come a dispositional trait of character.2
Although Miskawayh does not explicate his ideas in the
same way modern philosophers go about it, yet he ex¬
pounds his arguments sometimes in a syllogistic form and
occasionally he refers to Plato or Aristotle, or quotes
any of them to support the argument he is making. His
first assumption is the teachability of virtue within
human perfection of human nature qua human nature. This
is a preliminary step to be taken by the agent towards
attaining happiness. The utilitarian tendency is clus-
h Op. cit., p.207.
2. Miskawayh, T-A., (trans, by Zurayk), p.l and pp.29ff.
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tered round the concept of happiness. The aim of this
research is to trace the utilitarian tendency in the
philosophy of Miskawayh. This does not mean that we
have to force a modern interpretation on the moral
thoughts of Miskawayh; on the contrary, it is legitimate
to research into medieval philosophy with an eye of
modern scholarship. This will serve two purposes at one
time: (a) it will revive the text, (whether it is Muslim
or Christian, Eastern or Western); (b) it will benefit
modern scholarship and serve the spread of knowledge at
large. As to the compatibility of such research with
problems of general moral philosophy, it can be argued
that however developed the problems of philosophy are,cVv rui itjL-
there is still room for the -new. old problems to drag -on.
h> ^ CU\ CrCL+ fSJlcJi ,
**********
Miskawayh is said to be one of the great philosophers
of the fourth century of Hijra (10th A.C.) because of
his contribution to philosophic ethics in Islam. Indeed,
the name Miskawayh has been associated with philosophic
Ethics, for he is the foremost Muslim philosopher who
tries to change the course of Islamic philosophy from
logic and metaphysics, subjects which have been elabor¬
ately discussed by Muslim philosophers since al-Kindi,
down to Ibn-Slna and Ikhwan al-Safa' (Brethren of purity)
to Ethics. There may, perhaps, be some comparison with
the Socratic Revolution which brought philosophy down
from heaven to earth, i.e. from cosmological speculat¬
ion1 (a subject which had been tackled by Pre-Socratic
philosophers - dealing with problems concerning the *
1. Sidgwick, H., Outlines of the History of Ethics, p.xviii. C.f. Kirk, G.S. and
Raven, J.E., The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp.8f.
'i f 9- /s (j,^. ^ ~j
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external world) - to moral speculation (Socratic), (ques¬
tions of virtue, justice and piety), i.e. human study,
study of the man.
Miskawayh's interest in the study of man came through
a change in his personal life style. He used to indulge
in the life of joy and pleasure, himself being a legit¬
imate product of a period characterized by corruption
and decline in moral values. Yet this same period has
been described by Miskawayh in his Tajarib as flourish¬
ing culturally. 1 This seems to have been brought about
by the interest of Buyid ministers and princes in diff¬
erent sciences, arts and philosophy. They also used to
have special councils including poets, litterateurs,
logicians, philosophers, grammarians as well as jurists.
This contributed considerably to the making of the char¬
acter of Miskawayh and helped in shaping his philosophy.
His friend, the litterateur and philosopher, al-Tawhidi,
has written about this change in Miskawayh's life and
career; he says:
As to Miskawayh (among other philosophers,
logicians and litterateurs) he is a poor man
among rich men, and a dumb one among pro¬
phets, because he is an extraordinary man.
I gave him the commentary of Isagoge and
categories. He is now in the company of Ibn
al-Khammar (a translator,_ philosopher and a
logician), he might see Abu-Sulayman (a logic¬
ian and a philosopher.2
- c
1. Miskawayh, Tajarib al-Umam, Vol.11, p.408. "He describes how Addad al-Dawla,
the Buyid minister annexes a special room for knowledgeable people to his palace."
2. Al-Tawhidi, AbU Hayyan, al-ImtaC wa al-Mu'anasa, Vol.1, pp.31-36.
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Al-Tawhidi also talks about Miskawayh's wasteful time
spent in the life of pleasure and joy, and how he re¬
pented at last, and that he wasted some time in the
study of alchemy and that he was a greedy man. 1
The testimony for this change in Miskawayh's life style
is evident from the pledge he takes at this turning
point in his life with God, not to return to his prev¬
ious life and to straighten his ways and behaviour. He
has written this pledge down in a form of a promise be¬
tween himself and God, and as advice to other people to
follow suit. He summarizes this advice in a fifteen
points programme, which sets the background for the gen¬
eral tendency in his moral philosophy.
This programme sheds some light on the general outlines
of Miskawayh's moral thought. These can be featured as:
rational, benevolent and socially altruistic attitude
in a fifteen point programme. These features I propose
are salient evidence for a utilitarian tendency which
could be traced in Miskawayh's philosophy. The fifteen
points are:-
(1) He had striven to maintain what we would
call personal integrity. This he defined
as the preference (ithar) for what is
worthy (al-haqq), over what is futile in
beliefs; for what is true over what is
false in statements; and for what is
good (al-khayr) over what is evil (al-
sharr) in actions. ~~
(2) He had emphasized the continuous strug¬
gle that he needed to keep up between
1. Al-Tawhidi, op cit.
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essential manhood (al-mar') and his ani¬
mal nature.
Donaldson missed a point here: that one must remember
that happiness must always be obtained deliberately.1
(3) He had felt the importance of adhering
to Islamic law (al-Shari a) and of recog¬
nizing the necessity of its functions.
(4) He had endeavoured to remember agree¬
ments and to fulfil them, particularly
any agreements he had made with Allah.
(5) He had shown very little confidence in
men, and this he accomplished by avoid¬
ing familiarity with them.
(6) He had cultivated the love of the beau¬
tiful for its own sake and for no other
reason.
(7) He had appreciated the value of silence
in times of agitation, until reason
would direct him.
(8) He had striven to continue any state of
mind that was beneficial until it would
become a habit.
(9) He had approved taking initiative in
things that were creditable.
(10) He had found whole-hearted sympathy was
necessary in order to work on any impor¬
tant undertaking without distraction.
(11) He had felt that the fear of death and
poverty could be counteracted by doing
what was still possible by not being
indolent.
(12) He had shut out from his mind anxieties
as were aroused by sayings of the base,
1. Donaldson, D.H., Studies in Muslim Ethics, p.123; c.f. Miskawayh, Tajarib al-Umam,
Preface, quoted from A Dictionary of Learned Hen by Yaqut, p.8
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and he had tried to suppress his desire
so that
(not at night, as it has been rendered by Donaldson,
and not at night
he may not respond to what they say ag¬
ainst him.
(13) He had come to realize that he must be
inured to wealth or to poverty and to
liberality or to contempt.
(14) He had tried to remember times of sick¬
ness when he was in health, and occas¬
ions of joy and pleasure when anger was
apt to arise, so that there might be
less injustice and transgression.
(15) He had rejoiced in times of trust, ap¬
preciating the goodness and confidence
in Allah, turning his whole heart to
Him.2
This programme indicates a change of style and behaviour
in Miskawayh's life. Points (1) and (2) refer to this
change in the form of conflict between the worthy and
futile of beliefs, the true and false in statements and
the good and evil in actions. Point (2) projects this
conflict out in the struggle between his essential man¬
hood and human perfection and his animal nature. It also
shows that here Miskawayh has come to terms with: (a)
reason and (b) religion (revelation). This has been made
clear by Point (3) which refers to recognition of Islam¬
ic law and its function. The programme also shows that
there is a benevolent attitude, as in points (13) and
1. Donaldson, op. cit.
2. Ibid.
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(14) which are pregnant with altruistic qualities, al¬
though this seems to be marred by point (5), where he
shows an ascetic tendency. However, this benevolent
attitude has been further asserted in points (8) and (9)
by a trend towards the useful which can be taken as a key
to his utilitarian tendency.
2. Ethical Works of Miskawayh
1. Tartib al-Sacadat wa^Manazil al-cU]um
— q _
or Kitab al-Sa ada
This book has not been mentioned by Brockelman. The book
was published in two editions, 1917 and 1928, in Cairo
by Sheikh SacId '"All Tub' r—Jx al-Suyuti. . Arkoun rightly com¬
mented that such a philosophical work is turned into a
sermon by Sheikh Suyuti1s introduction.1 No manuscript
as yet has been discovered for the origin of the book.
q _ _
The theme of the book is al-sa ada al-quswa (ultimate
happiness), and the steps to be taken by the educated
one to attain it. The book is also an exercise in Aris-
totlelian logic, which is used by Miskawayh as a tool
for obtaining the requisite knowledge (hikma), for the
attainment of happiness. In fact, the major portion of
the book is concerned with the classification of philos¬
ophy and science.
Al-Suyuti's introduction is a collection of Sufi spirit-
1. Miskawayh, T.S., Introduction by Suyuti, Passim. C.f. Arkoun, M., Miskawayh Phil¬
osophic et Historien, p.108.
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ual ethics concerning the description of the ultimate
happiness (transcendental happiness), so to speak. The
book has been rendered into English in the Appendix by
the writer of this thesis. The translation does not in¬
clude al-Suyutl's introduction.
2. Kitab al-Fawz al-Agghar
The ethical part of the book can best be called the book
of the soul. The book argues extensively about the exist¬
ence of the soul and its immortality. It relates this
to man's perfection and real happiness. Miskawayh repres¬
ents the two substances body and spirit, by two worlds:
al-calam al-kabir war-al-Calam al-gaghlr, the macrocosm and
the microcosm. The philosophy involved in the book has
been described by Arkoun, M. as:
Le Fawz expose, en effet, des notions de
psychologie et de metaphysique qui serviront
de fondements theoriques aux positions ethi-
ques defendues dans le T.A.2
The book is divided into three parts: part one deals
with the proof of the existence of God; part two deals
with the existence of the soul; and part three tackles
the question of prophethood. The book was edited in
Beirut 1319 and in Cairo 1325. It has been translated
into English by Sweetman, J.W. as a part of his book,
Islam and Christian Theology.3
1. Miskawayh, F.S., pp.163-167.
2. Arkoun, Miskawayh (320/325-421) = (932/936-1030) Philosophe et Historien, p.110.
3. C.f. CAbd al-tUmid, Ibn Miskawayh: A Study of his Al-Fawz Al-Asghar. (A useful
contribution for the psycho-metaphysical basis of the philosophy of Miskawayh).
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3. Kitab al-Hawamil wa-al-Shawamil
Q
This book has been listed by Dr. Izzat in his source
book on Miskawayh among a group of lost works of Miska-
wayh, at the time he published his Ph.D. thesis on Misk¬
awayh 1946. The book is available now in its Arabic
edition. It has been edited and published in Cairo in
1951 - 1320 A.H. by Ahmad Amin and Sayyid Ahmad Sagr.
• • •
Ahmad Arnfn, who introduces the book, says that the book
was ignored by scholars, both from the orient and the
Occident, and that Muhammad Ibn Tawit al-Tanji found the
• •
manuscript of the book in the library of Ayi SufLya in
Istanbul Ahmad Amin was able to obtain a copy of the man-
uscript in Cairo. He refers to the book as the only copy
available in the world.1
The contents of the book comprise some answers produced
by Miskawayh to questions asked by his friend, the
writer and philosopher, al-Tawhidl. The book is a dis¬
play of the encyclopaedic learning of Miskawayh. The
questions and answers cover a variety of subjects and
disciplines, including some questions and answers on
philosophy and ethics.
4. Rasa'il Falsafiyya
These are philosophical essays included in a collection
by Dr. cAbd-al-Rahman Badawi in his book, Dirasat wa
_ * o c c
nugug ff al-falsafa wa-al- ulum ind al- Arab (Studies
1. Miskawayh, Al-Hawamil wa-al-Shawaniil, Preface, p.a.
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and Texts in the Philosophy and Sciences of the Arabs).
He includes two of these essays in his book.
i. Maqala Lil-Ustadh Abi cAli Miskawayh. Rahimahu Allah
— C C — — * —
fi al-nafs wa—al- aql? wa hiya jawab sa'il sa'al
Canhuma wa-hall shukuk adrakaha fl al-jawhar al-basi.t
al-q1 aim bi-nafsihi.1
This is an essay written by Miskawayh on soul and mind.
It is an answer to a question and doubts about the sim¬
ple substance which subsists on its own. The treatise
sheds some light on the nature of mind and body and it
also exposes Miskawayh's own way of philosophizing.
ii. Risala fi al-Ladhdhat wa-al-alam.
It is a 'Treatise on Pleasures and Pains', a subject
which has been tackled by Miskawayh in his T.A. as well.
The treatise is more revealing of the philosophical men¬
tality of Miskawayh and it also discloses his ascetic
attitude towards the question of pleasures and pains.
5. Tahdhib al-Akhlaq wa-Tathir al-aCraq
This is the main treatise written by Miskawayh in Islam¬
ic philosophical ethics and one of the most important
works on the subject. It is translated into English by
<*-_ C
1. Badwi, Abd al-Rahraan, op. cit., p.57.
A
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C. Zurayk.1 It introduces philosophical ethics to Islamic
philosophy and establishes the link between rational and
revealed knowledge concerning Islamic moral philosophy.
The book, although it does not reveal much of Miska¬
wayh' s originality, yet it is a reasonable compilation
of Neo-Platonic philosophy. However it pays special
attention to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.
_ _ c
6. Risala fi Mahiayt al- adl li—Miskawayh
A Treatise on the essence of justice, published, edited
and translated into English by Khan, M.S.
In an answer to a question about justice and injustice
in al-Hawamil wa—al-Shawamil, Miskawayh postpones the
answer as he says to a brief summary in a separate treat¬
ise.2 The treatise divides justice into three: divine,
natural and positive. In dealing with divine justice,
Miskawayh explicates that injustice cannot be attributed
to the unique one (al-Wafrid al-Mah<jQ. He thus alludes
to the uniting power in man (meaning the soul) and at¬
tributes justice to it. As to positive justice, it has
been divided into particular and universal. The univer¬
sal justice is that which is agreed upon by all, and the
particular justice is restricted to particular areas and
particular people. Natural justice is the one existing
in nature. The work is Miskawayh's own philosophy, with
some underlying elements of Aristotlelian ethics, esp¬
ecially the view of the soul as a uniting power of the
1. Zurayk's is the translation on which this thesis depends; it is published in
Beirut in 1968.




The book is available in both Arabic and Persian. The
Persian title is Jawldan Khirad. It is a collection of
adab and hikma of different nations, Persians, Indians,
Arabs and Greeks. Presumably the literature was avail¬
able and accessible to the general public at that time,
but Miskawayh had added the originality of combination,
compilation and reconciliation.
3. Critical Review of Literature on Miskawayh
1. De Boer
This study takes a quick glance at Tahdhlb al-Akhlaq and
gives useful but brief information about Miskawayh, the
moral philosopher who initiated philosophic tendency in
Islamic moral thought. De Boer alludes rightly to the
fact that Miskawayh's philosophy is,
a contribution of material taken from Plato,
Aristotle, Galen and the Muslim Religious
Law, although, Aristotle predominates in it.1
1. De Boer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, p.128.
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Yet, De Boer does not refer to Miskawayh's personal con¬
tribution, i.e., whether he is an original philosopher
or not. He, however, elucidates some philosophical
points about Miskawayh's philosophy, e.g. the concept
of good has been explained by De Boer as,
Now the good is either a general good or a
particular good. There is an absolute Good,
which is identical with the highest Being and
the highest knowledge; and all the good to¬
gether strive to attain it.1
De Boer follows also the different categories of happi¬
ness and pleasure as they ensue from the divisions of
the goods. The highest level of happiness pertains to
the highest level of humanity achieved by different in¬
dividuals.2 He mentions that Miskawayh's social tendency
would label his ethics as social ethics.3 However, if
this argument is expanded, we can say that this social
tendency has a teleological end in Miskawayh's ethics
and as such may be called utilitarian.
De Boer also describes this social ethics as a cultivat¬
ion of the love of one's neighbour in the widest accept¬
ation. Obviously this is true about an ethical viewpoint
which is basically growing in an Islamic background,
with a broad view of love which endorses all mankind,
since it endeavours to achieve the highest degrees of




perfection and the might that is man which depends on
the Mighty Power of God.
2. Muhammad Yusuf Musa
Dr. Musa's book, Falsafat al-Akhlaq fi al-Islam wa-
_ _
Silatuha bi-al-falsafa al-'Ighrigiyya throws some light
"*
— Q0 —
on the traces of (madhhab al-manfa a al- amma) which can
be translated directly to utilitarianism. He indicates
0
that the Mu tazila show some utilitarian tendency in
their rational approach to ethics and he alludes to the
fact that in Islam Allah wishes happiness for all his
creatures, in particular for man.1 There should be no sur¬
prise if such a tendency recurs in Islamic rational
thought of a later period. Dr. Musa considers Miskawayh
as a social thinker of Islam, who believes that man can¬
not live alone. He calls Miskawayh's philosophy pragmatic
thought.2 But technically speaking, the word pragmatic
has not been used in its philosophical denotation, i.e.
he means practical.
Dr. Musa describes Miskawayh as the social thinker who
■fv
devoted himself for the study and attainment of happi¬
ness, not for the individual alone but for the society
at large, i.e. mankind.3 He also alludes to Miskawayh's
definition of character as a psychology of choice, or
pp cvfiuL
the effect of the will. This has been confirmed by a
paper issued by the Faculty of Theology at Al-Azhar




University , 1935, that Miskawayh's dispositional moral
behaviour is a reference to the work of the will and the
work of the soul and its faculties.1 Dr. Musa also cen¬
tered his speculation on Tahdhib al-Akhlaq; he mentions
the classification of pleasures and how different pleas¬
ures produce different kinds of happiness according to
the quality of the pleasure, i.e. whether it is of base
or superior quality; again this can be paraphrased in
terms of human or animal qualities or mental and bodily
qualities.2
The different kinds of pleasures involve 'goods' which
are useful and eventually lead to a happy end, whether
it is a happy end for the individual, society or mankind
at large. These are all utilitarian features and they
support the claim of this thesis that Miskawayh's phil¬
osophy contains a utilitarian tendency. Reference has
also been made to social welfare or common good as a
legislative end aimed at by legislators; this is why he
says companionableness has been an end of some of the
acts of worship, like the aggregate prayers, the Friday
C ~T 3
prayer, hajj and the two ids.
Dr. Musa also mentions the Greek influence on Miskawayh
and his selective reconciliatory attitude which makes
it easier for him to accept the philosophies of Aris¬
totle and Galen and mix them with Islamic law and thus
produce a moral philosophy established on reason and
1. Jad al-Mawla, Muhammad A. and Sheikh Salman, A.R., Muilh.kirat fl Ilm al-Akhlaq,
(1935), pp.59-60. '
2. Musa, M.Y., op. cit., p.96.
3. Ibid., p.105.
- 17 -
revelation. On this basis, one can easily find a way to
compare Miskawayh's reconciliatory attitude, as this
thesis proposes, with Paley and the English utilitar¬
ians, who based his utilitarianism on a reconciliatory
approach to morality.1 Dr. Musa relies on two sources
for Miskawayh's whole philosophy, Tahdhib Al-Akhlaq and
al-Fawz al-Asghar. This, in itself, is not sufficient
to cover different aspects of Miskawayh's philosophy.
Since this is the case, it is a little unfair for Dr.
Musa to criticize Miskawayh's incomplete thought. How¬
ever, he does admire what he describes as his potential
ability to have produced a more perfect philosophy hav¬
ing read his Greek and Islamic authors and having got
the merits of both systems.2
3. Dr. cIzzat, cAbd al-CAziz
His work on Miskawayh was a Ph.D. Thesis presented to
Fu'ad I University (presently, the University of Cairo)
in the 1940s. The book is divided into two main sect¬
ions: one on the life and works of Miskawayh and the
other on the sources of his philosophy. Dr. Izzat con¬
siders Miskawayh as the third Master, the first being
Aristotle and the second al-Farabi. The credit which Dr.
Izzat bestowed on Miskawayh was given to him for his
contribution to moral philosophy in Islam, unlike his
predecessors who were concerned very much with logic and
metaphysics. The book is an encyclopaedia about Miska¬
wayh's life, works and moral philosophy. It is inval¬
uable as to the detailed information on the life, works
1. Musa, op, cit., p.116.
2. Ibid., p.120.
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and sources of Miskawayh's philosophy. The writer it
seems was overwhelmed by the efforts exerted by Miska-
wayh in the production of various books and treatises
on moral philosophy. But it seems that he wasn't able
to find 'al-Hawimil wa-al-Shawamil' at the time he wrote
the thesis. This is why he considers the book as one of
Q
the lost works of Miskawayh. Izzat's book, apart from
the contribution it makes in the revival of the original
works of Miskawayh and works written on him, is an im¬
portant primary reference for the source of Miskawayh's
moral philosophy. The book as much as it is important
as a source book on Miskawayh, is less revealing concern¬
ing the philosophical contents and it lacks critical con¬
tributions. In so far as the second section of the book
is concerned, which deals with the philosophy of Miska¬
wayh and its sources, it looks to Miskawayh's debt to
the Greek tradition, i.e. Plato, Aristotle, Galen,
Bryson, and how they influenced his moral thought. The
book, however, does not throw enough light on Miska¬
wayh's moral ideas in their relation to modern philos¬
ophy. This it seems has left the door open for further
study on the moral contribution of Miskawayh in terms
of the understanding of modern philosophy.
4. Donaldson, P.M.
In his book, Studies in Muslim Ethics, Donaldson wrote
a chapter on "The Manual Ethics of Ibn Miskawayh". This
study is concerned with Miskawayh's main treatise,
Tahdhib al-Akhlaq. The writer rightly describes the book
as, "the most important book on philosophical ethics in
Muslim literature".1 The writer deduced from the fact
1. Donaldson, D.M., Studies in Muslim Ethics, p.12.
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that Miskawayh was in association with Abu al-Khayr al-
Khammar, a Christian who had contacts with Yahya ibn
c c —
AdI that Miskawayh most likely had the use of Ibn Adi1s
Tahdhib al-Akhlaq. There is no doubt that this associat¬
ion existed since they used to meet at the Buyid's coun¬
cils of elite and learned people. Yet this association
C -r-
does not necessitate Ibn Adi1s parenthood to Miska¬
wayh 1 s T.A., because: (a) they were both in contact with
the available Greek sources; (b) the approach in the two
books is different, Miskawayh tends to philosophize
Q
whereas Ibn Adi1 s approach is more like adab and wisdom
than it is philosophy.1 Donaldson devotes some parts of
the chapter to an expository introduction and some other
parts to an analysis of the moral philosophy of Miska¬
wayh. The analysis, however, is rather a brief summary
of the main features of T.A. . Donaldson does not tackle
the implications of the philosophy of Miskawayh, nor
does he discuss the relevance of the philosophy to mod¬
ern philosophy. He quotes Leone Caetari's remark that
Miskawayh,
is not satisfied merely to collect material
to set forth in chronological order, for he
holds that all these events of the past were
bound together by a web of human interest.2
This web of human interest is part and parcel of the
utilitarian tendency in the moral philosophy of
Miskawayh, the subject matter of this thesis.
1. Ibn CAcfx, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, edited by Takriti (Cambridge - Ph.D. Thesis), Passim.
2. Donaldson, Studies, p.122.
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5. Valzer, R.
In his famous book, Greek into Arabic, Walzer devoted
a chapter to "Some Aspects of Miskawayh's Tahdhib Al-
Akhlaq" . The writer considers Tahdhib al-Akhlaq as a
major contribution of Miskawayh to Islamic ethical
thought. He does not, however, consider Miskawayh as an
independent thinker like Muhammad Ibn Zakariyya al-Razi.1
Walzer considers Miskawayh as a compiler. He alludes to
the dependence of Miskawayh on Greek authors like Galen
and Bryson and that it is through their works that he
was able to get to the philosophies of Plato and Aris¬
totle. He goes into tiny details about the classical
Greek tradition scattered in Miskawayh's T.A.. Walzer
refers to the educational element in the philosophy of
. Miskawayh and that,
He does not talk about himself from an urge
to confess his faults but because he believes
that his example will encourage others to ex¬
change beduin morality for philosophy.2
This is not doing justice to Miskawayh's starting point
where he states that his book T.A. is addressed to the
learned ones. Yet, in so far as the Muslim individual
is concerned, he would rather see to the fact that he
gets his instructions and education since early youth
according to Islamic Law.3 Walzer also looks into the
implications of the moral philosophy of Miskawayh. He




mentions in particular the social implications of this
philosophy in the concepts of human relations and friend¬
ship. He elaborates on this point as follows,
The analysis of different types of human rel¬
ations and friendships in chapter 5 has among
other things produced the result that there
exists a natural social feeling (uns) in man
which is the cause and principle of all the
different friendly associations between men.1
Walzer adds,
Now since it is essential to cultivate this
inborn sense of companionship in man, it has
been laid down by the Divine Law that man
should practice religious worship in public
and assemble in places of religious instruct¬
ion .2
ThenWalzer refers rightly to this social aspect of Misk-
awayh's philosophy as,
Miskawayh continues..., evidently unfolding
an idea of his own.3
It is the claim of this thesis that this social idea
which is Miskawayh's own philosophy, contains the seeds
of the utilitarian tendency which can be picked out from




Miskawayh's other works as well. Walzer does not forget
to mention with regard to Miskawayh's ethical approach,
the transcendental development of this social feeling
into higher forms of friendship and love of God. 1
6. Ansari, M.cAbd al-Haqq
Ansari wrote, The Ethical Philosophy of Miskawayh,
which was a Ph.D. Thesis presented to the University of
Aligarh in India in 1962. This work is a valuable expos¬
ition of the moral philosophy of Ibn Miskawayh. It does
not, though, present a positive aspect of the moral
ideas of Miskawayh. While the tone in the book is more
explanatory than some of the literature written on the
subject, yet in so far as the book is not directed to
a real moral issue or problem in the philosophy of Misk¬
awayh, its benefit must be restricted to its expository
value. Ansarl wrote extensively about Islamic moral phil¬
osophy before Miskawayh; he also relates parts of Miska¬
wayh's philosophy to the Greek origin. The book does not
consider those parts of Miskawayh's philosophy which can
be explained in terms of modern philosophy.
7. Dr. Subhx, Ahmad Mahmud
He introduced Miskawayh as the famous philosopher in the
field of moral philosophy because he filled a gap in the
study of Aristotle's philosophy left untouched by other
1. Walzer, R., op. cit., p.234.
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Muslim philosophers.1
Dr. Subhf thinks that Miskawayh's philosophy is a com-
• •
bination of different philosophies, that of Plato, Aris-
totle, Galen and Islamic Law (Shari a) . He feels that
the original work done is ingenious, namely that of coll¬
ecting, compiling and reconciling these different phil¬
osophies.2 Dr. Subhl throws some light on the importance
of happiness in Miskawayh's philosophy, in particular
that aspect which should be looked for by man qua man,
happiness as such should be attained for its own sake.
Happiness should also be attained for its relevance to
the honourable thing in man, i.e. reason. He also refers
to the teachability of virtue and the need for Islamic
Law, Sharic a to prepare the youth for higher knowledge
in later life, i.e. the knowledge which is derived from
reason and will.3
Dr. Subhi, however, criticizes the philosophy of Miska-
• •
wayh as being forged. He refers to the fact that it is
a collection of different ideas from Plato, Aristotle,
Galen and Bryson,* from whose work Miskawayh quotes his
ideas about the education of the young,5 not to mention
his dependence on Islamic Law for the instruction of the
young. The forged philosophy of Miskawayh Dr. Subhi
• •
1. Subhi, A.M.I., Al-Falsafa al-Akhlaqiyya fi al-fikr al-Islarci - al-CAqliyyun wa-
al-Dhawqiyyun aw al-Nagar wa-al-cAi»al, p.130.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp.312-313.
4. Bryson, according to Zurayk is a Greek author, probably of the Neo-Pythagorean
school and of the 1st century A.D. C.f. Zurayk Trans, of T.A., Notes 16, p.50, 1.2.,
p.201.
5. Miskawayh, Tahdhib Al-Akhlaq, p.50.
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says, has some fallacious assumptions, e.g., Miskawayh's
assumption that the Negroes are somewhere between humans
and animals.
Subhl also criticizes the philosophy of Miskawayh as not
• •
being Islamic, i.e. it has little connection with Islam
in the sense that it does not belong to Islam in its
basic assumptions. It seems that Dr. Subhi here refers
to the Platonic divisions of the soul into three as
psycho-metaphysical basis for the ethics of Miskawayh.
Thus Subhi considers the Greek elements as not represent-
« •
ative of Islamic spirit.
However, Miskawayh does introduce the principles of
Islamic Law (i.e. revelation) at various stages of his
philosophy.
8. Arkoun, Muhammad
Arkoun wrote a book on Miskawayh as a philosopher and
a historian with regard to the contribution of Miskawayh
to Arab humanism; the book is entitled:
/
Contribution a lfEtude de 1'Humanisme Arabe
au IVe/Xe Siecle:
Miskawayh (320/325-421) = (932/936-1030)
Philosophe et Historien
The approach is similar to the encyclopaedic style of
Dr. cIzzat's Miskawayh: falsafatuhu al-akhlaqiyya wa
masadiruha,1 but it is much concerned with the human
attitude underlying different aspects in the philosophy
C
1. Izzat, F.A.M., Passim.
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and history of Miskawayh. Arkoun exposes the encyclopae¬
dic education of Miskawayh and shows how it encompasses
different sciences and disciplines, ranging from adab,
philosophy and history to science and medicine.1 He
deals with the chronological order of the philosophical
works of Miskawayh,2 and the socio-political factors
which influenced the development of his philosophy.
Arkoun tackles Miskawayh as a sage, philosopher and a
historian. As regards Miskawayh's philosophical attit¬
ude, Arkoun deals with the literal consciousness which
helps in the making of Miskawayh's personality, as well
as the scientific curiosity which plays a role in the
shaping of his ideas. The book, however, could have a
different title if the writer deals with the author
(Miskawayh) as a Muslim thinker, because Miskawayh was
a Persian and not an Arab, to label his works under Arab
humanism would deal a blow to his social Islamic
thought.
9. Majid Fakhry
Fakhry classifies Miskawayh among writers like al-
Tawhidl and al-Sijistani and ascribes a psychological
dimension to Miskawayh's philosophy, namely the divis¬
ions of the soul and how they affect the super-structure
of Miskawayh's philosophy.3 Furthermore, Fakhry focuses
on Tahdhib al-Akhlaq as one of the few systematic ethic-
1. Arkoun, Miskawayh, Philosophe et Historien, pp.207-23.
2. Ibid,, pp.107-20.
3. Fakhry, Majid, A History of Islamic Philosophy, p.210.
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al treaties, with a mention every now and then of al-
Hawamil wa-al-Shawamil and Al- Fawz al-Asghar, forgetting
about important minor works like, The Book of Happiness,
A Treatise on Justice, two other treatises: one on Pains
and Pleasures and the other on Soul and Mind. We cannot
piece his philosophy together unless we compile these
fragmental information from the above different treat¬
ises for the sake of scholarly clarification. 1
Fakhry mentions the teleological end of moral values and
how they are linked with the perfection of man; he says,
In the light of this teleological account of
good and evil, it can be shown that to the
extent that man is able to live up to the per¬
cepts of his nature, as a rational animal,
,he would be assured of happiness both in this
life and the next.2
This is congruent with the teleological attitude which
characterizes utilitarian ethics. I take this as a clue
to the utilitarian tendency in the philosophy of Miska-
wayh. Fakhry also asserts the social element in Miska-
wayh■s philosophy which distinguishes man from animal
and refers to Aristotle's influence, i.e. the social ele¬
ment to him which distinguishes man (non-social) as
either a beast or a God.3
1. Fakhry, op. cit., pp.210-211.
2. Ibid., p.212.
3. Ibid., pp.212-214. C.f. Aristotle, Politics I, 1253329.
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10. Dr. cAyyish, cUthman Abd Al-Muncim
c — c
Dr. Ayyish wrote a book on Falsafat al-Akhlaq ind Ibn
Miskawayh. About five chapters of the book are devoted
to exposition and commentaries of Miskawayh's philos¬
ophy and the sixth and final chapter of the thesis deals
with a critical summary of Miskawayh's philosophy. In
this conclusive chapter, he sorted out the main features
of Miskawayh's philosophy. He summarized them in the
following points:-
(a) The essence of man or the 'know thyself starting
point'.
This has been referred to in the philosophy of Miskawayh
as the study of the soul and its faculties. The right
question to be asked about actions is whether or not
they conform to the perfection of man, i.e. whether they
belong to the rational human faculty of the soul or the
animal faculty of the soul.1
When every creature animate or sentient knows the sort
of perfection which pertains to its nature, he would try
to bring it about. If he does the action accordingly
then he would have accomplished the task which has been
assigned to his nature and, consequently, he will get
the happiness which ensues therefrom. Thus happiness de¬
pends on human nature. The kind of happiness which one
attains pertains to the kind of perfection which one
1. CAyyish, Falsafat al-Akhlaq °irid Ibn Miskawayh, pp, 121f.
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aspires for. This conforms to the proposal of this thes¬
is to prove that this process of selecting the kinds of
perfection to suit which kind of happiness and working
accordingly, is a utilitarian tendency in the philosophy
of Miskawayh. Man could obtain the highest degree of
happiness because he is at the top of the hierarchy of
creation, the best of creatures, a prefer ence which is
bestowed on him for his mental qualities and rational
power.1
(b) The social nature of man, that man cannot live on
on his own without a social life that satisfies his
basic human needs. This is also an essential element
of human nature.2
(c) The Criterion of Morality.
The measure of human actions, i.e. their Tightness or
wrongness, is their conformity to the rational and spir¬
itual qualities of man.
Q
Dr. Ayyish also asserts the effect of ethics in safe¬
guarding the social utility of the community.3
Dr. cAyyish also comes to some results, what he calls The
General Aims. These can be summed up in the following:-
c




(i) The attainment of the quality that pertains to the
substance of man.
(ii) The attainment of transcendental happiness through
theoretical and practical wisdom.1
What is Special About Miskawayh's Philosophy?
a. It is characterized by a rational attitude, i.e. the
study of human nature to determine the actions which
pertain to the perfection of man.
b. It is a moderate philosophy, not materialistic and not
idealistic and the aim is the acquirement of virtue.
c. It is cognitive philosophy, i.e. it depends on the
perceiving and knowing of all virtues so that one can
apply them accordingly.
d. It is an elitist philosophy, only few people can
choose to live by it and abide by its high demanding
knowledge.
Here Dr. cAyyish forgets to mention that Miskawayh also
encourages the teaching of Islamic Law to young people
so that they can be brought up to bear the responsibil-
C
1. Ayyish, op. cit., pp.125-126.
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ity of social life.
The trend then in his philosophy, although directed to
self-betterment, AS yet the generally idea is to build a
model of a perfect man.1
e. It is also a social philosophy calling for a full-
fledged social life and shunning the life of isolat¬
ion and desolation.
h. Morality and Religion.
The role of religion is secondary, in that it does
proxAcAjL-
not lay the basic assumptions of his system of moral¬
ity. But most of the secondary customs and traditions
are used to build up an overall rational system.
The Sources of the Philosophy are obviously Greek, but
C 2
Dr. Ayyish does not go into details.
As a final word, cAyyish thinks that the Greek element
in Miskawayh's philosophy should not delete the excell¬
ent qualities of his philosophy, nor his position as a
philosopher.3
c





Khan edited and published A Treatise on Justice by Miska-
wayh; he also wrote a book on the contemporary history
of Miskawayh. What is relevant to the subject matter of
this thesis is Khan's conclusion that Miskawayh1s writ¬
ing on history was directed towards a utilitarian aim.
Khan substantiates this claim by the fact that Miskawayh
wrote history with an open eye on the practical ends of
his writings, i.e. he tackles the use of writing history
ai
for a practic® purpose, helped by the fact that he was
in close contact with politics and politicians. He says,
Miskawayh wrote _history with a utilitarian
aim, but al-Tabari had no such purpose.1
What would worry any attentative reader about Khan's
statement is that it is not well enough supported to
stand for a conclusive evidence and is too general to
be accepted as conclusive and final.2
Another example of Khan's generalization about Miska¬
wayh 's philosophy is this,
From his four _available philosophical _works
Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, al-Fawz al-Agghar, Jawidan
Khird, and al-Hawami 1 wa -al -Shawami 1, it is
evident that he was interested in philosophy
and had read many books on this subject.3




Nobody is really interested in the number of books Misk-
awayh read on Philosophy as much as they are interested
in his actual philosophy and the influence of other phil¬
osophies on his own, and this is what Khan does not tell
us about.
Yet Khan seems to have realized that he needs some de¬
tails for his generalization and this time he supplies
this evidence for the utilitarian aim of history. He
says,
Miskawayh suggests that the instruction re¬
ceived from history will be more practical
than moral. He thinks that the relation be¬
tween history and morals is inevitable and
is also reciprocal. In his view, history is
a practical discipline, and its purpose is
purely utilitarian. Abstract ideas lie beyond
his view of history. He does not deal with
theological matters, nor with wisdom (hikmah)
nor with knowledge ( ilm) in the technical
sense of these words.1
It is obvious here that the term 'utilitarian' is used
for some kind of legislative changes, i.e. something to
do with the geo-political structure of society. If this
is what Khan means, then this is a major argument be¬
tween the subject matter of this thesis and what Khan
unravels about this utilitarian tendency in Miskawayh's
thought. Khan also hinted that there is a strong link
between history - politics - ethics. Khan rightly con¬
cludes that Miskawayh was influenced in his writing of
history by his moral philosophy. He cites the example
1. Khan, op. cit., p.22.
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c — —
that Miskawayh focuses on (al-a mal as-saliha) good
deeds as the sinews of history.1
The Approach Followed in This Thesis
Although this thesis is not concerned with the sources
of Miskawayh's ethical philosophy, some note must be
taken of the more influential features of earlier works.
The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle furnish the back¬
ground on which Miskawayh has written his moral philos¬
ophy. Miskawayh borrows from Plato, through Galen and
the Neo-Platonists, the main Platonic dictum that,
'Virtue is knowledge' and 'Virtue is teachable'.2 He
thence devotes his philosophy to the teachability of
virtue and lays special emphasis on the educational as¬
pect of morality. To the Platonic tradition also belongs
his transcendental conception of happiness, conceived
as pleasure qua pleasure and as a human end detached
from pleasure. The ultimate end, according to him,
should conform to the divine model of happiness. As to
Aristotle, one can understand how much Miskawayh owes
to him, if one knows how extensively and frequently he
quotes Aristotle, in his T.A., F.A. and K.S..3 Miskawayh
is indebted to Aristotle in most of what he has written
1. Khan, op. cit., p.24.
2. Plato, Memo, 87°^
3. (1) T.A. = Tahdhib Al-Akhlaq, Refinement of Character.
(2) F.A. = Al-Fawz Al-Asghar, Shorter Theology.
— c—
(3) K.S. = Kitab Al-Sa ada , 8ook of Happiness.
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about moral philosophy or moral ideas, e.g. he quotes
from Aristotle his concept of perfection, i.e. the
function of man is for man to practise his perfection,
which pertains to his human nature. He also quotes from
Aristotle the idea of the 'good', material goods and
goods as ultimate ends. This is linked with the develop¬
ment of the idea later to a complete concept of happi¬
ness, material as well as ultimate happiness. He also
borrows from Aristotle the divisions of pleasures into
human and animal,1 and this seems to be the copy on
which Miskawayh depends in his exploration of philos¬
ophical ethics.2
Miskawayh, however, adds his own Islamic contribution
to that of his Greek sources, such as the relevance of
Islamic Law to the question of morality, the problem of
happiness and its relation to Islamic justice. The main
fascination of Miskawayh in his writings about morality
remains the same, i.e., reason as a faculty of human
understanding, or human nature as a denominator to all
human beings. It is from reason or the rational aspect
of Aristotle's philosophy that he is able to draw the
conclusion that human behaviour can be improved by educ¬
ation, i.e. moral training.
My argument is that the moral philosophy of Miskawayh
is invested with a utilitarian tendency, which can be
picked out in his work. This is also true of the Plat-
Q Q C — —•
1. Izzat, Abd al- Aziz, Ibn Miskawayh, Falsafatuhu al-Akhlaqyyia wa-Nasadiruha,
8k.II, sources of Miskawayh moral philosophy, op. cit., p.362, 368, 372, 381, 382,
383. This section of Izzat's book is invaluable as a source book for the Greek
influence on the moral philosophy of Miskawayh. Miskawayh mentions in his T.A.
Aristotle's Nicoraachean Ethics and that it has been translated into Arabic by Abu
c —
Uthman al-Dimashqi.
2. Miskawayh, T.A., translated by Zurayk, C.K., p.81.
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onic and Aristotlelian rational thinking which permeates
the philosophy of Miskawayh.
Reference, then, can easily be made to the relation be¬
tween the rational philosophy of Miskawayh and the main
themes in utilitarianism, namely, the principle of util¬
ity as a mode of moral reasoning; the concept of happi¬
ness and its implications for the individual and for
society; pleasures and pains as motivations and inhib¬
itions for actions.
I choose three representative of classical utilitarian¬
ism, namely Paley, Hume and Mill. Paley represents the
religious utilitarian tendency in the moral thinking of
18 th century England; Hume is known as the father of
classical utilitarianism, because he is a pioneer in
using the utility principle as a mode of moral reason¬
ing, i.e. a kind of justification for morality. Mill is
the brilliant philosopher who gives flesh and bones to
classical utilitarianism; he introduces the Greatest
Happiness principle, which incorporates the promotion
of the happiness of all, even at the expense of sacrific¬
ing one's own happiness, as an end of human action. This
being an implementation of the principle of utility.
Three utilitarian tendencies, i.e., a) human nature as
a justification for moral reasoning (Hume); b) religious
utilitarianism, which refers the good of all and the
happiness of mankind to the Greatest Utilitarian, God
(Paley); c) Rational Benevolence as an end of the Great¬
est Happiness principle (universal hedonism) (Mill)
they all have their replicas in the moral philosophy of
Miskawayh.
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The method followed in the presentation of the thesis
is as follows:
The thesis is divided into two main sections, each sect¬
ion contains three chapters. The first section is a
critical exposition of the philosophies of Paley, Hume
and Mill. The exposition is aimed at the elucidation of
the issues of the comparison. The second section is a
projection of the utilitarian tendency in the moral phil¬
osophy of Miskawayh in comparison with the philosophies
of Paley, Hume and Mill.
The end and aim of the research is to probe into a new
scope of the moral philosophy of Miskawayh. It is hoped
that the research will widen the approach to Islamic
moral philosophy, so as to enhance its role in the gen¬
eral enrichment of human practical thought. Philosophy
is seen as a dynamic device for the achievement of socio-
ethical change in a human society. Philosophy as such
is considered as a living experience rather than a
historical piece of knowledge.
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SECTION I
EXPOSITION OF UTILITARIANISM IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF




IS HIS UTILITY AN APPEAL TO REASON OR SENTIMENT?
In his Enquiry, Hume starts the chapter on 'Why Utility
Pleases' thus:
It seems so natural a thought to ascribe to
their utility the praise, which we bestow on
the social virtues, that one would expect to
meet with this principle everywhere in moral
writers, as the chief foundation of their
reasoning and enquiry.1
This seems to be an indication that Hume will be using
the principle of utility as a mode of moral reasoning.
In common life, we use utility and appeal to the prin¬
ciple of utility as a criterion of accepted social vir¬
tue, i.e. we praise a man for his service to society and
his public usefulness in general. Praise for a person
can only be appreciated if he is fit for a purpose.
Hume also argues that even inanimate objects can be
praised if they fit a useful purpose. Disproportion or
deformity in the construction of any object will be dis¬
regarded if the object appears to fit a particular pur¬
pose.2 There is a hint here that aesthetical qualities
1. Hume, 0., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.46.
2. Ibid.
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are appreciated for their usefulness. In other words
Hume is saying that ethical and aesthetical qualities
are appreciated by an appeal to their usefulness. Al¬
though Hume does not explicitly rule out intrinsic ethic¬
al values or intrinsic aesthetical qualities, yet having
utility or usefulness as a criterion of ethical and
aesthetical qualities, implies that Hume does not ap¬
prove of intrinsic qualities as such.
Usefulness, then, is the sole moral and aesthetical
arbiter, i.e. a person cannot be intrinsically honest,
but he can be honest in reference to the purpose which
he is fit for, e.g. maybe he is fit for keeping promises
or not lying or because he is useful in keeping secrets
whether they are private or public.
Architectural beauty can be superseded by the principle
of utility; thus Hume says,
A building, whose doors and windows were ex¬
act squares, would hurt the eye by that very
proportion; as ill adapted to the figure of
a human creature, for whose service the
fabric was intended.1
Thus it seems that there is a compatibility between art
and function, i.e. purpose or utility in case of aesthet¬
ical qualities, as well as there being a compatibility
between human nature and usefulness in the case of ethic¬
al valuations.
1. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.46.
- 40 -
At the same time there is a kind of incompatibility be¬
tween art and function in the case of unuseful objects.
Unuseful objects, according to Hume, will communicate
aesthetically a feeling of disproportion and disharmony
to the person concerned. The same is true of human nat¬
ure ethically, so to speak. This is why people who are
hurtful to society are useless and they should be sub¬
jected to disapprobation, i.e. moral disapproval because
they communicate feelings and sentiments of disgust to
their fellow human beings.1 Hume's endeavour is to prove
that utility can be derived from human nature; he
writes,
But it is not just reason for rejecting any
principle, confirmed by experience, that we
cannot give a satisfactory account of its
origin, nor are able to resolve it into other
more general principles. And if we would em¬
ploy a little thought on the present subject,
we need be at no loss to account for the in¬
fluence of utility, and to deduce it from
principles, the most known and avowed in
human nature.2
As to how he is going to resolve the issue, he eluci¬
dates as follows:-
For granting that morality had no foundation
in nature, it must still be allowed, that
vice and virtue, either from self-interest
or the prejudices of education, produce in
us a real pain and pleasure; and this we may
observe to be strenuously asserted by the
defenders of that hypothesis. Every passion,
1. Hume, D., An Equiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.47.
2. Ibid.
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habit, or turn of character (say they) which
has a tendency to our advantage or prejudice,
gives a delight or uneasiness; and 'tis from
thence the approbation or disapprobation
arises.1
The advantage, then, of the moral feeling and its dis¬
advantage to us produce either pleasure or pain. If the
feeling is related to our self-interest, for instance,
then it produces pleasure and consequently it gets our
approbation. The opposite is true of prejudices, they
produce pain and consequently get our disapprobation.
This at the outset seems to prove that moral feeling is
derived from education. Hume, however, produces another
argument to refute this view; he says:
From the apparent usefulness of the social
virtues, it has readily been inferred by scep¬
tics, both ancient and modern, that all moral
distinctions arise from education, and were,
at first, invented, and afterwards encour¬
aged, by the art of politicians, in order to
render men tractable, and subdue their nat¬
ural ferocity and selfishness, which incapac¬
itated them for society.2
However, Hume says that this is not the case because,
Had nature made no such distinction, founded
on the original constitution of the mind, the
words, honourable and shameful, lovely and
1. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, p.295.
2. Hume, 0., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.48.
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odious; noble and despicable, had never had
place in any language; nor could politicians,
had they invented these terms, ever have been
able to render them intelligible, or make
them convey any idea to the audience.1
As to how moral distinctions can appeal to the mind
directly, Hume in answer to this says,
The social virtues must, therefore, be allow¬
ed to have a natural beauty and amiableness,
which, at first, antecedent to all percept
or education, recommends them to the esteem
of uninstructed mankind, and engages their
affections. And as the public utility of
these virtues is the chief circumstance,
whence they derive their merit, it follows,
that the end, which they have a tendency to
promote, must be some way agreeable to us,
and take hold of some affection. It must
please, either from considerations of self-
interest, or from more generous motives and
regards.2
Hume is alluding here to utility as a first principle,
a principle which is antecedent to all percept or educ¬
ation, i.e. a self-evident principle. By stating the
principle of utility, Hume lays down the foundation of
utilitarian philosophy which will be pursued by his
successors.3 Hume was aspiring to establish a scientific
experimental method in moral reasoning. His aim was "to
state the principles of morality in such a way as to
bring it entirely into the domain of science".4 This
1. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.48.
2. Ibid., pp.48-49.
3. Plamenatz, J., The English Utilitarians, p.22.
4. Stephen, L., History of English Thought in the 18th Century, p.87.
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quest for the precise and the definite in moral reason¬
ing has been expressed by Hume as follows:-
Now as perceptions resolve themselves into
two kinds, viz. impressions and ideas, this
distinction gives rise to a question, with
which we shall open up our present enquiry
concerning morals, whether 'tis by means of
our ideas or impressions we distinguish be¬
twixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an act¬
ion blameable or praise-worthy? This will
immediately cut off all loose discourses and
declamations, and reduce us to something
precise and exact on the present subject.1
Hume, in trying to find a way out of this predicament,
produces a lengthy argument to the effect that if all
systems agree that morality is discerned by ideas and
by their similarities and comparisons, then one here
needs to see if reason alone is the criterion of moral
good and evil.2
Hume adds that if morality is the practical aspect of
philosophy and if it is supposed to affect our passions
and actions then moral feelings cannot be derived from
reason; he explains his viewpoint as follows,
Morals excite passions, and produce or prev¬
ent actions. Reason of itself is utterly
impotent in this particular. The rules of
morality, therefore, are not conclusions of
our reason.3




Thus, in his endeavour to build a system of ethics, he
sacrifices reason or at least loses sight of reason in
most cases, e.g. at one time we are told that reason and
passion are not incompatible, yet again we are told that
only sentiments and passions count in this system of
ethics. So the endeavour to enact a science of ethics
boils down to a subjective system of ethics.
His quest for a method appears in statements like,
Men are now cured of their passion for hypo¬
theses and systems in natural philosophy and
will hearken to no arguments but those
which are derived from experience. It is full
time they should attempt a like reformation
in all moral disquisitions, and reject every
system of ethics, however subtle or ingenious
which is not founded on facts and observat¬
ions . 1
Yet the facts and observations he mentions are nothing
more than sentiments and passions, i.e. different states
of human nature. Usefulness of actions (utility of act¬
ions) is not an invention of politicians, nor is it some¬
thing that we acquire by education, but is rather an
appeal to our natural affection, i.e. the faculty that
determines whether the consequence of the action is
agreeable or not agreeable to us.2
Moral values like honourable, shameful, lovely and
odious are implanted in our minds by nature. It is their
1. Hurae, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 7.
2. Ibid., pp.48-49.
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public utility which commends them to us. Our actions
should be directed towards justice and the welfare of
humanity. According to this logic, Hume should not have
considered self-love as the origin of the principle of
utility. In clarification of this point he argues that
sentiments of self-love and interest in public utility
can be understood from the unity of the principle, in
that close union of interest, which is so observable be¬
tween the public and each individual.1
If this were the case, public interest should not have
been connected with self-denial. To base the feeling for
public interest on self-love is to drift towards egois¬
tic rather than altruistic attitude in morality, because
of the apparent incompatibility of the two feelings.
This is why public interest is related to self-denial
rather than to self-love. Hume, however, asserts posit¬
ively that we do not refer to our interests when consid¬
ering a character in general, which may also refer to
public interest, in contradiction to his first position.
He argues,
The good qualities of an enemy are hurtful
to us, but may still command our esteem and
respect. • Tis only when a character is consid¬
ered in general, without reference to our
particular interest, that it causes such a
feeling or sentiment as denominates it mor¬
ally good or evil.2
1. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.53.
2. Hume, D., Treatise on Human Nature, III, 1.1, p.472.
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Hume here is addressing qualities of others which cause,
i.e. excite, good or bad moral feelings; one is forced
to say 'moral feeling' because this seems to be what is
meant by Hume's words... 'a feeling or sentiment as de¬
nominates it good or evil'. He does not seem to refer
to moral qualities as intrinsically good or bad, but
only their utilities enhance our approbation or dis¬
approbation, but this time, approbation or disapprobat¬
ion has nothing to do with self-interest. Qualities of
an enemy if excited by self-love, would only yield
hatred whatever they may be. It has nothing either to
do with unity of the principle, i.e. union of interest
as an enemy's interests are contrary to ours. If these
qualities are not intrinsic in the person concerned, and
if they are not excited by self-interest then the only
option open for Hume, here, is to appeal to the rational
nature of the principle of utility. The sequence of
Hume's arguments seem to be leading towards that direct¬
ion. At some juncture he argues that,
This deduction of morals from self-love, or
a regard to private interest, is an obvious
thought, and has not arisen wholly from the
wanton sallies and sportive assaults of the
sceptics.1
This is a reference to utility as a first principle and
a self-evident one (obvious thought) but it is geared
to self-love and closely tied with the moral sense
theory, i.e. the moral feeling is instinctive or natural
since self-love is natural.
1. Hume, D., An Equiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.49.
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Hume, however, at another juncture introduces utility
as an open principle, i.e. not derived from self-love
as such; he writes,
Usefulness is agreeable, and engages our
approbation. This is a matter of fact, con¬
firmed by daily observation. But, useful? For
what? For somebody's interest surely. Whose
interest then? Not our own only. For our
approbation frequently extends farther. It
must, therefore, be the interest of those,
who are served by the character or action
approved of; and there we may conclude, how¬
ever remote, are not totally indifferent to
us. By opening up this principle, we shall
discover one great source of moral distinc¬
tions . 1
This is a step forward and a move towards an inclusive
principle which caters for our own interests as well as
those of others. But, is Hume, now, free from the attrac¬
tions of self-love?
His answer is that,
self-love is a principle in human nature of
such extensive energy, and the interest of
each individual is, in general, so closely
connected with that of the community, that
those philosophers were excusable, who fan¬
cied that all our concern for the public
might be resolved into a concern for our own
happiness and preservation.2
1. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.52.
2. Ibid., p.53.
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The link between self-love and public interest (interest
of the community) is less obvious in cases when help and
support is wanted by the community and not needed by
the individual, i.e. there is no personal interest in¬
volved and one is not hankering after selfish needs and
desires. In such cases, the link is not viable. Accord¬
ing to Hume, however, the link is obvious, instinctive,
or it pertains to moral sense and hence it leads him to
conclude that the harmony of self-love and public inter¬
est leads to the unity of the principle which is the
union of interest. Nevertheless, Hume does not rule out
cases where the link is missing between self-love and
public interest, which shows his quest for a scientific
morality. He says,
But notwithstanding this frequent confusion
of interests, it is easy to attain what nat¬
ural philosophers, after Lord Bacon, have
affected to call the experimentum crucis, or
that experiment which points out the right
way in any doubt or ambiguity. We have found
instances, in which private interest was sep¬
arate from public; in which it was even con¬
trary: And yet we observed the moral senti¬
ment to continue: notwithstanding this dis¬
junction of interests.1
Yet, Hume still insists that self-love is the origin of
moral approbation and disapprobation and what we have
to do in such cases,
We must adopt a more public affection, and
allow, that the interests of society are not,
even on their own account, entirely indiffer¬
ent to us.2
1. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.53.
2. Ibid., p.54.
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From hence we have to promote the happiness of society
at large. This is a good justification on its own merit,
but it may not be a good justification for a utilitarian
theory.
Because in a utilitarian system, Rational Benevolence
is basic to the working out of the system. Hume still
has a claim to be a utilitarian; he argues,
If usefulness, therefore, be a source of
moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be
not always considered with reference to self;
it follows, that everything, which contrib¬
utes to the happiness of society, recommends
itself directly to our approbation and good
will. 1
And for Hume this is the principle to be counted,
there is a principle, which accounts, in
great part, for the origin of morality: And
what need we seek for abstruse and remote
systems, when there occurs one so obvious and
natural?2
There is also a glimpse of reason in Hume's argument for
public interest or happiness of society at large. Here
we are reminded that the force of humanity in us is so
strong and so obvious. Hume, instead of making a refer¬
ence to reason, articulately refers to primordial human
1. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.54.
2. Ibid.
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nature as a source of morality. He writes,
Have we any difficulty to comprehend the
force of humanity and benevolence? Or to con¬
ceive, that the very aspect of happiness,
joy, prosperity, gives pleasure; that of
pain, suffering, sorrow, communicates un¬
easiness? 1
Hume, by referring to human nature and the humanity of
man, is hammering on the very rational aspect of utility
which he attributes to sentiments and affections.
Thus he says,
It is needless to push our researches so far
as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-
feeling with others.2
To Hume, we do not have to bother about reason in such
cases, because:
It is sufficient, that this is experienced
to be a principle in human nature.3
If we ask, what then is experience? Isn't reason part
of experience and isn't experience an aspect of moral




reasoning? Hume would positively answer,
The human countenance, says Horace, borrows
smiles or tears from the human countenance.
Indeed it does, and we come to know this from exper¬
ience. And Hume rightly supplies this example,
And if the effects of misery touch us in so
timely a manner; can we be supposed alto¬
gether insensible or indifferent towards its
courses; when a malicious or treacherous char¬
acter and behaviour are presented to us?
It is a difficult option -for Hume to bridge the gap be¬
tween our own miseries and sufferings and those of
others in the human community by an appeal to reason.
But it is by reason that we come to know that man should
not be humiliated or exploited by man. The difficulty
in Hume's position is that his unity of principle will
fail to cater for the feelings of oppressors and aggres¬
sors unless he is prepared to argue that they are irrat¬
ional or lose reason when they commit acts of aggression
and suppresion, which will reduce the whole system to
\
the idea of reason. This problem, however, cannot be con¬
sidered apart from Hume's theory of knowledge. To Hume,
the question of causation or reason boils down to the
association of ideas and ideas are more or less a com¬
bination of human sentiments and passions. It is a cir¬
cular process.
A serious objection to this group feeling as it has been
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raised by Sidgwick, is that,
if the essence of "moral taste" is sympathy
with the pleasures of others, why is not this
specific feeling excited by other things be¬
sides virtue that tend to cause such pleas¬
ure . 1
Sidgwick quotes Hume's answer to this question that,
there are a numerous set of passions and sen¬
timents, of which thinking beings are by the
original constitution of their nature the
only proper objects.2
However, Sidgwick retorts that the idea of usefulness
is vague and the quality of sentiments needs explanat¬
ion .
Obviously Sidgwick, here, is making an appeal to reason
for such explanation. But reason, according to Hume, is
a slave of passion. Indeed, reason and passion are not
incompatible. Yet, Hume as a utilitarian cannot escape
the grip of reason.
Hume's utilitarianism is considered by Lyons as a kind
of rule-utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism according
to Lyons,
1. Sidgwick, H., Outlines of the History of Ethics, p.212.
2. Ibid. C.f. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Footnotes
(1), P.".
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is the kind of theory according to which the
rightness or wrongness of action can and must
be determined by reference to a set of rules
having some utilitarian defence, justificat¬
ion or deviation.1
To test whether the utility of the tendency of the rule
produces good or bad consequences, we apply the general¬
ization test which can be formulated as,
What would happen if everyone applies the
rule (observed rule R)2
in case of a set of rules, assessment can be made by
this test,
What would happen if everyone observed Rl...
R2... Rn...?3
The appeal here is to our reason and to moral rules and
principles. Hume uses reason in referring to generaliz¬
ation of the utility of tendencies of actions and that
they should bring happiness to the society as a con¬
sequence of their performance. As to what reason means
in his moral philosophy, he explains,




Morals excite passions and produce or prevent
actions. Reason of itself is impotent in this
particular. The rules of morality, therefore,
are not conclusions of our reason.1
What are they then? Hume's answer is,
Reason can have an influence on our conduct
only after two ways: Either when it excites
a passion by informing us of the existence
of something which is a proper object of it
or when it discovers the connection of causes
and effects, so as to afford us the means of
exciting any passion.2
Hume claims that morality has nothing to do with matters
of fact. He expounds this idea, saying that,
Take any action allow it to be vicious: wil¬
ful murder, for instance, examine it in all
lights and see if you find that matter of
fact, or real existence, which you call vice.
In whichever way you take it, you find only
certain passions, motives, volitions and
thoughts. There is no matter of fact in the
case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long
as you consider the object. You never find
it, till you turn your reflection into your
own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprob¬
ation, which arises in you, towards this act¬
ion. Here is a matter of fact; but it is the
object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in
yourself not in the object.3
1. Plamenatz, J., The English Utilitarians, p.24. C.f. Hume, D., Treatise on Human
Nature, p.549. See Tr. Bk.III Pt.I, sec.I, p.457.
2. Ibid.
3. Hume, 0., A Treatise on Human Nature, Bk.III, Pt.I, sec.I (Selby—Bigge edition),
pp.468-469.
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Hume wants to give moral feelings, e.g. vice, virtue,
the same status as sounds and colours, which are said
to be mere perceptions of the mind. By doing so Hume is
hoping to establish a scientific system of ethics based
on scientific observations. These observations according
to Hume's account represent different states of the mind
but they never refer to matters of fact. He says,
Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared
to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which ac¬
cording to modern philosophy, are not qualit¬
ies in objects, but perceptions in the mind.1
Judging Hume by the modern philosophy terms which he
chooses, the kind of science which can be established
by these observations is not a science of ethics proper,
since, according to him, ethics does not depend on mat¬
ters of fact, but it can be moral psychology, in so far
as moral feelings can be reduced to states of mind.
It has been said that the connection between factual and
conceptual issues is much closer in the physical sci¬
ences.2 But it is much more close in the humanities than
in other sciences. Because the subject of human studies
is man, there can be no distance between the subject and
the object. Does the closeness of the factual and the
conceptual conceal the factual from Hume's scientific
observations, that he could see only subjective states
of the mind?
1. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, 8k.Ill, Pt.I, sect.I, Selby-Bigge edition,
p.469.
2. Mischel, T., Human Action, Conceptual and Empirical Issues, p.2.
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The objection which can be raised against the reduction
of vice and virtue into mere states of mind without any
roots in reality and factual existence is that Hume's
view is far too subjective and that he prefers to dis¬
miss any link between moral qualities and the world of
facts. A.J. Ayer seems to have been echoing Hume in re¬
ducing moral statements to psychological statements. The
way he looks at the problem is as follows,
The supposed ethical problems are either mean¬
ingless or they belong to psychology and soc¬
iology. 1
Ayer in his emotive theory holds the view that a value
judgement merely expresses, not asserts, a given feel¬
ing. The expression of a feeling is neither true nor
false like a burst of laughter or a scream of terror is
not true or false.2 The difference between Hume and
Ayer is that Ayer is refusing to assign reason any place
in this kind of judgement whatsoever, whereas Hume
thinks that reason excites this feeling.3 Nevertheless
reason does not show Hume that there is a link between
this moral feeling and a moral object which causes the
feeling. It seems that both Hume and Ayer are echoing
the Shakespearean verse in Hamlet:
There is nothing either good or bad, but
thinking makes it so.*
1. Risieri, Frondizi, What is Value, p.71.
2. Ibid., p.68.
3. Hume, D., A Treatise on Human Nature, Bk.III, Pt.I, sect.I, Selby-Bigge edition,
p.459.
4. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Act II, Collected Works of William (Cont1d)
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Strangely enough, the empirical philosophy of Hume and
the positivist philosophy of Ayer both have room for
romantic morality. To be more precise, it is romantic
in the sense that it is subjective and neither philoso¬
phers would not deny the fact that their views on moral¬
ity are subjective, although they would decline to des¬
cribe their philosophies as subjective. As a matter of
fact Ayer admits the truth of Moore's refutation of the
subjectivists, which says that,
if ethical statements were simply statements
about the speaker's feelings, it would be im¬
possible to argue about questions of value.1
As an example, Moore elucidates that if two men were to
argue about thrift, one saying that it is vice, while
the other says that it is virtue, both of them could be
right in their judgement since there is no reason why
both these statements should not be true.2
Cont'd:.. Shakespeare, p.956.
Hamlet: "Denmark's a prison."
Rosencrantz: "Then is the world one."
Ham: "A goodly one; in which there are many confines, wards, and dungeons. Denmark
being one o' the worst."
Ros: "We think not so my lord."
Ham: "Why then, 'tis none to you; for there is nothing either good or bad, but think¬
ing makes it so: to me it is a prison."
Ros: "Why, then, your ambition makes it one: 'tis too narrow for your mind."
Ham: "0 God. I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself a king of infinite
space, were it not that I have bad dreams."
1. Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic, pp.145—146.
2. Ibid., p.146.
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Ayer, however, adds that Moore's refutation of the sub-
jectivists, refutes his own subjective theory, but never¬
theless maintains that his theory holds because he
thinks that questions of value are subjective by definit¬
ion.1 The way Hume would go round the problem is to
resort to the notion of approbation and disapprobation,
which should conform to the principle of utility, i.e.
the usefulness of the moral action, (object or subject),
so that moral judgements can accordingly be accepted or
rejected. Hume explicates as follows,
It has been observed, that reason, in a
strict and philosophical sense, can have an
influence on our conduct only after two ways:
Either when it excites a passion by informing
us of the existence of something which is a
proper object of it; or when it discovers the
connexion of causes and effects, so as to
afford us means of exerting any passion.2
This is obviously not in agreement with Ayer's subject-
ivist view-point. -Although Hume would say that reason
here is just serving passions. Hume opts for moral qual¬
ities based on sentiments and passions and denies in¬
trinsic qualities in moral agents such as a person being
good in himself without being fit or useful for a pur¬
pose :
A person may be affected with passion, by
supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an ob¬
ject, which has no tendency to produce either
of these sensations, or which produces the
contrary to what is imagined. A person may
1. Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth ana Logic, p.146.
2. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge edition, p.459.
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also take false measures for the attaining
of his end, and may retard, by his foolish
conduct, instead of forwarding the execution
of any project.1
There is room then for false and true judgements, depend¬
ing on the tendency of moral objects to produce expected
pleasures, and to fulfil the priorities of executing the
project. This implicit reason would be a credit in
favour of Hume's point of view as well as a refutation
of Ayer's emotive theory. Jan Narveson, in his book
Morality and Utility, speaks for the justifiability of
moral judgements; he says,
The view that we are prevented, logically and
therefore forever, from really solving ethic¬
al problems seems incomprehensible, espec¬
ially since people sometimes do solve them.
The view that they cannot be said to be true
or false is at best obscure, especially since
people talk as if they were true or false.
And the view that people cannot literally con¬
tradict each other on ethical questions is
simply incredible. Even if there were no cur¬
rently available theories to suggest a plaus¬
ible way of combining the undoubted truth
that ethical statements are not essentially
factual with the doubted truth that they are
nevertheless subject to rational investigat¬
ion, we could not remain satisfied with the
curious view that they are not open to such
investigation, which could mean that there
is no point in thinking about ethical ques¬
tions at all.2
This criticism is directed to the emotive theory which
1. Hume, D., A Treatise on Human Nature, p.459.
2. Narveson, Jan, Morality and Utility, p.7.
- 60 -
the writer rightly calls 'armchair investigations'.1 The
holder of the emotive theory is a logical positivist,
and he stands firmly by his armchair investigations.
This attitude has been exposed more clearly by K. Popper
in his criticism of the positivists,
The positivists dislike that there should be
meaningful problems outside the field of 'pos¬
itive' empirical science - problems to be
dealt with by a genuine philosophical theory.
He dislikes the idea that there should be a
genuine theory of knowledge, an epistemology
or a methodology. He wishes to see the all¬
eged philosophical problems as mere 'pseudo-
problems' or 'puzzles'. He does not express
his wish as a proposal but as a statement of
fac t.2
The position then of the positivist as far as ethical
judgements are concerned, is more or less a wish to rule
out ethical problems as philosophical problems and to
shift them to the field of psychology and sociology.
Ayer, for example, holds that ethical predicates are not
factual and that they do not represent any feature of
the situation to which they are applied.3 As to the ques¬
tion of right and wrong, Ayer thinks that to say that
somebody acted rightly or wrongly is not to say anything
about what he did. And if you relate what a man did, to
add that he was justified or unjustified is to add noth¬
ing to the story.4 The logical conclusion which Ayer
1. Narveson, J., op. cit., p.7.
2. Popper, K., The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p.51.
3. Ayer, A.J., Philosophical Essays, pp.235-236.
A. Ibid., p.235.
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wants to draw is that to talk about moral judgements is
to talk about nothing. However, he says that all moral
theories are neutral as regards actual conduct.1 The ob¬
jection which can be raised against this argument is
that the mere fact that there are different moral theor¬
ies is a vindication of the fact there are different
moral conducts, or else why should people talk different¬
ly about people's behaviour?! Supposing that I come to
know that there are certain properties in murder which
makes me feel a certain passion of disgust and hatred
towards such actions, and supposing that whenever I come
across such actions as murder and genocide I have the
same feeling and passion, and supposing that I used the
word vice to refer to such actions as murder and geno¬
cide, am I not justified in ascribing the description
vice to these actions? If this is the case then the word
vice refers to an action which took place in the theatre
of life. If murder is just a passion then vice can be
just a passion. As to whether the word vice describes
the feeling or the action, we can say that it describes
a murder-feeling, in other words, the word vice denotes
a feeling towards murder, genocide, etc. and connotes
the same feeling towards the same action, i.e. the occur¬
rence of the feeling is inseparable from the occurrence
of the action. The word 'murder' does not excite the
feeling unless an actual murder takes place.
As to the question of the truth and falsity of the moral
feeling, i.e. whether it corresponds to the actual occur¬
rence of the action taking place or whether it does not,
maybe by 'murder is vicious' I refer to a certain murder
which took place in the past. To say that the function
1. Ayer, A.J., Philosophical Essays, p.246.
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of truth is performative rather than corresponding
to an object, is becoming a truism in modern philosophy.1
According to P.E. Strawson truth is
a property of symbols, for it is not a prop¬
erty.2
To say that: Murder is vicious is true,
or
Murder is vicious is false,
is not to say anything about the subject-matter of the
statement, it is just to add a further statement, i.e.
a statement about a sentence. The phrase 'is true' or
'is false' plays no part, it is just a performatory
existential meta-assertion, i.e. it says something about
a given sentence.3 This concept of truth asserts and con¬
firms a place for moral judgements in philosophy. The
necessity of correspondence between statements and ob¬
jects of thought no longer holds.
There is no reason why Hume should think that moral feel¬
ing lies in the self and not in the object, because ac¬
cording to the linguistic approach, "is true" is not a
predicate, any more than "is good" or "exists".* Yet if
we take murder away, there will not be any feeling of
1. Narveson, Jan, Morality and Utility, p.3.
2. Strawson, P.E., Truth, Analysis, Vol.9 (1948-1949), p.84.
3. Op. cit., pp.87-93.
4. Narveson, op. cit., p.4.
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vice as a murder-feeling. The moral feeling pertains to
the action since it is excited by a certain action, as
well as it pertains to the self, i.e. passions and senti¬
ments .
Some logical empiricists think that there is no quality
in the object or in the act, or even the person to whom
we attribute the quality of being good. We only express
or evince our own emotions. For example, they say that
there is no quality in the used stamp that makes it
worth our attention. It is the philatelist who gives it
a quality.1
As it is obvious, this argument is not representative
of moral qualities.
What is moral about the collection of stamps? It cannot
be said to be either good or bad. The justification re¬
mains absolutely subjective; only the philatelist can
explain his motive. Moral feelings, as Hume rightly
says, are excited by moral qualities of the object, act
or indeed a person. This is why the quality cannot be
evinced by us (those who make the moral judgement). If
the empiricist wants to express a disbelief in moral
qualities like Russell who says,
we call something 'good' when we desire it.2
1. Sidgwick, Henry, Methods of Ethics, p.86.
2. Russell, Bertrand, Outline of Philosophy, p.242.
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It could, however, be argued that we also say "X is a
good man", but we do not necessarily express a desire
towards him. It is just a moral statement.
Moral qualities have indeed been adequately described
by Aristotle as we have been told by Sidgwick,
Human wellbeing is essentially welldoing, ex¬
cellent activity of some kind, whether its
aim and end by abstract truth, or noble ob¬
jects of rational choice apart from pleasure
attending them; still all activities are at¬
tended and is a manner perfected by pleasure,
which is better and more desirable in propor¬
tion to the excellence of the activity.1
Here virtue which is the practical aspect of wisdom ac¬
cording to Aristotle is the object of rational choice.
In some sense we can say pleasure is aimed at here as
a tendency of the utility of the action. This is remin¬
iscent of Hume's approbation or disapprobation theory;
we have, however, to realize that there is a difference
in Aristotle's theory between bodily pleasure and in¬
trinsic pleasure, i.e. pleasure of contemplation, the
speculative aspect of phronesis (practical wisdom). Aris¬
totle says,
and every activity is completed by the atten-
dent pleasure.2
Since contemplation is an activity, it is accompanied
1. Sidgwick,, [J.^Outlines of the History of Ethics, p.55. C.f. Aristotle, N.E., Bk.l,
Ch.4, 10953 , p.349.
2. Aristotle, N.E., Bk.X, Ch.4, 1175* !, p.565.
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by pleasure.
Hume nevertheless does not see any link between subject¬
ive moral sentiments and factual observations, yet it
seems that the link does exist. Because, if we did not
see or know murder, we couldn't have coined the term
'vice', which is the corresponding moral word. In other
words, we owe our moral feelings and sentiments to induc¬
tive reasoning. In fact, Hume refers to the importance
of reason in morality, in his Enquiry, and he finds this
reason in the principle of utility; he says,
But it is no just reason for rejecting any
principle, confirmed by experience, that we
cannot give a satisfactory account of its
origin, nor are we able to resolve it into
other more general principles. And if we
would employ a little thought on the present
subject, we need be at no loss to account for .
the influence of utility, and to deduce it
from principles, the most known and avowed
in human nature.1
Utility according to this account is deducible from prin¬
ciples rooted in human nature. Utility then is to be
looked for in self-evident principles, provided that it
is compatible with reason and human nature. Obviously
by reason he means human reason, i.e. human judgement
in morality, human experience; this is why it can be
traced in human nature. Hume makes it clear that public
utility of different virtues is deeply entrenched in
human nature. This is really an intricate relation of
subject and object, i.e. utility as a rational principle
1. Hume, D., Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.47.
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and the feelings excited by utility as an indispensable
component of this relation. Hume explains this relation
as follows,
The sentiments excited by utility, are, in
the two cases, (man and inanimate object)*
very different, and the one is mixed with
affection, esteem, approbation, and not the
other. In like manner, an inanimate object
may have good colour and proportions as well
as a human figure. But can we ever be in love
with the former? There are a numerous set of
sentiments, of which thinking rational beings
are, by the original constitution of nature,
the only proper objects and though the same
qualities be transferred to an insensible,
inanimate being, they will not excite the
same sentiments.1
Utility does not only enhance feelings, moral feelings
so to speak, it is also closely tied to feelings of ap¬
probation or disapprobation, i.e. agreement or dis¬
agreement. The principle of utility is acting simultan¬
eously as a rational justification of the moral action
(speculative - theoretical) and a way of bringing the
desired end about, i.e. practical end.
Hume says,
If usefulness, therefore, be a source of
moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be
not always considered with a reference to
self, it follows, that everything, which con¬
tributes to the happiness of society, recom¬
mends itself directly to our approbation and
good will.2
1. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.47. *explanation
between two brackets is the writer's.
2.Ibid., p.54.
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Hume here moves from the narrow circle of self-love to
the altruistic feeling for others. This is why the prin¬
ciple of utility promotes the happiness of society at
large and thence whatever promotes the happiness of soc¬
iety is recommended for our approbation.
Hume asserts the clarity of the principle of utility as
follows,
In general, it is certain, that, wherever we
go, whatever we reflect on or converse about,
everything still presents us with the view
of human happiness or misery, and excites in
our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure
or uneasiness. In our serious occupations,
in our careless amusement, this principle
still exerts its active energy.1
As the purpose of Hume was to introduce experimental
thinking into the study of morality, he wanted to show
us that the principle of utility is an integral part of
an overall scheme, i.e. the establishment of scientific
ethics. Thus Hume explains moral reasoning as follows,
The only object of reasoning (reasoning about
morals) is to discover the circumstances on
both sides which are common to these qualit¬
ies (he means the qualities that men call
estimable or blameable), to observe that par¬
ticular in which the estimable qualities
agree on the one hand, and the blameable on
on the other, and thence to reach the found¬
ation of ethics, and found those universal
principles from which all censure or approb¬
ation is ultimately derived. As this is a
1. Hume, 0., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.56.
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question of fact, not of abstract science,
we can only expect success by following the
experimental method and deducing general
maxims from a comparison of particular in¬
stances. 1
But has Hume succeeded in establishing this experimental
method? Let us find out the answer from his own words.
At one time Hume was of the opinion that,
Morals excite passions, and produce or pre¬
vent actions. Reason of itself is impotent
in this particular. The rules of morality,
therefore are not conclusions of our reason.2
Hume in another place denies that reason has any place
in moral thinking and he says,
No one, I believe, will deny the justness of
this influence, nor is there any other means
of evading it, than by denying that princi¬
ple, on which it is founded. As long as it
is allowed, that reason has no influence on
our passions and actions, 'tis in vain to pre¬
tend, that morality is discovered only by a
deduction of reason.3
He goes on to say,
An active principle can never be founded on
1. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.7.




an inactive one; and if reason be inactive
in itself, it must remain so in all its
shapes and appearances, whether it exerts it¬
self in natural or moral subjects, whether
it considers the powers of external bodies,
or the actions of rational beings.1
He nevertheless adds later that,
It has been observed, that reason, in a
strict and philosophical sense, can have an
influence on our conduct only after two ways:
Either when it excites a passion by informing
us of the existence of something which is a
proper object of it; or when it discovers the
connection of causes and effects, so as to
afford us means of exerting any passion.2
At this juncture it seems that Hume's position is incon¬
sistent. In the first statement we have been told that
morality excites passions and that the rules of morality
are not conclusions of our reason. Yet Hume believes
that the function of reason is to excite passion, in
other words, the function of reason is the same as the
function of morality; why then rule out deductions of
reason in morality?
Hume tries to find a justification for not involving
reason in the moral question, which goes as follows,
These are the only kinds of judgement, which




can accompany our actions, or can be said to
produce them in any manner; and it must be
allowed, that these judgements may often be
false or erroneous.
A person may be affected with passion, by sup¬
posing a pain or pleasure to lie in the ob¬
ject which has no tendency to produce either
of these sensations, or which produces the
contrary to what is imagined. A person may
also take false measures for the attaining
of his end, and may retard by his foolish con¬
duct instead of forwarding the execution of
any project. These false judgements may be
thought to affect the passions and actions
which are connected with them, and may be
said to render them unreasonable, in a figur¬
ative and improper way of speaking.1
This is a rather sceptical account given by Hume about
passions and reason. He feels that some kind of reason¬
ing should be used in moral judgements but this so
called figurative reasoning has nothing to do with reas¬
on. It is much more related to passions and sentiments
than to reasons.
Yet again Hume tells us that passions may be erroneous
because they may lead us to a wrong conclusion. If pass¬
ions cannot be relied on because they are erroneous and
if reason is not to be trusted, to what other method
should we appeal?
The idea of erroneous passions leads Hume to think that
people are not to blame for moral mistakes especially
those connected with erroneous passions, e.g. being af¬
fected by passions, a person may think a certain object
will produce pleasure but, instead, the object may pro-
1. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk.III, Pt.I, sec.I, Selby-Bigge edition,
p.459.
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duce sensations contrary to what is imagined. 1 Such mis¬
takes, according to Hume, are innocent mistakes and
should not cause the person concerned any sense of being
guilty. Hume adds later that,
For the very essence of morality is supposed
to consist of an agreement or disagreement
to reason, the other circumstances are entire¬
ly arbitrary, and can never either bestow on
any action the character of virtuous of vic¬
ious or deprive it of that character.2
It is by reason then that we discover agreement or dis¬
agreement with a particular kind of action, in other
words, approbation or disapprobation; this in turn could
be what is useful and what is not useful, i.e. we choose
to do or to accept what is useful or fit for a purpose
and leave what is unuseful or unfit for a particular pur¬
pose. Thus reason is involved in this process of choice
and selection according to the utility principle. If
Hume uses utility as a mode of moral reasoning then the
appeal is apparently to reason rather than sentiment,
and if moral passions tend to be erroneous then how can
we know whether they are erroneous or not? Could it be
by reason?
If rational reasoning is an inevitable process for the
principle of utility, i.e. the process of experience,
then this appeal is naturally to reason. In contention
against the indefinability of moral concepts, R.F.





There is a danger that the presence of pecul¬
iar moral feelings, may lead us to argue
wrongly, that the objects, the contemplation
of which gives rise to those feelings are
identifiable. 1
As a way of getting round the problem Harrod refers to
the use of the word 'good' (as an example of moral con¬
cepts), in disciplines other than moral philosophy. It
is mainly used to mean, e.g., a good way of getting to
a place, of opening a tin or as in craftsmanship it
refers to an approximation to a perfect model; thus per¬
fection here is relative to a purpose. Being good means
good in serving a purpose as required.2 This is more or
less a way of bringing moral reasoning to terms with the
principle of utility. It seems that Hume, by using senti¬
ments, passions and sympathy as feelings of approbation
or disapprobation, i.e. moral feelings, wanted to use
them as a manifestation of reason in morality. However,
the principle of utility adds up to something more than
passions and sentiments, as it leads to a mode of moral
reasoning; while on the contrary, if we approve of pass¬
ions, sentiments and sympathy as components of moral
feeling and dispense with rational-^and benevolence, we
shall get the means-end ethics which is the outcome of
the utility principle.




UTILITARIAN RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF PALEY
Paley's approach to morality in general is a religious
one. He resorts to religious prescriptive reasoning as
a basis for morality.
He defines ethics as the science which teaches man his
duty and the reason for it.1 The use of the study of
ethics is to the effect that the rules of life can al¬
ways mislead men either through a defect in the rule or
in its application. The rules which were then considered
as rules of life are : -
The Law of Honour, Law of Land and Scriptures. These
rules should not be taken for granted; the Law of Honour
is designed by men of fashion to suit their own inter¬
ests and for no other purpose; the Law of Land is re¬
sorted to by good citizens who are beneath the Law of
Honour; as to Scriptures, they are not supposed so much
to teach new rules as to enforce the application of
rules.2 The point then of studying morals is to avoid
the blind application of the rule.
This religious attitude permeates the moral philosophy
1. Paley, W., The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, p.l.
2. Ibid., pp.1-3.
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of Paley and characterize.!1 his philosophy by: (a) relig¬
ious virtues like piety, justice, benevolence and pur¬
ity; (b) practicality of moral rules, i.e. rules are in¬
carnated in actions like worshipping God in spirit and
truth, doing as we would be done by, loving our neigh¬
bour as ourselves and forgiving others as we expect
forgiveness from God. That mercy is better than sacri¬
fice, heart is the seat of the devil, not reason nor
ceremonial pollutions. These samples are illustrated by
the example of the Samaritan and the cruel servant.1
Paley does not woo reason and a rational approach to
morality; instead he sticks to the scripture as a sort
of standardized moral prescription. Yet within this kind
of prescription there is room for rational organization
and discipline. This is why Paley compares the study of
ethics with other practical sciences where we can set
rules and examples subjoined, e.g. Arithmetic, Grammar,
Navigation and the like. His concept of utility is based
on this concept of happiness; that
any condition may be denominated happy, in
which the amount or aggregate of pleasure ex¬
ceeds that of pain; and the degree of happi¬
ness depends upon the quality of this excess.2
The principle of utility incorporates promotion of
happiness, expediency and it also determines the oblig¬
ation to do action; thus Paley expresses the statement
of the principle as:-
1. Paley, W., The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, pp.3-4.
2. Ibid., p.10.
- 75 -
Actions are to be estimated by their tendency
to promote happiness. Whatever is expedient
is right. It is the utility of any moral rule
alone which constitute the obligation of it.1
It may be argued here that 'what is expedient' can be
useful to the individual alone not to the society at
large. Paley so far has not referred to others or soc¬
iety or altruistic feeling in any sense of the word,
i.e. he does not answer the question as to whose happi¬
ness is utility directed. But judging by what he says,
it can be shown that by the 'degree of happiness' or the
'quality of this excess' he imp%4=es tteat happiness of
a particular individual, but 'this excess' cannot refer
to excess in the happiness of others; how can X refer
to the quality of happiness which pertains to Y? Paley
here leaves a room for doubt of whether he means happi¬
ness for others at all? This might well be considered
as an indicator to a hedonistic tendency in his utility
principle. Hume makes it clear that the utility which
promotes happiness must be pre-empted by considerations
of self-interest, or by more generous motives and re¬
gards, i.e. social feelings, philanthropic, benevolent
attitude; this is why he makes it a condition for util¬
ity.
It must please, either from considerations
of self-interest, or from more generous mot¬
ives and regards.2
Paley, by considering self-interest as prior to social
1. Paley, W., The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, p.33.
2. Hume, 0., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.42.
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welfare and altruistic feelings, is moving towards egois¬
tic hedonism; what he is saying is that, in order to
work for social justice, one has to consider what would
happen to him if unjust rules are implemented. Like
Hume, Paley considers these subjective feelings necess¬
ary for moral approbations or disapprobations. Unlike
Hume, he does not approve of a moral sense position,
i.e. the derivation of virtues from instinctive intuit¬
ion. In his practical religious approach he uses self-
love and self-interest instead of moral instinct and
moral intuition. 1
How then does Paley tie up his egoistic hedonism with
religious attitude? By reference to his definition of
virtue we will be able to understand how he makes the
connection between religious benevolence and self-
interest or hedonistic morality.
Paley concludes the chapter on happiness by referring
to the link between individual happiness and social
happiness, he says,
First, that happiness is pretty equally dis¬
tributed amongst the different orders of civil
society;
secondly, that vice has no advantage over vir¬
tue, even with respect to this world's happi¬
ness .2
1. Paley, W., The Principles of Moral & Political Philosophy, pp.5-10.
2. Ibid., p.19.
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Obviously Paley is referring to a predestined distribut¬
ion of happiness and a prescribed division of vice and
virtue, i.e. a prior religious description. Thus he de¬
fines virtue accordingly as,
the doing good to mankind, in obedience to
the will of God, for the sake of everlasting
happiness. 1
He elucidates further, saying that,
'the good of mankind' is the subject; 'will
of God' is the rule, and 'everlasting happi¬
ness' the motive of human action.2
Paley here speaks about the 'good of mankind' as a sub¬
ject of virtue but he does not mention anything as to
whether people can or ought to deliberate in moral
action or moral decision. On the contrary, moments of
deliberation take place as a result of accumulation of
experiences and habits; this is why men may not always
act for the 'good of mankind' or for 'the will of God',
nor aim at everlasting happiness as an end. Instead they
act from what he calls,
an impulse, which is the effect and energy
of pre-established habits.3




One would argue here that a pre-established habit does
not necessarily preclude the possibility of choice in
a new situation and new circumstances. He cites an ex¬
ample of a beggar; would it be suitable to question his
intentions for begging and our aim in answering his re¬
quests; and if we happen to ask the questions shall we
still be moral?1
But certainly one would try to deduce from the material
condition of the beggar whether or not he deserves the
sum of money one is going to give him, i.e. one would
make a decision, deliberate and choose (either to give
him some money or not) from different alternatives that
offer themselves to him in deliberation.
What I termed 'accumulation of experiences', which Paley
terms 'an impulse of pre-established habits', seems to
furnish a background for a practical sense of morality
in the philosophy of Paley.
He describes this experience as follows:
Having experienced, in some instance a partic¬
ular conduct beneficial to ourselves, or ob¬
served that it would be so, a sentiment of
approbation rises up in our minds, which sen¬
timent afterwards accompanies the idea or men¬
tion of the same conduct although the private
advantage which excited it no longer exists.2
1. Paley, W., The Principles of Moral £ Political Philosophy, p.21.
2. Ibid., p.7. (Paley here is quoting Hume's Enquiry, Sect.IX, p.326, (New Edition
pp.113f.)
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The utility or the use of what we are doing or going to
do excites the approbation of the sentiment which makes
it inevitable for us to perform the action. Utility then
comes first. This actually complies with Paley's first
statement of the principle of utility, i.e.
the utility of any moral rule alone constit¬
utes the obligation of it.1
But it also confirms the tendency towards egoistic hedon¬
ism as reflected in the idea of 'what is beneficial to
ourselves' which implies that self-interest instigates
the feeling of approbation. Self-interest as a matter
of fact gives rise to selfish feelings rather than to
benevolent altruistic sentiments which are the backbone
of utilitarian philosophy be it (act utilitarianism or
rule utilitarianism).2
To argue for an impulsive reaction to a moral action,
though it is based on pre-established habits is to re¬
duce Paley's position to a moral sense theory of which
Paley disapproves. In other words, to speak in terms of
moral sense is to say that instinctive moral feelings
should come prior to deliberation and reason. Paley's
justification of this egoistic hedonism in his philos¬
ophy is that: God is the greatest utilitarian, and He
cannot be unjust; this is why He distributed happiness
equally among different strata of society.
1. Paley, W., The Principles of Moral £ Political Philosophy, p.33.
2. Reference to these Utilitarian Rules has been made in the introduction to this
thesis.
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J. Plamenatz sums up Paley's religious utility as
follows:
It is in God that Paley finds the conciliator
of egoism and utilitarianism. Though Paley
believes that every man desires only his own
happiness and can desire no other man's ex¬
cept as a means to his own, he also believes
that God desires the greatest happiness of
the greatest number of men. Paley's God is
the one true utilitarian in the universe for
He desires men's greatest happiness for its
own sake.1
Paley's basic position is that: self-interest comes
first and foremost as an essential component of our ap¬
probation, then hewrapped it up with religious justific¬
ation to prove the universality of the principle, i.e.
utility is not something to do with my own happiness or
benefit, it has also something to do with others. What
Paley wants to say is that, although every man is a land
on his own, yet all are under the guardianship of God.
H. Sidgwick explains the connection between the utilitar¬
ian tendency in the moral philosophy of Paley and its
link with egoistic hedonism and how they all stem from
a religious attitude in Paley's philosophy,
A man may aim at the greatest happiness with¬
in his reach, and yet not attempt to explain
empirically what amount of pleasure and pain
is likely to attend any course of action;
believing that he has some surer, deductive
method for determining the conduct which will
make him happy in the long run. He may believe
1. Plamenatz, J., The English Utilitarians, pp.51-52.
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this on grounds of positive religion, because
God promised happiness as a reward for obed¬
ience to certain definite commands; or on the
grounds of Natural Religion, because God be¬
ing just and benevolent must have so ordered
the world that happiness will in the long run
be distributed in proportion to virtue.
It is (e.g.) by a combination of both these
arguments that Paley connects the Universal-
istic Hedonism that he adopts as a method for
determining duties, with the Egoism which
seems to him Self-evident as a fundamental
principle of rational conduct.1
Would Paley then be a true utilitarian, having based his
utility principle on self-interest and narrow self-
directed benefits?
Plamenatz has this to say,
Paley's reconciliation is more mechanical and
less plausible. It may be that the cause of
virtue is further from his heart, that hav¬
ing, like James Mill, derived benevolence
from the selfish passions, he is more concern¬
ed to keep their origins constantly in view.
It is for this reason only that Paley, rather
than Bentham or James Mill, deserves to be
called a pseudo-utilitarian. Fear plays as
great part in his system as in that of
Hobbes.
Is Paley really a Pseudo-Utilitarian? Paley himself was
in doubt about the universality of the principle of util¬
ity; this is why he was wondering whether any useful
1. Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics, pp.121-122.
2. Plaraenatz, J., The English Utilitarians, pp.51-52.
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action should necessarily be right.
Paley, however, finds a way out in the following example:
It might be useful to rob a miser, and give
the money to the poor; as the money, no
doubt, would produce more happiness, by being
laid out in food and clothing for half a
dozen distressed families, than by continuing
locked up in a miser's chest.1
Paley goes on to give a more vivid example of a useful
act which is legally wrong, (e.g. robbery), but would
it be morally wrong to do such action, for the greatest
happiness?
Paley's answer is as follows:-
It may be useful to get possession of a
place, a piece of preferment, or of a seat
in parliament, by bribery or false swearing:
as by means of them we may serve the public
more effectually than in our private station.
What then shall we say? Must we admit these
actions to be right, which would be to jus¬
tify assassination, plunder, and perjury: or
must we give up our principle, that the crit¬
erion of right is utility?2
According to Universalistic Hedonism, it seems that the
1. Paley, W., The Principles of Moral £ Political Philosophy, p.33.
2. Ibid., pp.33-34.
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principle, so far, is working properly, i.e. egoism, or
self-interest is self-evident principle. But, here, how¬
ever, Paley seems to have reversed the order of the se-
quence, he considers self-interest from an altruistic
point of view, deferring the benefit and the utility to
others, the needy and the poor. He does not refer to any
religious command, he is sticking to the principle of
utility which he chooses as a criterion for the Tight¬
ness of actions. This seems to be a genuine utilitarian
trend, i.e. a true proof of the greatest happiness for
the greatest number.
Now Paley's answer to the question he raised earlier,
i.e. what to do in such cases, is this:-
It is not necessary to do either.
The true answer is this; that these actions,
after all, are not useful, and for that
reason, and that alone, are not right.
To see this point perfectly, it must be ob¬
served that the bad consequences of actions
are twofold, particular and general.1
The way Paley is going about the problem here is im¬
moral, because the principle of utility goes beyond the
limits of expediency, and becomes rather a justification
of crooked means to attain the greatest happiness as an
end.
Paley's answer that the actions are not useful is ob¬
viously wrong since the actions are actually useful,
1. Paley, W., The Principles of Moral S Political Philosophy, p.34.
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e.g., giving money to the needy is useful, helping the
poor is useful, getting rid of the wicked and greedy is
also useful; but the question is: how are we going to
do it? As is clear from Paley's example we are going to
commit an immoral action to promote the greatest happi¬
ness, e.g. robbery and even murder, but is he going to
make it a universal law? Obviously he isn't because when
the principle of utility is in conflict with a general
law 'general bad consequence' , like 1 do not steal or
theft is prohibited ', Paley's attitude is quite scep¬
tical. He would rather sacrifice the principle of util¬
ity than the general rule, because in his opinion, the
government of the world is run by the general rule and
it is not worth the trouble we take to get rid of a par¬
ticular single individual who happened to be greedy or
wicked.1
Again, if we are going to make this a universal law then
we've got to get rid of all bad people in the world, in
order that good people would live happily ever after,
i.e. everlasting happiness.
But this isn't going to be the case since Paley accepts
the fact that the moral government of the world should
proceed by the general rules. By moral government, he
means dispensations which influence the conduct of reas¬
onable creatures; not only that, but he believes that
future rewards and punishments at the hand of God will
be distributed by general rules.
General Rule then supersedes the principle of utility,
1. Paley, W., The Principles of Moral £ Political Philosophy, pp.34-36.
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and general bad consequence override particular bad con¬
sequence, this being the mischief which is inflicted by
the single action whether it is theft or murder on the
part of the wicked person, a morally bad person, at the
same time it is being an act of benevolence to the needy
and the poor person.
What will then remain of the principle of utility in
which he states clearly that,
Actions are to be estimated by their tendency
to promote happiness. Whatever is expedient
is right. It is the utility of any moral rule
alone which constitute the obligation of it.1
According to the principle those crooked actions are use¬
ful and consequently right. If the moral government of
the world is going to rule these actions out as wrong
and illegal, then the principle should be scrapped be¬
cause it is not working any more. It seems that Paley's
principle would label him as an act-utilitarian, as a
matter of fact God Himself will accordingly be the Great¬
est Act-Utilitarian.
The statement of Act-Utilitarianism is as follows:-
Those actions which produce the greatest bal¬
ance of good over evil in the universe.
1. Paley, W., The Principles of Moral S Political Philosophy, p.33.
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The action will be prompted in answer to the question:
What effect will my doing this kind of act
in this kind of situation have on the general
balance of good over evil?
Not the question:
What effect will everyone's doing this kind
of act in this kind of situation have on the
general balance of good over evil?
The example given by W. Frankena for the acts which will
be included in the act-utilitarian principle is,
Telling the truth which is generally for the
greatest general good.
However, Frankena expressed his dissatisfaction with the
Act-Utilitarian principle because he thinks that it is
immoral. The reason why Frankena thinks that it is im¬
moral is the same one which makes Paley take refuge in
the moral government of the world, i.e. we cannot make
it a universal principle.1
To support his dissatisfaction, Frankena quotes what has
been said by Ewing about Act-Utilitariansism, as follows:
1. Frankena, W., Ethics, pp.34-37.
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It is indeed difficult to maintain that it
cannot under any circumstances be right to
lie, etc., on (act) utilitarian grounds e.g.,
to save life, but it seems to me pretty clear
that (act) utilitarian principles, logically
carried out, would result in far more cheat¬
ing, lying, and unfair action than any good
man would tolerate.1
If Paley's principle is an act-utilitarian one, it is
intended to produce the greatest balance of good over
evil in the universe and, if by 'doing good to mankind',
he means to alleviate the grievances of the needy and
have-nots, then it proves to be a failure. But Paley
would not give up; he would rather shift the responsib¬
ility to God, the Greatest utilitarian, it could be
added, Act-Utilitarian. God would keep the proportion
of good and evil intact, according to him.
However, Paley is not in disagreement with what has been
said about the act-utilitarian principle, namely:
Those actions which produce the greatest bal¬
ance of good over evil in the universe.2
On the contrary, he stresses the necessity of general
rules in making a distinction between permitted and for¬
bidden actions. Thus he illustrates the case saying
that,
1. Frankena, rt.K., Ethics, p.37. (Quoted by Frankena from: Ethics - By Ewing - (New
York: The Free Press, 1955, p.41).
Ibid., p.35.
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The assassin knocked the rich villain on the
head, because he thought him better out of
the way than in it. If you allow this excuse
all who act in the same manner, and from the
same motive, that is, you must allow every
man to kill any one he meets, whom he thinks
noxious or useless, which in the event, would
be to commit everyman1s safety to the spleen
fury, and fanaticism, of his neighbour, a dis¬
position of affairs which would soon fill the
world with misery and confusion; and ere long
put an end to human society, if not to human
species.1
But certainly this kind of example is different from the
kind of example he mentioned earlier, i.e. stealing
money from a rich, greedy person and giving it to a poor
man. An act-utilitarian would make this an answer to the
question:
What would my doing this kind of act in this
kind of situation have on the general balance
of good over evil?2
It seems that the punishment of criminals is not a util¬
itarian end, because punishment as such will cause pain
not happiness in the world. But it may become a utilit¬
arian end if it leads to the greatest happiness or the
over-balance of good over evil. Yet Paley's example is
concerned with a legal case rather than a moral situat¬
ion. Nevertheless Paley mentions this example to prove
the necessity of general rules. By sticking to general
rules and adhering to the Scripture, eventually he dim¬
inishes the role of his principle of utility in promot-
1. Paley, W, The Principles of Moral S Political Philosophy, pp.34-35.
2. Frankena, W.K., Ethics, p.35.
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ing happiness for the good of mankind.
Perhaps Paley is opting for a negative utilitarian end,
i.e., minimization of miseries rather than maximization
of happiness and the good of mankind, which has been re-
ferred to by J.J. Smart as minimizing miseries, is one
step towards maximizing happiness.1
Smart gives the following example in support of his idea,
Suppose that we found a new university. We
may hope that indirectly research will help
to minimize pains, but that is not the only
reason we found universities. WE do so partly
because we want the happiness of understand¬
ing the world. But producing the happiness
of understanding could equally well be
thought of as removing the unhappiness of ig¬
norance .2
However Smart suggests that negative utilitarianism can¬
not achieve an ultimate end. Because the minimalization
of misery is one aspect of promoting happiness. If happi¬
ness is the ultimate end then misery cannot be an ulti¬
mate end too.3
In so far as Paley is concerned, the alleviation of
misery is an end of the moral action but not an end of
life; such an end, the achievement of which depends part-




ly on divine grace because, according to Paley, God has
already distributed good and vice equally or in good pro¬
portion. If negative utilitarianism, represented in the
case of the alleviation of misery, even if one commits
an immoral act like theft or murder, is not workable,
then how about the utility principle in a religious con¬
text? Is it applicable? If not, can it go along with a
religious attitude like Paley's?
It seems that utility, as a mode of moral thinking or a
technique of choosing the appropriate decision from diff¬
erent alternatives, is not incompatible with descriptive
religious morality. But expediency, as a means to an
end, is not compatible with religious morality. In pos¬
itive religions, an end does not justify the means, i.e.
means and ends should be consistent and compatible.
R.M. Hare argues' that an appeal to a moral principle is
not a one-sided way of reasoning in morality. He illus¬
trates his position as follows:-
It would be folly, however, to say that there
is only one way of learning a skill or any
other body of principles, or of justifying
a particular decision made in the practice
of it. There are many ways, and I have tried
to make the above account sufficiently gen¬
eral to cover all of them. It is sometimes
said by writers on morals that we have to
justify an act by reference to its effects,
and that we tell which effects are to be
sought, which avoided, by reference to some
principle. Such a theory is that of utilitar¬
ians, who bid us look at the effects, and
examine these in the light of the principle
of utility, to see which effects would
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maximize pleasure.1
Hare continues the argument to the effect that a single
principle is not the sole effect of our decisions; there
is a long series of principles and effects which help
bring the decision about till they end up with a first
principle or a way of life in which other principles and
effects are incorporated; he says,
Thus a complete justification of a decision
would consist of a complete account of its
effects, together with a complete account of
the principles which it observed, and the
effects of observing those principles -, of
course, it is the effects (what obeying them
in fact consists in) which give content to
the principles too. Thus, if pressed to jus¬
tify a decision completely, we have to give
a complete specification of the way of life
of which it is a part. This complete specif¬
ication it is impossible in practice to give;
the nearest attempts are those given by the
great religions, especially those which can
point to historical persons who carried out
the way of life in practice.2
Hare's analysis supports the argument I make that util¬
ity, as a mode of moral thinking or a technique for
choosing decisions from different alternatives, is not
incompatible with religious morality, since these de¬
cisions are incorporated in the basic principle or basic
belief or basic way of life.
1. Hare, R.M., The Language of Morals, p.68.
2. Ibid., p.69.
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Hare concludes his argument as follows:-
If the inquirer still goes on asking 'But why-
should I live like that?' then there is no
further answer to give him, because we have
already, ex hypothesi, said everything that
could be included in this further answer. We
can only ask him to make up his own mind
which way he ought to live; for in the end
everything rests upon such a decision of
principle.1
So far as Paley's philosophy is concerned, his principle
of utility is controllable by an overall guiding Scrip¬
ture which in turn is controlled by the Greatest Utilit¬
arian, God.
1. Hare, R.M., The Language of Morals, p.69.
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CHAPTER III
MILL'S UTILITARIANISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The line of philosophy which is followed by Mill has
been established by Bentham before him, i.e. the utility
principle and the greatest happiness for the greatest
number. Bentham considers utility as a first principle,
because his morality is directed towards the observable
facts, i.e. he was aiming at a scientific approach to
morality. It was natural then for Bentham to start his
approach with a self-evident principle, a first prin¬
ciple. For Bentham, utility is that principle. B. Rus¬
sell, talking about immediate knowledge and knowledge
required by experience, says,
When anything is known immediately, its exist¬
ence is known by experience alone, when
anything is proved to exist, without being
known immediately, both experience and a
priori principles must be required in the
proof.1
Utility, then, is also an a priori knowledge, i.e. it
is a principle which we appeal to in our moral reason¬
ing, which is identical to Hume's function of utility,
i.e. a mode of moral reasoning.2 Coincidentally, both
Bentham and Hume accept the scientific approach to moral¬
ity; the difference is that Hume's approach does not
recognize reason as a motivation behind moral approb-
1. Russell, B., The Problems of Philosophy, p.42.
2. Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics, p.86.
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ation or disapprobation, whereas Bentham considers the
principle of utility as a device for obtaining moral
happiness and a standard of moral Tightness as such! Thus
for him, utility is' the rationale of morality.
As to Mill, the principle of utility is based on the
Benthamite dictum that,
human nature is governed by pain and pleas¬
ure .2
He used it to deduce his final statement of the princi¬
ple of utility as,
The creed which accepts as the foundation of
morals, utility,' or the greatest happiness
principle, holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness,
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure
and the absence of pain: by unhappiness, pain
and the privation of pleasure.3
The objective of the action, i.e. the consequence of the
action is happiness. Happiness, then, is the end of
human action.
1. Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals £ Legislation, pp.11 —
12.
2. Ibid., p. 11.
3. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.257.
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According to Mill's statement, happiness means,
Pleasure and the absence of pain.
The problems raised by Mill's principle of utility are:
(a) happiness as a criterion of Tightness or wrongness
of actions; (b) the Tightness or wrongness of actions
is to be judged by their consequences; (c) pleasure as
a component of happiness is also problematic, in the
sense that it needs redefining, as to whether it is sen¬
sual or mental qualitatively, and how much of it quant¬
itatively would qualify for the greatest happiness.
Again, how can we measure the quantity of pleasure, the
mental one, in individual as well as collective cases?
As to problem (a), if happiness is supposed to be an end
of the principle then it has got to be a final end for
the validity of the principle, i.e. an end for its own
sake. B. Russell produces an argument in that direction,
i.e. the useful end; he argues,
If something is useful it must be useful be¬
cause it secures some end, the end must, if
I have gone far enough, be valuable on its
own account, and not merely because it is
useful for some further end. Thus all judge¬
ments as to what is useful depend upon judge¬
ments as to what has value on its own ac¬
count . 1
1. Russell, 8., Problems of Philosophy, p.42.
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Mill's argument is more or less the same as that of
Russell's. D.P. Dryer formulates Mill's principle of
utility as follows:
The main principle which Mill maintains is
that something should be done if and only if
it would cause more happiness than would any
alternative, and that something should not
be done if and only if it would fail to cause
as much happiness as would some alternative.1
This is really in congruence with Mill's own words in
answer to the critics of the principle, he elucidates
that the principle of utility does not preclude the
existence of other subordinate principles, i.e. other
alternatives to govern the complexity of human society,
he says,
The proposition that happiness is the end and
aim of morality, does not mean that no road
ought to be laid down to that goal, or that
persons going thither should not be advised
to take one direction rather than another.2
Then Mill emphasizes the necessity of subordinate prin¬
ciples ,
Whatever we adopt as the fundamental princ¬
iple of morality, we require subordinate prin¬
ciples to apply it by, the impossibility of
1. D.P. Dryer, "Mill's Utilitarianism", in Collected Works of J.S. Mill,PP'VM-X»
edited by J.M. Robson.
2. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.276, ed. by M. Warnock.
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doing without them, being common to all sys¬
tems, can afford no argument any one in par¬
ticular, but gravely to argue as if no such
secondary principles could be had, and as if
mankind had remained till now, and always
must remain, without drawing any general con¬
clusions from the experience of human life,
is as high a pitch, I think as absurdity has
ever reached in philosophical controversy.1
To say that happiness is an end, and a consequence of
an action, is tantamount to saying that it is useful for
its own sake and that the action and the only action
that should be done is that action which is conducive
to happiness more than any other alternative. But act¬
ions are not always done for their ends or consequences,
nor are ends and consequences always aimed at because
they are conducive to happiness. The promotion of happi¬
ness is not determinant in the doing of actions, i.e.
the Tightness or wrongness of the actions. Frondizi ques¬
tions the apprehension of values as it is conceived by
the utility principle he writes,
Do we really perceive values at first sight
and in their entirety? Are they really trans¬
parent. Are they revealed to us through emot¬
ional intuition?2
In case of Mill's utility the principle is a self-evid¬
ent and a priori, but it is the kind of knowledge which
Russell speaks of as partly known immediately and partly
by experience; this is why it can not be completely in¬
tuitive, though it can be partly intuitive and partly
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, pp.276-277.
2. Frondizi, What is Value, p.33.
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empirical depending on past human experience and present
moral observation. Frondizi goes on to say,
The utility of an object cannot be apprehend¬
ed without a prior concept of the purpose
which it is to fulfill, and the manner in
which it fulfills it.1
The purpose of Mill's utility principle is obviously to
increase the amount of happiness and decrease pains. The
way to bring it about is to achieve a certain amount of
tranquility and excitement in the society.2
In answer to problem (b), whether actions are judged by
consequences or, in other words, the justifiability of
moral rules and practices, it can be argued that provided
that we know the practical aspect of experience, how can
we guarantee the Tightness or wrongness of a practical
experience by this self-evident a priori principle?
D.P. Dryer explains the rightness and wrongness of act¬
ions in Mill's utilitarianism as follows,
From his main principle in turn Mill draws
a conclusion about what it would be right to
do and what it would be wrong to do. The ques¬
tion of whether it would be right or wrong
to do a certain action is a question about
its morality. Mill writes, "the morality of
an individual action is a question ... of the
application of a law to an individual case."*
He thus holds that it would be wrong to do
a certain action only if it would be at var¬
iance with a certain rule. If we ask what
sort of rule he is referring to, Mill makes
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, pp.256-278.
* This quotation is from Mill's Utilitarianism, p.253, edited by M. Warnock.
2. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, pp.256-278.
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it clear that he means a rule should gener¬
ally be observed. By his main principle Mill
has already given a general answer to what
should be done. In accordance with it he
holds that a certain rule is one that should
generally be observed if and only if its gen¬
eral observance would cause more happiness
than would any alternative to its general ob¬
servance. 1
Mill's actual statement, however, is as follows:
The intuitive, no less than what may be term¬
ed the inductive, school of ethics, insists
on the necessity of general laws. They both
agree that the morality of an individual act¬
ion is not a question of direct perception,
but of the application of the law to an indiv¬
idual case.2
From these accounts on the importance of rule, Mill
seems to be moving towards Rule-Utilitarianism, i.e.
he emphasizes the centrality of rules and that we appeal
to a rule by asking what particular action will have the
best consequences in a particular situation.3 Utility
then endorses a rule and not a direct perception of the
situation; this provides room for experience and prev¬
ious knowledge, i.e. the application of the rule needs
some knowledge of previous practices in similar as well
as different circumstances.
What then is the function of happiness in a rule-utilit-
1. Dryer, D.P., "Mill's Utilitarianism", from Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society,
ed. by J.M. Robson, pp.LXIV-LXV.
2. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, pp.252-253.
3. Frankena, W.K., Ethics, p.39.
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arian theory and where is the place of utility in the
theory, and what is its relation to happiness?
Hume, for instance, advocates self-interest as a basis
for moral approbation or disapprobation, yet the agree¬
able end is achieved through the agreement of collective
affections. Thus Hume writes,
The social virtues must, therefore, be allow¬
ed to have a natural beauty and amiableness,
which, at first, antecedent to all percept
of education, recommends to the esteem of un-
instructed mankind, and engages their affect¬
ions. And as the public utility of these vir¬
tues is the chief circumstance, whence they
derive their merit, it follows, that the end,
which they have a tendency to promote, must
be some way agreeable to us, and take hold
of some natural affection. It must please,
either from considerations of self-interest,
or from more generous motives and regards.1
Hume's viewpoint can be compared with Bentham and James
Mill's conception of the best society, in which the
aggregate of collective wishes is based on the harmony
of selfish desires and interests, individual wishes so
to speak.2 That is to say, they agree on a kind of egois¬
tic hedonism at the heart of their utilitarian philos¬
ophies.
John Mill, however, is a universalistic hedonist,3 in
1. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, pp.48-49.
2. Plamenatz, J., The English Utilitarians, p.10.
3. Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics, pp.412-413.
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that his utility principle is addressed to the greatest
happiness of the greatest number. As to how is he able
to reconcile the collective happiness with individual
happiness, however, the problem being: from the fact
that I desire my own happiness, how come I can also
desire the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
Mill solves the problem by what has been suggested by
Sidgwick as Rational Benevolence, which is part of the
reasoning for universalistic hedonism.
It can also be said that part of the usefulness pertain¬
ing to the individual is educational, i.e. to cultivate
the nobleness of his character, in other words, to con¬
sider the greatest happiness of others as part and par¬
cel of his own happiness. Mill elucidates this part of
happiness as,
Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain
its end by the general cultivation of noble¬
ness of character, even if each individual
were only benefited by the nobleness of
others, and his own, so far as happiness is
concerned, were a sheer deduction from the
benefit.1
Mill goes on to expound the nature of the Greatest Happi¬
ness principle; he says,
According to the Greatest Happiness Princi¬
ple, as above explained, the ultimate end,
with reference to and for the sake of which
1. Hill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.262.
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all other things are desirable (whether we
are considering our own good or that of other
people), is an existence exempt as far as
possible from pain, and as rich as possible
in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and
quality; the test of quality and the rule for
measuring it against quantity, being the pre¬
ference felt by those who in their opportun¬
ities of experience, which must be added
their habits of self-consciousness and self-
observation, are best furnished with the
means of comparison.1
Up to this end, Mill describes the Greatest Happiness
as: an ultimate end, desirable (individually and soc¬
ially), exempt from pain, and enjoyable in quality and
quantity. That the test of approbation or disapprobation
is left to... the consensus of experts in different
walks of life.
Mill then refers directly to utility, which is the end
of human action, as a rule; he explicates,
the end of human action, is necessarily also
the standard of morality; which may according¬
ly be defined, the rules and percepts of
human conduct, by the observance of which an
existence such as has been described might
be, to the greatest extent possible, secured
to all mankind; and not to them only, but,
so far as the nature of things admits, to the
whole sentient creation.2
The question which can be raised here concerns the just-
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, pp.262-263.
2. Ibid., p.263.
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ifiability of the utilitarian rule: does it emerge from
the moral practice, experience and wisdom of those who
know, as mentioned in Mill's account, or does the rule
justify the practice? And does the rule here mean oblig¬
ation, i.e. if something, a rule or an act, is justified
as the agreeable kind of practice, is it obligatory on
all members of society to do it? In other words, is the
rule universal? Mill is quite sure about the universal¬
ity of the rule, since the greatest happiness is direct¬
ed to all mankind, not only that, but to the whole sen¬
tient creation.1 Having a utilitarian rule as a first
principle and self-evident principle, Mill insists that
we need all the past experience for the achievement of
subordinate ends, (he means daily moral practice like
'keep promises', 'do not lie', 'do not steal' and so
on); and principles apart from the ultimate end or sum-
mum bonum; as a matter of fact, we cannot dispense with
past experience in our endeavour to achieve either sub¬
ordinate principles or a first principle.2 Even in posit¬
ive religions man is advised to look back into the his¬
tory of ancient nations and ponder about the different
patterns of behaviour those people of the past were ex¬
periencing, so that he can follow the good examples and
avoid the bad practices; e.g. in the Quran there are
complete chapters about stories of earlier prophets.
The case being that different prophets are sent to diff¬
erent nations, according to the particular pattern of
behaviour practised by those people at different times.
We are reminded in each chapter that the story is for
admonition.3 Mill supplies a similar example; he says,
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.263.
2. Ibid., pp.275-276.
3. The Holy Quran, passim.
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There is no difficulty in proving any ethical
standard whatever to work ill, if we suppose
universal idiocy to be conjoined with it; but
on any hypothesis short of that, mankind must
by this time have acquired positive beliefs
to the effects of some actions on their happi¬
ness; and the beliefs which have thus come
down are the rules of morality for the mult¬
itude, and for the philosopher until he has
succeeded in finding better.1
The similarity being, the effect of past experiences on
the present experiences, whether at an individual level,
or a social level. As far as the principle of utility
is directed towards the greatest happiness as a desired
good, then utility does justify all actions to promote
this end, since it is an ultimate end and a summum bon-
um. But in so far as other ends and practices are con¬
cerned, man is capable of the necessary improvement in
his behaviour and capable of learning from experience.
Moser argues that,
However, Mill presupposes not only a distinc¬
tion between right and wrong, but also the
basic principles of customary morality, like
"One ought not to murder", "One ought not to
torture", "One ought to help people in dis¬
tress", etc. Although he does not say so ex¬
plicitly, he probably believes that what mot¬
ivates people to accept such moral principles
are the social feelings of mankind which he
calls a "powerful natural sentiment". The mor¬
ality which Mill claims for his argument is
not meant to operate in a moral vacuum, but
only against this background of social feel¬
ings and moral beliefs.2
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, pp.275-276.
2. Moser, Shia, "A Comment on Mill's Argument for Utilitarianism", Inquiry, Vol.6,
1963, p.308.
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Moral rules, then, can act as paradigms and ideals or
standards, the achievement of which determines the Tight¬
ness of wrongness of actions. We may not be able to
attain the standard of morality set by the rules, yet
we can be right or wrong according to our nearness to
the ideal standard. The rule as such, then, must justify
the practice and, at the same time, allow for utilitar¬
ian considerations for different practices. Mill argues
to the effect that experience and practice are as nec¬
essary as the received rules; he says,
Again, defenders of utility often find them¬
selves called upon to reply to such object¬
ions as this - that there is not time, prev¬
ious to action, for calculating and weighing
the effects of any line of conduct on the gen¬
eral happiness. This is exactly as if anyone
were to say that it is impossible to guide
our conduct by Christianity, because there
is not time, on every occasion in which any¬
thing has to be done, to read through the Old
and New Testaments. The answer to this object¬
ion is, that there has been ample time, name¬
ly, the whole past duration of the human
species. During all that time, mankind have
been learning by experience the tendencies
of actions; on which experience all the prud¬
ence, as well as all the morality of life,
are dependent. People talk as if the commence¬
ment of this cause of experience had hitherto
been put off and as if, at the moment when
some man feels tempted to meddle with the pro¬
perty or life of another, he had to begin con¬
sidering for the first time whether murder
and theft are injurious to human happiness.1
'Paradigm' or 'standard' morality, means 'learnable' or
'recognizable', as has been suggested by Urmson2 and
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.275.
2. Urmson, J.O., "The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill", from
Theories of Ethics, edited by Philippa Foot, pp.128-136.
- 106 -
Brandt.1 This sense has been asserted by Mill himself;
when talking about the ultimate sanction, he says,
The ultimate sanction, therefore, of all mor¬
ality (external motives apart) being a sub¬
jective feeling in our own minds, I see noth¬
ing embarassing to those whose standard is
utility in the question, what is the sanction
of that particular standard? We may answer,
the same as of all other moral standards -
the conscientious feelings of mankind. Un¬
doubtedly this sanction has no binding effic¬
acy on those who do not possess the feelings
it appeals to: but neither will these persons
be more obedient to any other moral principle
than to the utilitarian one.2
Even if morality were to belong to the realm of 'things
in themselves', still the practice depends on subjective
experience, i.e. a process of learning, or give and take
process. This could be formulated in a rule such as pro¬
posed by Urmson,
An act is right if and only if it conforms
with that learnable set of rules, the adopt¬
ion of which by everyone would maximize in¬
trinsic value.3
These set of rules will act as subordinate moral codes,
the application of which would necessarily lead to the
first principle. Brandt makes this fact clear as he
1. Brandt, Richard 8., "Toward a Credible Utilitarianism", from Morality and the
Language of Conduct, edited by Hector-Neri-Castaneda and George Nakhrikian (London,
1963), pp.123-126.
2. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, edited by M. Warnock, pp.281-282.
3. Brandt, R.B., "Toward a Credible Utilitarianism", op. cit., p.124.
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writes,
This principle does not at all imply that the
Tightness or wrongness of an act is conting¬
ent upon the agent's having thought about all
the complex business of the identity of a set
of ideal moral rules; it asserts, rather,
that an act is right if and only if it con¬
forms to such a set of rules, regardless of
what the agent may think.1
Brandt adds later that,
We do not, of course, ordinarily do anything
as complicated as try to think out the com¬
plete ideal moral code; we are content with
considering whether certain specific injunct¬
ions relevant to the problem we are consider¬
ing might be included in a good and workable
code. Nevertheless, we are prepared to admit
that the whole ideal code is relevant. For
if someone shows us that a specific injunc¬
tion which we think would be an acceptable
part of a moral code clearly would not work
out in view of other provisions necessary to
an ideal code, we should agree that a telling
point had been made and revise our thinking
accordingly.2
This I think would be typical of a paradigmatic morality
which can accomodate Mill's utility principle as well
as his subordinate rules, which work side by side with
the main first principle. The word 'conforms' in
Brandt's first statement, does not mean 'strictly con¬
form', but there is a degree of laxity and flexibility
1. Brandt, R.B., "Toward a Credible Utilitarianism", op. cit., p.124.
2. Ibid., pp.124-125.
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allowable in the practice, as far as it approximates to
the standard, or at least fulfils most of the conditions
set by the standard or ideal morality, i.e. set of
rules.
(c) The problem of pleasure in a pleasure intended happi¬
ness .
As an explanation of what he means by pleasure and pain
as ends, Mill writes,
To give a clear view of the moral standard
set up by the theory, much more requires to
be said; in particular, what things it in¬
cludes in the ideas of pain and pleasure: and
to what extent this is left an open question.
But these supplementary explanations do not
affect the theory of life on which this
theory of morality is grounded - namely, that
pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only
things desirable as ends, and that all desir¬
able things (which are as numerous in the
utilitarian as in any other scheme) are des¬
irable either for the pleasure inherent in
themselves, or as means to the promotion of
pleasure and the prevention of pain.1
Pleasure according to the principle, then, is the desir¬
able thing because it is desired as an end. Mill embarks
on this business before he defines 'good', or what he
means by good as an end; this is why the query at this
juncture centres round 'the desirable' and 'desired' as
ends. It has been suggested by Moore that, if the des¬
ired and the desirable are the same thing (i.e. from the
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, edn, M. Warnock, p.257.
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fact that something is desirable Mill draws the conclus¬
ion that people desire it); and if pleasure is the only-
end desirable as good in itself, then there will be no
difference between the different kinds of pleasures,
i.e. if pleasure is the criterion for what is good, then
there should not be any difference between two different
pleasures, the same can be said about colour, if it were
the criterion of what is good there wouldn't be any diff¬
erence between different colours, e.g. black and red
shall be the same, or white and blue for that matter
won't be any different at all.1 The problem with Moore's
interpretation is that he does not consider 'good' as
a natural object or a feeling for that matter; on the
contrary, he considers it as an indefinable, unanalys¬
able predicate. This is why he accuses Mill of what he
calls the 'Naturalistic Fallacy', i.e. predicating
'good' of natural- objects. Again Moore in supposing the
good as 'unnatural*, 'indefinable', 'unanalysable', is
not really proving that there is a quality or property
which is good and which is indefinable; what he seems
to imply is that such quality or property has no exist¬
ence whatsoever and we shouldn't tamper with the term
'good' anymore. We can only think of God as indefinable,
unanalysable as such, or 'the good' in a Platonic sense,
i.e. the idea of 'good' or 'real good'. But if we attrib¬
ute the quality good to natural objects as well as to
animate objects or sentient beings, and also to super¬
natural or metaphysical being, e.g. God, then we've got
to redefine the word according to the different uses.
Certainly, we can apply the use to the above mentioned
categories, we have to distinguish, then, between diff¬
erent contexts of the use, e.g. 'this is a good descrip¬
tion', and 'that is good food', I can say about the
1. Hall, Everett W., "The 'Proof' of Utility in Bentham and Hill", Ethics, LX (1949),
1-18, (p.2).
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description of the food that 'it is good' and that 'I
enjoyed the description' and that I would like to prom-
i
ote such enjoyment or 'pleasure' in the future. Would
any wise man think of this kind of enjoyment or 'pleas¬
ure', i.e. of the description as an enjoyment of food
or a pleasure of food? If 'description' is not something
to do with stomach and appetite, then to where does it
belong? If the pleasure of the description is a pleasure
of writing or reading, certainly it will not be of the
same type as the pleasure of eating or drinking, i.e.
pleasure of food; then may I deduce that the 'good'
which pertains to 'description' is different from the
'good' which pertains to food. If I can say this, then
I can simply say that they are two different kinds of
pleasures, if not logically, then physiologically and
psychologically they are different, i.e. pleasures of
the senses or sensual pleasures and mental pleasures.
So the quality is different.
But if Moore insists that the 'good' is indefinable be¬
cause it is 'the good' or 'a real good' which is unnat¬
ural, then, of course, pleasure or colour or any other
predicate for that matter, which is identifiable with
'good' will fall in the same category as Moore rightly
suggests. In this respect then, the 'Naturalistic Fall¬
acy' itself will be a naturalistic fallacy, i.e. denying
the predication of good to natural objects. Mill, how¬
ever, distinguishes between different pleasures and
assigns them different places in life; he says,
To suppose that life has (as they express it)
no higher end than pleasure - no better and
nobler object of desire and pursuit - they
designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as
a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the
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followers of Epicurus, were, at a very early
period, contemptuously likened, and modern
holders of the doctrine are occasionally made
the subject of equally polite comparisons by
the German, French, and English assailants.1
Mill, in elucidation of the concept of pleasure adds
that,
It is quite compatible with the principle of
utility to recognize the fact, that some
kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more
valued than others. It would be absurd that
while, in estimating things, quality is con¬
sidered as well as quantity, the estimation
of pleasures should be supposed to depend on
quantity alone.2
As to how we can differentiate between different pleas¬
ures quantitatively, Mill's answer is that,
Of two pleasures, if there be one to which
all or almost all who have experience of both 3'v<_
a decided preference irrespective of any feel¬
ing or moral obligation to prefer it, that
is the more desirable pleasure.3
It seems here Mill is opting for a kind of moral induct¬
ion based on observation learned by experience of diff¬
erent people who practised different sorts of pleasures,
to decide which is quantitatively greater than the




other. It seems that the consensus of experts can decide
whether the quality of this pleasure is greater than
that pleasure, but could they also make this pleasure
or that a criterion of right and wrong? And how could
the pleasures of different individuals, lead to the great¬
est happiness for all?
Sidgwick suggests that the gap between the pleasure of
an aggregate of individuals and the general happiness
as desirable by all can be bridged by an appeal to Rat¬
ional Benevolence as a basis for the utilitarian system.1
This it would seem, is not incompatible with Mill's ap¬
peal to the consensus of experts who can decide which
is the greatest pleasure and consequently, if it is the
only good conducive to the greatest happiness, it should
be a universal rule. This is why Mill insists on the
nobleness of character, cultivation of character as a
background for a utilitarian system, i.e. to emphasize
the role of those who know in the implementation of the
system. Mill endeavours to make this point clear; he
says,
Now it is unquestionable fact that those who
are equally acquainted with, and equally cap¬
able of appreciating and enjoying both, (he
means higher and lower pleasures)...
do give a most marked preference to the man¬
ner of existence which employs their higher
faculties.
Few human creatures would consent to be chan¬
ged into any of the lower animals, for a pro-
1. Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics, Bk.III, Chap.XIII, pp.387-388.
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mise of the fullest allowance of a beast's
pleasures; no intelligent human being would
be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and
conscience would be selfish and base, even
though they should be persuaded that the
fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better sat¬
isfied with his lot than they are with
theirs.1
This is what Sidgwick calls the Rational Benevolence,
which is identifiable with Universalistic Hedonism,
Sidgwick argues that,
Intuitional method vigorously applied yields
as its final result the doctrine of pure Univ¬
ersalistic Hedonism - which it is convenient
to denote by the single word, Utilitarianism.2
It appears that Sidgwick's analysis is right about the
utility principle, as far as the greatest happiness
which is an ultimate end, universal rule and a first,
a priori, principle is concerned, but the subordinate
rules, e.g. 'keep your promise', 'do not tell lies',
'keep your word', etc., are subject to what Mill himself
calls human experience, which depends on past observat¬
ion, i.e. some empirical background apart from the in¬
tuitive first principle. It seems that Mill's utilitar¬
ianism can be said to be partly intuitive and partly em¬
pirical. Mill relies on such experience as practised by
children, as Dorothy Mitchell argues that,
1. Hill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.259.
2. Sidgwick, H., Methods of Ethics, p.407.
- 114 -
In order to achieve the greatest good of the
greatest number, children are to be brought
up so that they cannot conceive of themselves
being happy if someone else is miserable and
so, anyone who is well brought up will be
able to answer his own question "What reason
have I to do the right thing?" by reminding
himself that he wants other people to be
happy. 1
Mill depends on education, cultivation of noble feelings
and observation as much as he depends on the first prin¬
ciple and the Rational Benevolence in defending the sys¬
tem. His utilitarian system incorporates various kinds
of knowledge including religious knowledge. Thus he de¬
fends utilitarianism against assailants who argue that
the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct,
is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all con¬
cerned, he answers that,
As between his own happiness and that of
others, utilitarianism requires him to be as
strictly impartial as a disinterested and
benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of
Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spir¬
it of the ethics of utility. To do as you
would be done by, and to love your neighbour
as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection
of utilitarian morality.2
This is actually similar to the religious spirit which
permeates the religious utilitarianism of Paley. Mill
launches also a move towards educational approach to
utility as he says,
1. Mitchell, Dorothy,"Mill's Theory of Value", Theoria, 35 (1970), 109-115 (p.114).
2. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.268.
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As a means of making the nearest approach to
this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that
laws and social arrangements should place the
happiness, or (as speaking practically it may
be called) the interest, of every individual,
as nearly as possible in harmony with the in¬
terest of the whole; and secondly, that educ¬
ation and opinion, which have so used that
power as to establish in the mind of every
individual an indissoluble association be¬
tween his own happiness and the good of the
whole.1
It seems that this sense of social mobilization of human
feelings is more or less typical of any utilitarian sys¬
tem and indeed, as Sidgwick rightly says, it adds up to
Rational Benevolence which underlies universalistic hed¬
onism, the backbone of the utilitarian system.
1. Hill, J.S., Utilitarianism, pp.268-269.
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SECTION II
THE UTILITARIAN TENDENCIES IN THE ETHICS OF MISKAWAYH
COMPARED WITH ASPECTS OF UTILITARIANISM IN




Reason as an Essence of Human Nature
Why should a treatise on moral philosophy start off with
a definition of the soul and a description of the facul¬
ties of the soul? Miskawayh posed his writing on the
soul, as an answer to the question,
Can man's being and his existence be explain¬
ed without postulating the existence of the
soul?1
or:
Can sensibility, perception, imagination and
intellection stand by themselves, each suffic¬
ient for itself, or must they all inhere in
some substance which exists in its own right?2
Miskawayh was obviously not satisfied with corporeal
C —
1. Abd al-Hamid, Ibn Miskawayh: A Study of His al-Fawz al-Asghar, p.98.
2. Ibid.
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existence so as to attribute the activities of the soul
to bodily or material existence; he finally and emphatic¬
ally opted for the existence of the soul. Such activit¬
ies for him necessitate an existence of a different sub¬
stance. The human nature of man pertains to the soul,
for the body is common to man and animal.1
Miskawayh then divides the soul into three faculties
each with a different function.
The importance attached by Miskawayh to the divisions
of the soul is based on the functions of the three fac¬
ulties of the soul. The functions ascribed by Miskawayh
to the three different faculties of the soul, i.e. the
rational, the irascible and the concuspiscent, are resp¬
onsible for the emergence of the different moral vir¬
tues. Thus the rational soul is responsible for true
knowledge, by which it achieves the virtue of knowledge
and wisdom. The concuspiscent soul, when moderate,
yields to the rational soul and achieves the virtue of
temperance and liberality. The irascible soul is resp¬
onsible for the virtues of magnanimity and courage.2
What Is The Relation Of The Faculties Of The Soul To
Reason?
Miskawayh allots each of the faculties of the soul a
function, i.e. a virtue. It is to the different facul¬
ties that different virtues accord. The hierarchy of
1. Op. cit., Passim.
2. Miskawayh, T.A., (trans, by Zurayk), pp.14-15.
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different faculties corresponds to the hierarchy of diff¬
erent virtues. The best virtues are the ones which com¬
ply with the dictates of reason. Likewise the higher
faculties are the ones which constitute the rational
nature of man. Indeed, Miskawayh is very much interested
in the rational harmony between the faculties which res¬
ults in a rational outcome of rational virtues; he ex¬
plains this as follows:-
Then, when all these virtues are moderate and
have the proper relation one to another, a
virtue is produced, which represents their
perfection and completeness, namely, the vir¬
tue of justice. 1
Miskawayh, as it appears, is keen to see that there
is a proper relation between virtues and that they are
all perfect, perfection being represented by the virtue
of justice, for justice keeps the proportion between
virtues as it has been suggested by Miskawayh in the
chapter on justice, where he defines justice as,
The etymology of the word musawah _/equality_/
indicates_ to you its meaning. For counter¬
balance / cidl 7in loads_j_ equilibrium /~i tidal 7
in weights and justice / cadl 7in actions are
all derived from the meaning of equality/ mus¬
awah _7 Equality is the noblest of the propor¬
tions in the art of music* and other arts.
1. Miskawayh, T.A., pp.15-17.
2. Ibid., p.101.
♦Music is one of the four sciences from which arithmetic originates. The first being
number, the second is geometry, the third figure and the fourth is the science of
combination, which searches into the different conditions of tunes and it... (Cont'd)
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In his treatise on Justice, Miskawayh defines voluntary
justice as,
As for voluntary justice which is found par¬
ticularly in man and for which he is praised,
it is the cultivation of peaceful co-operat¬
ion among the different faculties of the
soul, so that they may not dominate one over
the other and rebel one against the other.1
The co-operation of the faculties of the soul results
in the health of the soul, the nobility of it and the
excellence of soul over body.
All the noblest proportions of the faculties of soul and
the co-operation between different powers of the soul
are directed towards an end, as we have been told by
Miskawayh in his Al-Hawimil wa-al-Shawamil, in which he
describes justice in treatment as,
Injustice particularly _contrasts with justice
in treatment, Justice / Gadl 7is derived from
]_ i ctidal J which means equal division (al-
taqsit bi-al-sawiyyah). This sawiyyah is de¬
rived from musawah _/equality_/ between many
things, equality brings about multiplicity
and gives it existence and maintains its dis¬
cipline. It is by Justice and Equality that
love spreads among people, their intentions
are reconciled, their cities prosper, their
treatment is completed and their ways straigh¬
tened.2
(Cont'd)... is called music. Terms used in A Dictionary of the Tech¬
nical Terms Used in the Sciences of the Muslmans, Part I, edited by Mawlawie Muham¬
mad Wajih Abd al-Haqq & Gholam Kadir, p.41.
1. Miskawayh, T.J., p.30131.
2. Miskawayh, Al-Hawamil wa-al-Shawamil, problem 29, p.84.
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This is a broad definition of justice; it involves equal
division as well as equality among many things, i.e. a
kind of mathematical proportion. But this definition is
employed towards an end, i.e. a social level, which is
social justice, which leads to love, prosperity and com¬
plete treatment. This is apparently a utilitarian end.
Utilitarian here means that it is a kind of Rational
Benevolence.1 It is by knowing justice, the mother of
virtues that we come to know the social end towards
which justice should be directed. This utilitarian sense
of justice has been introduced by Miskawayh in T.A. as
follows;
Furthermore, a person is said to possess one
of These and is praised for it only when it
goes beyond him to others. If he confines it
to himself alone, it cannot be attributed to
him and its name will then be changed. Thus,
generosity when it does not extend beyond its
possessor, is called hypocrisy (and self-
gratification) (nifaq),2 and /similarly_7cour-
age is termed arrogance and zeal, while know¬
ledge becomes J_ merely_7 a kind of enlighten¬
ment .3 *
1. Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics, p.387, in which Sidgwick refers to some util¬
itarian moral terms such as "The axiom of prudence, as I have given, implied in Rat¬
ional Egoism as commonly accepted. Again the axiom of justice or equality as above
stated - 'that similar cases ought to be treated similarly' belongs in all its ap¬
plications to utilitarianism as much as to any system commonly called intuitional:
While the axiom of Rational Benevolence is, in my view, required as a rational basis
of the utilitarian system".
2. Zurayk translated (nifaq) as prodigality, but the nearest word to (nifaq) in
English is hypocrisy. Zurayk is referring to Aristotle's use of the word: Aristotle
uses the word as follows, "With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is
liberality, the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness". It seems that Zur¬
ayk is putting Aristotle's prodigality in the mouth of Miskawayh. Aristotle, N.E.,
8k. II, Ch.6, 11076-8-10.
3. Miskawayh, T. A., (trans, by Zurayk), p.16. * Zurayk's translation of (fjjjstabsj jr )
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It seems here that Miskawayh is suggesting that the util¬
itarian end is a moral end, because it is altruistic,
i.e. it extends beyond the individual to others, whereas
a non-utilitarian end is a mere knowledge, i.e. a kind
of enlightenment.
Miskawayh, here, is also ascribing usefulness to moral
virtues,
a person is said to possess one of these vir¬
tues and is praised for it only when it goes
beyond him to others.1
Coincidentally, this is typical to Hume's sense of use¬
fulness; Hume says,
It seems so natural a thought to ascribe to
their utility the praise, which we bestow on
the social virtues, that one would expect to
meet this principle everywhere in moral writ¬
ers, as the chief foundation of their reason¬
ing and enquiry.2
If moral virtues are not useful, i.e. do not extend to
others, then they are liable to disapprobation. Thus
Miskawayh expresses this sense of disapprobation as,
(Cont'd)... is seeking discernment, but in the view of the writer, the nearest word
to in English is enlightene<^ and hence the noun enlightenment.
1. Miskawayh, T.A., (trans, by Zurayk), p.16.
2. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.46.
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If he confines it to himself alone, it cannot
be attributed to him and its name will then
be changed. Thus, generosity, when it does
not extend beyond its possessor, is called
hypocrisy, and J_ similarly_7 courage is termed
arrogance and zeal, while knowledge becomes
j_ merely J enlightenment.1
This is exactly what Hume calls disgust and disapprobat¬
ion excited by (unuseful) qualities. He borrows an
example from architecture,
A building, whose doors and windows are exact
squares, would hurt the eye by that very pro¬
portion, as ill-adapted to the figure of a
human creature, for whose service the fabric
was intended.2
Hume then transfers the scene from architecture to a
human situation, i.e. a moral quality; he says,
What wonder then, that a man, whose habits
and conduct are hurtful to society, and dan¬
gerous or pernicious to every one who has an
intercourse with him, should, on that ac¬
count, be an object of disapprobation, and
communicate to every spectator the strongest
sentiment of disgust and hatred.3
Obviously, hypocrisy and self-gratification excites dis¬
gust and so is the case with arrogance and all similar
1. Miskawayh, T.A., (trans, by Zurayk), p.16.
2. Hume, 0., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.46.
3. Ibid., p.47.
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qualities, i.e. unuseful qualities, though Miskawayh
does not use the word, yet these qualities convey the
same sense as Hume's sense of disgust and hatred.
Hume would actually refer the origin of these qualities,
i.e. moral qualities, to human sentiments and sympathy
based on self-love, due to his inclination towards moral-
sense theory, i.e. instinctive moral behaviour. Thus he
states that,
Morals excite passions, and produce or pre¬
vent actions. Reason of itself is utterly un-
impotent in this particular. The rules of
morality, therefore, are not conclusions of
our reason.1
As a matter of fact, sentiments and sympathy are the com¬
ponents of these passions excited by morals. The link,
therefore, between human sentiments, which initiate
moral valuation and self-love on the one hand, and the
link between self-love and moral-sense theory, on the
other hand, would label Hume as an egoistic hedonist
rather than an altruistic hedonist.2
Miskawayh, however, would resort to reason or the ration¬
al aspect of human nature envisaged in the concept of
justice, which is borrowed by Miskawayh from Plato's
Republic3 and Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics.4 Miska-
1. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, p.456.
2. C.f. the writer's analysis of Hume's viewpoint in Chapter I, Passim.
3. Plato, The Republic IV 440C , speaks about the harmony between the powers of the
soul, which produce justice.
4. Aristotle, N.E., 8.1135^^^ -1136^ , where Aristotle talks about justice as an act
of deliberation and injustice as an act violating proportion.
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wayh also refers to the nature of moral qualities and
whether they are gained by natural disposition or acquir¬
ed by experience and reason. In T.A. he agrees with the
view that the character, or what he calls (a state of
the soul which causes it to perform its actions without
thought or deliberation),1 is partly natural and partly
acquired by experience. He, however, decides later that
actions are done out of a customary trend, gained from
long experience and practice, but we can define it as
a customary behaviour, from which actions ensue without
thought or deliberation.
This definition has been mentioned in al-Hawami 1 -wa al-
Shawamil almost word for word.2 It is actually not very
far from Hume's position, where Hume considers reason
impotent in the formation of moral traditions.3 For Hume
the role of reason in moral philosophy is limited; it
can only function in two ways,
Either when it excites a passion by informing
us of the existence of something which is a
proper object of it; or when it discovers the
connection of causes and effects, so as to
afford us means of exciting any passion.*
Miskawayh, on the other hand, considers reason as an
essence of human nature. It is by reason that man is
different from animal. Yet in the final analysis, char-
1. Miskawayh, T.A., p.29.
2. Miskawayh, H.wa Sh., p.86 (Arabic Text).
3. Hume, D. A Treatise on Human Nature, p.457.
4. Ibid., p.459.
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acter can be natural and acquired at the same time.
Miskawayh thus expresses his views about reason as an
essence of human nature and, at the same time, he states
its importance in practical philosophy,
It is for this reason that the ancients held
different views regarding character. Some
said that character belongs to the non-
rational soul; others that the rational soul
may have a share of it.
Then people have differed on another point.
Some have expressed the view that he who has
a natural character does not lose it. Others
have said: No part of character is natural
to man, nor is it non-natural. For we are
disposed to it, it also changes as a result
of discipline and admonition either/ rapidly
or slowly.
This last view is one we favour because we
observe its truth plainly and because the
former view leads to the nullification of the
faculty of discernment and reason, to the re¬
jection of all forms of guidance, to the sur¬
render of people to savagery and neglect, and
to the abandonment of youth and boys to the
state in which they happen to be without any
direction or instruction. This is manifestly
very disgraceful.1
It seems that the views reviewed by Miskawayh represent
different groups of philosophers. They are, according
to their philosophies, as follows:-
(1) The Epicureans Character belongs to the non-
natural soul.2
1. Miskawayh, T.A., pp.29-30.
2. Sidgwick, H., Outlines of the History of Ethics, p.85.
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(2) The Stoics He who has a natural character
does not lose it. 1
(3) Galen No part of character is natural
to man, nor is it non-natural.
For we are disposed to it, it
also changes as a result of dis¬
cipline and admonition either/
rapidly or slowly.2
It is evident that Miskawayh chooses Galen's viewpoint.
The contrast, as far as reason is concerned, is between
Miskawayh and Hume: Miskawayh is adopting a Greek posit¬
ion and he is sticking to it. This Greek viewpoint can
be true of Galen, as well as it is true of the philos¬
ophies of Plato and Aristotle.
Hume's view on morality represents a revolt against
reason and a trend towards scientific observation of
moral feeling or moral qualities, i.e. the science of
psychology. This attitude of Hume's has been presented
by T. Nagel as,
On Hume's viewpoint one begins with psychol¬
ogy, and ethics is an elaboration of it. The
basic psychological factors are not them¬
selves brought to light by ethical investig-
1. Sidgwick, H., Outlines of the History of Ethics, p.77.
2. Galen,Mukhtasar Kitab al-Akhlaq Li-Galinus,pp.25-34.
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ation (the the need for a foundation for
ethics may have led to the search for them).
And given Hume's famous restrictions on rat¬
ional assessment of the passions and of pre¬
ferences, the possibility of justifying
morality is strictly limited. Any justificat¬
ion ends finally with the rational gratuitous
presence of the emotion of sympathy; if that
condition were not met, one would simply have
no reason to be moral.1
This being Hume's position, the Greek school represents
the anti-psychological approach to morality; T. Nagel
elucidates the position of Plato and Aristotle as foll¬
ows :
Plato and Aristotle, each in his own way, con¬
stitute examples of such a rebellion against
the priority of psychology. Both felt, I
think, that the motivation for being moral
does not come from elsewhere, i.e. from any
independently comprehensible desire or feel¬
ing. The ethical motivation, even at its most
basic level, can on this view be understood
only through ethics.2
Thus we can observe that the Hume revolt against reason
contrasts with Miskawayh's revolt for reason, i.e. the
Greek rational approach. Hume's psychology, depending
on self-interest, takes the form of egoistic hedonism.
For him, useful qualities must please and must be fit
for a benevolent purpose. It is therefore the utility
of the action which is to be praised or blamed.3
1. Nagel, T., The Possibility of Altruism, pp.10-11.
2. Ibid., p. 11.
3. Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.52.
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Again, it is the social outcome of the action which each
individual appreciates differently. The love for others
is pivoted on self-love and self-interest. To Hume, they
are instinctive.
Although Hume denies reason in morality, especially
practical reason, yet he seems to have initiated the
utilitarian reasoning as a way of justifying scientific
moral thinking, i.e. moral psychology.1 Miskawayh, how¬
ever, opts for Rational Benevolence and hard-headed
reason to prove the necessity of altruism in his ration¬
al utilitarian attitude to morality, i.e. the right of
others to be counted as human beings, members of the
city by dint of their social nature.
This is a typical Aristotelian intellectualism, where
Miskawayh borrows Aristotle's dictum that
... Man is born for citizenship.2
—
_ c 3
Al-Insan madani bi-al-tab .
This social nature of man presents one aspect of his
rationality. Thus Miskawayh elucidates,
1. C.f. writer's criticisms of Hume's position about reason, Chapter I, Passim.
h 1
2. Aristotle, NJh, 8k.I, Ch.7, 1097
3. Miskawayh, T.A., p.25.
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We have made it clear in the preceding pages,
that man, of all the animals, cannot attain
his perfection by himself alone. He must have
recourse to the help of a great number of
people in order to achieve a good life and
follow the right path. This is why the phil¬
osophers have said: *Man is a civic being by
nature. This means that he needs to live in
a city with a large population in order to
achieve human happiness. Every man needs
other people by nature as well as by necess¬
ity. He must, therefore, be friendly towards
others, associate well with them, and hold
them in sincere affection, for they comple¬
ment him and complete his humanity; and he
himself plays the same role in their lives.1
This is the kind of practical reason which is workable
in morality and which has been reduced by Hume to mere
human sympathy.2 This, here, is the point where Miska-
wayh and Hume part company. It is a difference of epis-
temology, (theory of knowledge). In part of Hume's view¬
point, there is a confusion between knowing and perceiv¬
ing,3 for Hume does not approve of moral qualities or
values as matters of fact. If moral values have nothing
* This is what Aristotle says about life in a city: "for the final good is thought
to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is suffic¬
ient for a man by himself, for one man who lives a solitary life, but also for par¬
ents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man
is born for citizenship". Aristotle, N.E., Bk.I, Ch.7, 109?'3®_^.
1. Miskawayh, T.A., p.25.
2. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk.III, Of Morals, pp.468-469.
3. C.f. the controversial book on Moral Notions by Julius Kavesi, pp.19-20, in
which he criticizes Hume's position and tries to prove that there are some real
values in the real world and until this world changes we have no option but to use
the evaluative vocabulary for reference to the existing present real world.
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to do with matters of fact, then they are not perceiv¬
able ideas but they can be perceivable impressions.1 This
status would resign them a place with sounds and col¬
ours, i.e. perceptions of the mind.2 Reason here is
impotent. Because,
reason or science is nothing but the compar¬
ing of ideas, and the discovery of their rel¬
ations .3
Hume, however, fails to see that reason is part of
practical knowledge, e.g. murder as a human action in¬
volves a rational process which is part and parcel of
observable and deductive knowledge; for Hume it is not
a matter of fact and, therefore, it is human sympathy
which makes me feel that murder is disgusting, and
thence it is not knowledge per se. Miskawayh, on the
other hand, following the Greek's track, would consider
murder as a vice, i.e. a moral quality which involves
practical reason and, therefore, is a practical know¬
ledge; i.e. by going back to the Socratic dictum that
'Virtue is knowledge', we can understand that, here,
knowledge means a rational process involving practical
reasoning, not mere intellectual fantasy. Hume ends up
with a kind of moral psychology, whereas Miskawayh
sticks to his philosophic ethics, the Aristotelian rat¬
ionalism tinged with intellectual Platonism and Neo-
Platonism, represented by Galen.




The real difference though between Hume's position and
Miskawayh's position, on the other hand, is that the
resultant moral quality of Hume's utilitarianism does
not pay heed to what is intrinsic of the moral qualit¬
ies; in fact, there are no such things as real moral
values. What we call moral values does not add up to
'intrinsic qualities' or 'real values'. They only ex¬
press the public usefulness of human feeling and sym¬
pathy. They are a mode of reasoning about this human
phenomenon, which does not accept reason as part of the
psychological process. Miskawayh, at the other end of
the scale, is using a Greek way of reasoning about moral
qualities to prove the deep-rooted values in man's soc¬
ial life, which are part and parcel of human nature.
Miskawayh does not negate the role of reason because he
considers reason as one of the components of the ration¬
al process about intrinsic real human values.
The difference between the two philosophers can be illus¬
trated by a simple example; if we say 'X is a good man',
this sentence means to Hume that a particular action or
behaviour done by X at a particular time and in a partic¬
ular situation meets our approbation, but if the
action or the situation could have happened or ensued
from X as an inanimate object, still we could have
approved of it.1 For Miskawayh, however, 'X is a good
man', means X has a character which is good, i.e. X has
a khuluq which we know about him and which is customary,
and which is also a state of the soul which causes it
to perform its actions without thought or deliberation.2*
1. Hume, 0., A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk.III, Pt.I, sect.I, pp.468-469, where
Hume is making the point that morality is not an object of reason and that it has
nothing to do with matters of fact.
2. Miskawayh, T.A., p.29. * Apparently this definition of khuluq has been ...(Cont'd)
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This khuluq or character can best be depicted as that
which distinguishes man from animal. Miskawayh's intro¬
ductory chapter on the powers of the soul and the vir¬
tues which are connected with each, is not written in
vain. It actually helps explaining the noble quality of
the substance of the soul and hence ascribes human qual¬
ities to the soul. Rationality then pertains to the
human substance of man. Miskawayh expresses this ration¬
al quality of man as follows,
That this art - I mean the art of character
training, which is concerned with the better¬
ment of the actions of man qua man is the
most excellent of all the arts becomes evid¬
ent from what I say:-
As we have shown already, the human substance
has a distinctive activity which it does not
share with any other of the world's exist-
ents. Man is the noblest of these existents,
but, when he does not perform the actions dis¬
tinctive of his substance, he resembles, as
we have said, the horse which, if it ceases
to perform completely the actions distinctive
(Cont'd)... borrowed by Miskawayh from Galen. Galen's statement of the definition
is as follows:- ^ \ & '(_> > \ a-^JL \ p iUJ d^>- !
.. 3 <Vyy JkV (yL£J>\ (jLa3 \
(Badawi, Abd al-Rahman, Studies and Texts in the Philosophy and Science of the Arabs,
p.190, C.f. Kraus, B., Kitab al-Akhlaq Li~G51inus (Galen's Book on Morality), p.25),
which can be rendered into the following English translation: "Character is a mood
of the soul which moves man to perform actions of the soul without discernment or
choice".
Miskawayh's version is,
f )J LzJ'f O ^ ^ '
^ ^ j
and the English translation is, "Character is a state of the soul which moves it
to perform its actions without thought or deliberation".
This is also typical of the definition given by Yahya Ibn Adi, which goes as fo11—
ows,#
^ \ (r (J\s> \ <0 \
. i >V
which can be rendered into the following translation, "Character is a mood of the
soul which moves man to perform his actions without discernment or choice".
The two versions of the Muslim philosopher, Miskawayh, and the Christian philospher,
Yahya Ibn Adi prove that they have borrowed the definition from Galen whose book
on Moral Philosophy was very well known to Muslim and Christian scholars of the time.
# Kitab Tahdhlb Al-Akhliq, written by Yahya Ibn CAdi, edited by Takriti, p.72.
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of a horse, is used/ as a donkey for carrying
loads or as cattle for slaughter and is bet¬
ter dead than alive.1
There is, then, a certain degree of expectancy which is
important for the attainment of humanity. It is this
expectancy which gives rationality a human flavour, and
also human experience turns expectancy into a rational
process. In fact, Miskawayh first raised the issue of
the soul in answer to the question,
Can sensibility, perception, imagination and
intellection stand by themselves, each suffic¬
ient for itself, or must they all inhere in
some substance which exists in its own right?2
Indeed the answer to this question gives priority to the
rational soul as the monitor of the-body-soul mechanism
and a generator of higher virtues and hence a guardian
of moral values. Miskawayh makes this clear,
At the beginning of this work, we said that
it is necessary for us to know our souls:
What they are, and for what purpose they ex¬
ist. We said further that, for every existing
substance, there is a perfection which is dis¬
tinctive of it and a certain activity which,
in so far as it is that individual thing, it
does not share with anything else.3
1. Miskawayh, T.A., p.33.
c —
2. Abd al-Hamid, Ibn Miskawayh: A Study of His al-Fawz al-Asghar, p.98.
3. Ibid., p.35.
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Rationality, then, is unique in human experience. If
Hume builds his utilitarian moral reasoning without
depending on reason, on the contrary it is mainly based *•
on self-love and self-interest which teaches man to be
benevolent because he would like to be treated on the
same terms and on the same basis, Miskawayh also builds
his rational approach on altruistic premises. He, how¬
ever, draws some controversial conclusions from those
premises, e.g. from the initial definition of khuluq as
a constant mood of the soul (sajiyya) , he draws the con¬
clusion that there are such unchangeable characteristics
which pertain to different nations like the Arabs,
Romans, Persians and Indians, which distinguish them one
from another. The cause for this difference between diff¬
erent nations, we are told by Miskawayh, has something
to do with the geographical as well as the cosmological
background of different lands and countries.1
. Fo be more precise, Miskawayh provides this answer to
the question of whether we can attribute different char¬
acteristics to different nations,
When a mood of a noble part of the soul is
moderate, I mean in the noble parts of the
body which are: heart, liver and brain, if
to this is added the good virtues we mention¬
ed - I mean the order of the best actions,
and according to the mood, and the refinement
of the mood and maintaining it, there the act¬
ion recurs, and devotion to habit - there we
reap the resultant virtue. Whether this takes
place in a nation, or a person, or whether
1. The main' source on which Miskawayh depends as far as this part of his work is
concerned, is Galen, the physician-philosopher. C.f. Aristotle, N.E., Bk.IX, Ch.2,
1165a3°-35 and Bk.X, Ch.9, 1180a6.
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that was the beginning of noble qualities,
or a gradual training, when the mood is pleas¬
ant, and the aptitude is in a state of read¬
iness and the custom is continuous, then vir¬
tue will be the constant outcome.1
The geographical and cosmological background of a person
or a nation affects the structure of the different pow¬
ers of the soul and hence results in different states
or moods of the soul typical of that person or that
nation. Miskawayh, however, gives a practical example
in an answer to problem 87 in al-Hawamil wa-al-Shawamil
about the miseries of the ignorant ones and the happi¬
ness of the knowledgeable ones; this can be found in the
blacks (Ad-Sudan) and the reds (Al-Humran) . The blacks
are pleasant and ignorant, while the reds are wise, more
rational and considerate. Miskawayh's answer is that,
The blacks, especially the negroes are pleas¬
ant and active, this is caused by the moder¬
ation of their hearts' blood, not because
their characters are as dark as the darkness
of their colours. The blackness of their col¬
ours is caused by their nearness to the sun.
When the sun passes in its lowest orbit over
their heads, it burns their skins and their
hair. It appears - I mean their hair, crispy
(woolly), which is really an oxidization of
the hair, because the heat covers their exter¬
iors and extracts instinctive heat from their
interiors. For heat moves towards heat. This
is why there is not much instinctive heat in
their hearts. If the instinctive heat in the
heart is not strong, the blood will not be
caused to burn, instead it will be rather re¬
fined and thin. The blood of the negroes is
always thin and refined, this is why they are
also less courageous...
1. Miskawayh, HwaSh., Problem 87, pp.209-210.
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As to the reds (by the reds he means the
whites) most of them are in the Northern hemi¬
sphere and the cold countries which are far
from the sun, the instinctive heat increases
in their hearts, and because the cold covers
their exteriors, their skins become white,
and their hair curly (fluffy). Their heat
goes back to the interiors of their bodies,
escaping the cold weather, for the sun is far
from them, this is why they are courageous
and the heat of their hearts is more stonger.
Their blood for this reason, is darker and
black and not moderate.
The moderate people, who are away from the
North and South, and they inhabit the mid¬
lands, are more complete as compared with
these directions, and they have good moods,
and nearer to moderation.1
Miskawayh here commits himself to many sciences without
perfecting any or satisfying the conditions of scient¬
ific study. He describes a phenomenon, geographically
and biologically and then draws ethical conclusions
about the characteristics of these different groups of
people and nations without providing a strong support
for his argument. The initial step in the argument comes
from Galen's definition of khuluq, i.e. natural and ac¬
quired khuluq. The afore-mentioned description does not
commit Miskawayh to a particular scientific theory or
a racial attitude towards a particular group of people.
In T.A. , however, Miskawayh seems to be nearer to a par¬
ticular commitment rather than just stating a philos¬
ophic assumption based on a particular scientific hypo¬
thesis. He states that,
The first rank in the human realm, which
touches the limit of the animal realm, is the
1. Miskawayh, H. wa Sh., Problem 87, pp.211-212.
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rank of the people who dwell in the farthest
parts of the inhabited world both to the
north and to the south, such as the remotest
Turks in the countries of Gog and Magog and
the remotest Negroes and similar nations
which are distinguished from apes to a slight
degree only. Then the faculty of discernment
and understanding grows in men until they
reach the central regions where intelligence,
quickness of understanding and the ability
to acquire virtues are produced in them.1
This is not only a biased viewpoint about the (Akhlaq),
characteristics of both Turks and Negroes, but it has
a certain racial overtone that distorts the philosoph¬
ical framework of Miskawayh's utilitarian altruistic
attitude which is based on Rational Benevolence and,
indeed, Rational Nature of man. The same biased views
about human nature and the moral qualities attributed
to it, can be traced in Hume's egoistic hedonism. The
fact that Hume based his utilitarian attitude on self-
love and self-interest, signifies that his scientific
ambition is based on subjective observations about the
self,2 rather than a broad survey of this human phenom¬
enon, but Hume by doing this, is not committed to an
ethical theory; as a matter of fact, he is not committed
to a moral theory at all. The moral sense theory, which
he advocates, is a loose commitment to human sympathy
and sentiment. The others are included by way of egois¬
tic benevolence, stemming from selfish feelings. Some
philosophers do not consider Hume as a utilitarian.3
Hume is certainly consistent in building his egoistic
moral psychology on the basis of moral sense theory and
1. Miskawayh, T.A., p.61.
2. Stephen, t., History of English Thought in the 18th Century, p.87.
3. Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, p.208. It says this about Hume's ... (Cont'd)
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its corollaries. Miskawayh, on the other hand, does not
depend on Islamic Law or Muslim Sharic a in his conclus¬
ions about characteristics of actions or Turks and Neg¬
roes for that matter. His ideas in this respect should
be judged on the merit of the soundness of their logic,
i.e. basic ethical and scientific assumptions. They evid¬
ently do not stand scientific criticism since they lack
experimentation as far as science is concerned and they
are not logically sound because their premises are not
proven.
The utilitarian trend in the moral philosophy of Miska¬
wayh can be designated as Rule-Utilitarian, because he
does not refer to particular actions as much as he
refers to collective actions and universal patterns of
behaviour, which are customary, and are done without
thought or discernment. This pattern of behaviour im¬
plies a degree of expectancy in moral attitudes which
can be analysed in the light of modern R.U. or A.U. 1 *
Yet it can be said to be utilitarian according to the
common features it shares with utilitarianism, classical
and modern. For instance, it has rational benevolence
altruistic hedonism and universalistic hedonism, involv¬
ing all members of the city. These utilitarian princi¬
ples have been summed up in the following passage from
T.A. ,
(Cont'd)... utilitarianism,
"David Hume is often classified as a utilitarian, but he used utility not as norm¬
ative or even as a utilitarian, but as a normative or even as a descriptive princ¬
iple, but as an explanatory one: When asked why we approve of certain traits of char¬
acter, he would point out that they are traits which either are useful or are immed¬
iately agreeable.
1. Frankena, William K., Ethics, pp.35-43.
* R.U. = Rule Utilitarian, one must act as if his action will be a universal rule.
A.U. = Act-Utilitarian = one must act so that the end of his action will bring
greatest happiness.
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We have made it clear in the preceding pages
that man, of all the animals, cannot attain
his perfection by himself alone. He must have
recourse to the help of a great number of peo¬
ple in order to achieve a good life and foll¬
ow the right path.
This is why the philosophers have said: "Man
is a civic being by nature". This means that
he needs to live in a city with a large pop¬
ulation in order to achieve human happiness.
Everyman needs other people by nature as well
as by necessity.
He must, therefore, be friendly towards
others, associate well with them, and hold
them in sincere affection, for they comple¬
ment him and complete his humanity; and he
himself plays the same role in their lives.1
These, as has been shown, are typical utilitarian tend¬
encies.
1. Miskawayh, T.A., p.25.
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CHAPTER V
RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF MISKAWAYH'S UTILITARIAN TREND:
MISKAWAYH AND PALEY
A broad background can be drawn for the comparison be¬
tween Paley and Miskawayh. It involves mainly their
religious viewpoints. The one is a Muslim and the other
is a Christian. They are both said to have stumbled on
philosophy by way of curiosity. Both, therefore, are not
original philosophers so to speak. Miskawayh comes
across Greek philosophy translated .into Arabic at his
time, himself being a litterateur. He indulges in as¬
pects of moral philosophy dealing with the teachability
of virtue by keeping to the feet of Aristotle and Plato.
Paley, on the other hand, is a theologian whose interest
in Mathematics leads him to speculate into logic and
later political and moral philosophy. Their philoso¬
phies can be characterized as normative, religious and
didactical.
Miskawayh, an admirer of Aristotle, succumbs to the dic¬
tates of Aristotelian rationalism. After having spent
some time in the life of joy and pleasure, he decides
with rigorous determination to carry on a new life of
virtue to the end of his life. He comes, thereafter,
to reconcile reason and religion or revelation. Accord¬
ing to his didactical programme, religion or received
instructions comes first, i.e. at an early age and,
thence, we start rationalizing or philosophizing about
our behaviour, in such a way so as not to contradict the
letters of the scripture. Paley more or less builds his
moral reasoning on the same edifice of received revelat¬
ion. In this case, it is Christianity. He opts for a
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utilitarian reasoning, depending on mutual benevolence
of the faithful for the sake of everlasting happiness.
So far, both Miskawayh and Paley agree on the general
scheme of philosophy; in other words, they both follow
the same method in researching morals, which can be
illustrated as follows
They may differ as to the last step of the method. Misk¬
awayh would rather give the priority to scripture as far
as the early years of life are concerned, 1 whereas Paley
sticks to the revealed scripture as a guidance all
through his research.2
c c c —
1. Izzat, Abd-Al- Aziz, Miskawayh, p.213. C.f. Miskawayh, T.A., pp.50, 55, 154.
2. Paley, W., Principles of Moral S Political Philosophy, p.1-3.
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Miskawayh demonstrates the workability of the method
when he says,
_ ^
It is the j_Law_/ Islamic Law, (al-Shari a)
which reforms the young, accustoms them to
good deeds, and prepares their souls to re¬
ceive wisdom, seek virtue, and attain human
happiness through sound and correct reason¬
ing. It is the duty of the parents to train
them to observe these and other forms of good
conduct, by different methods of discipline,
such as flogging if necessary, or rebukes if
availing, or promises of favours or enjoy¬
ments which they like, or warnings of punish¬
ments which they fear. Then, after they have
become accustomed to this conduct, and have
followed it for a long period of time, they
will be able to learn the proofs of what they
had adopted by tradition and will perceive
the ways of virtues, their acquisition, and
the attainment of their ends by the art which
we are treating now.1
This is not a systematic presentation of the method, but
in a way, it presents the method in a practical, simple
style that can be grasped. It simply refers to the prac¬
ticality of the method and how reasonable it is. What
Miskawayh wants to say, can be summarized: Revelation
precedes reason.
By stating that religion comes before philosophy, Miska¬
wayh is preparing the ground for his didactical moral¬
ity, i.e. the readiness of the child to be taught at the
beginning of his life and, then, the growth and develop¬
ment of reason from potentiality to actuality makes him
_ c
1. Miskawayh, T.A., p.32. (The translation of "Shari a" as 'law' even with a capital
(L) will not render the right meaning of Islamic Law which is meant to stand for
revelation.)
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mature enough to handle problems of philosophy. This is
actually based on Miskawayh's thesis on mind and sense
in his Treatise on Mind and Soul; he holds the opinion
that,
Sense is associated with j_ reason_7 or mind,
not vice versa but sense appears in us before
reason, i.e. we have used our sense since the
time of our creation. Mind, however, appears
in us later, though it precedes sense in
existence.1
Miskawayh, here, is stating that /_Mind_7or _/Reason_7ex¬
ists potentially in us since birth, but we come to use
it actually after we are mature enough. If this is the
state of our mental development, then naturally we can¬
not philosophize, i.e. use reason proper, unless we are
well trained to use our minds actively. Miskawayh, then,
is consistent in trying to reconcile reason and relig¬
ion. To state that religion comes first is consistent
with the precendence of sense to mind in time-lapse.
Childhood for him is the right time for instruction and
— c
the Shari a is the right instruction for that purpose.
The Sharic a, then, sets the example to be followed by
children in their future life, and about which they will
later reason.
Paley, the Christian philosopher of the 18th century,
has a similar way of reasoning. He considers morality
as the
1. Miskawayh, A Treatise on Soul and Mind, from Sadawi's, Studies and Texts in the
Philosophy and Science of the Arabs, p.58.
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science which teaches men their duty and the
reasons for it.1
As to why this science should be studied, Paley's answer
is that:
Without it, the rules of life, by which men
are ordinarily governed, oftentimes mislead
them, through a defect either in the rule,
or in the application.2
The rules which should govern life, according to Paley,
are :
These, rules are the Law of Honour, the Law
of the Land, and the Scriptures.3
In examining how we can possibly teach such a combinat¬
ion of positive and divine rules, he maintains that
positive laws are not so important or necessary as the
Scriptures. We learn morality from Scripture by way of
example, because morality to him is a practical science,
thus he writes,




in which all practical
as Arithmetic, Grammar,
like. Rules are laid
re subjoined: not that




these examples are the cases, much less all
the cases which will actually occur, but by
way only of explaining the principle of the
rule, and as so many specimens of the method
of applying it. 1
Paley adds later:
The above considerations are intended to
prove, that the scriptures do not supersede
the use of the science of which we profess
to treat, and to acquit them of any charge
of imperfection or insufficiency.2
Here Paley is trying to reconcile practical reason and
revelation; the outcome will be the science of morals.
It seems here that Miskawayh is more precise and
straightforward in his approach to the question of reas¬
on and revelation. R. Walzer considers this conciliat¬
ory attitude as a kind of conversion; he says,
Miskawayh is a convert to philosophy. Through
philosophy alone man can become perfect and
happy, happy in this world and in the world
to come. It is the road to salvation... and
the only true education (adab haqiqi- ). The
upbringing which could guarantee this aim
should be based on habituation as offered by
the established religious tradition (adab al-
Shari a) : this tradition provides truth in
religious form, accessible to the child's
mind as well as to those who have by the lim¬
itations of their nature no access to philos-




Miskawayh could be considered as a convert to philos¬
ophy, but certainly he does not consider philosophy
alone as a road to salvation. The fact that he depends
on religion 1 Shari ca' as a tool of instruction proves
the limitation of reason according to his own analysis.
Miskawayh succeeds, in the previous examples, to recon¬
cile reason and revelation in practical philosophy. Act¬
ually this practical sense of morality moves Miskawayh,
as it moves Paley, towards a search for a moral end and,
hence, a utilitarian trend occurs as a result of this
social happy end, or benevolent end, or altruistic hedon¬
ism (universal hedonism). This utilitarian trend is not
separate from the religious outlook of his moral philos¬
ophy. G.E. Grunebaum explains this coherent ethico-
religious aspect of reason in Miskawayh's moral philos¬
ophy as follows,
A Hellenizing philosopher such as Miskawayh
cannot reconcile himself to_£he thought that
any injunction of the Shari a could lack a
direct relation to an inborn disposition or
need of man. Companionableness or "social
feeling", uns, is an elementary human trait.
It is to cultivate this trait that the sari
a imposed the duty to perform the five daily
prayers in common rather than in isolation.
The purpose of that community prayer is, as
Miskawayh expressly states, to actualize the
natural companionableness which is in man in
potentia. The Friday Service, which will
1. Walzer, R., "Some Aspects of Miskawayh's Tahdhib al-Akhlaq", from Greek into Arabic,
edited by Walzer himself, pp.232-233.
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will bring together people from different
parts of town, the two principal festivals
of the Muslim year, which will unite villag¬
ers with townspeople, and even the pilgrimage
to Mecca, which unites Muslims from every
country, are viewed, and if you wish account¬
ed for, by the same consideration.1
What Grunebaum did not observe is the utilitarian end
which Miskawayh aims at here, i.e. love and happiness.
These cibadat, are a daily practice towards the achieve¬
ment of love and happiness. In T.A., Miskawayh mentions
this practice of the innate disposition to companionable-
ness as the purpose or end, in other words, utilitarian
C — 2
end of the ibada.
1. Grunebaum, G.E. von, "Concept and Function of Reason in Islamic Ethics", from
Oriens, Vol.15, 1962, p.6. C.f. Miskawayh, T.A., pp.127-128.
(X —
2. This can only be true about material benefits of ibadah in this world, apart
from the spiritual benefits in this world and in the hereafter. Miskawayh uses the
c c —c
word 'la alla"'Wala alia al-Shari a" (perhaps) to denote that which he is suggesting
to have been the aim or purpose of these. ibadat is his own 'ijtihad' (research),
and not something that should be thought of as inherent in these religious obligat¬
ions, the pros and cons of which one does not have to argue about, unless one is
making 'ijtihad' about his own experience of the utility of these ibadat here and
now: This is actually what Miskawayh has been doing. In his paper, Grunebaum draws
the conclusion that reason for the West is a task to be accomplished, but for Islam
it is a testimony to a reasoned order already in existence. (Grunebaum, ibid.).
As one can see from the example of community prayer, Friday prayer and Muslim Festi¬
vals, given by Miskawayh, even those ibadat which are prescribed by the Quran and
Sunna, can be turned into a social task to be accomplished to transform the Muslim
society into a united group and indeed to transform different Muslim groups into
a united Muslim Umma; the example of Hajj is the best testimony. One has only to
look into the utility of the ibada . Reason as such, i.e. a utilitarian end, will
be directed towards an end to be achieved rather than reasoning about facts and
prescriptions already in existence, because it is a utilitarian reason, a reason
which is directed towards a useful end, and it is also directed towards a task to
be accomplished. If Grunebaum, however, deduced from the conditions of Muslims
at the present what Islamic reason is, then he must have known that what is, is
not necessarily in conformity with what ought to be.
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This end of natural companionableness can be found in
Paley's moral sense approach, which is built on a diff¬
erent social attitude, i.e. self-love instead of love
of others. The outcome is a utilitarian end based main¬
ly on a social-return: 'do as you would be done by'.
This Christian dictum is turned by Paley in the direct¬
ion of self-love, instead of turning it in the real
Christian direction, the direction of 'love your neigh¬
bour as yourself', i.e. equal love, for self and others,
not a kind of imbalanced love of self, which accomodates
for others by way of selfish desires and selfish feel¬
ings. 1
Miskawayh, however, is keen to see his utility working.
He wants to see that Islamic Law plays a part in the up¬
bringing of children, but when they grow up they have
to devote themselves to philosophy, which is the highest
kind of wisdom; he explains his views about this, as
follows,
From what we have already said, it follows
that there are four kinds of happy people,
which we can determine by examination and
perception. Thus, we find the kind of man who
is good and virtuous from the beginning of
his life. We observe his intelligence since
childhood, and in his youth we perceive in
him the aptitude for success by his modesty
and noble disposition, his preference for the
company of the good and for the friendship
of the virtuous, and his aversion to their
opposites. But as we have said before, he can¬
not reach this condition without receiving
1. Paley, W., Principles of Moral £ Political Philosophy, op. cit., pp.1, 5, 10,
19, 20.
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attention from the time of his birth. We also
find the man who does not possess this qual¬
ity at the beginning of his life. He is like
all other children, but he strives, works
hard and seeks the truth whenever he sees
people disagreeing about it.1
If this becomes the educational practice for the citiz¬
en then it should lead him to the expected happiness.
The kind of happiness which Miskawayh is aspiring to
achieve by this reconciliatory method is twofold:-
The part of happiness which has got something to do with
material happiness and the other part of it which has
got something to do with the spiritual happiness, which
means to Miskawayh an eternal happiness congruent with
the eternity of the soul. Material happiness satisfies
bodily needs, which process is called practical virtue,
and it originates from the faculties of the soul which
are concerned with bodily pleasures and desires, i.e.
the concupisent and irascible faculties. Whereas spirit¬
ual happiness satisfies a spiritual need. This process
is called theoretical virtue, and it originates from the
rational faculty of the soul.2
Happiness can be attained also as a perfection of man.
Perfection of man being for Miskawayh the achievement
and satisfaction of the purpose of his creation. Certain-
1. Miskawayh, T.A., pp.153-154.
2. Ibid., pp.10-15.
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ly perfection does not pertain to the bodily faculties,
since they are by nature subservient to the rational
soul. 1 *
Paley, on the other hand, asserts the role of the script¬
ure in Morality,
Without entering into a detail of scripture
morality, which would anticipate our subject,
the following general positions may be ad¬
vanced, I think with safety.
1. That a state of happiness is not to be ex¬
pected by those who are conscious of no moral
or religious rule...
Paley then mentions the second position as:
That a state of happiness is not to be expect¬
ed by those who reserve to themselves the hab¬
itual practice of any one sin, or neglect of
one known duty. Because no obedience can pro¬
ceed upon proper motives, which is not univer¬
sal; that is, which is not directed to every
command of God alike, as they stand upon the
same authority... and because... When our
duties are recited, they are put collective¬
ly, that is, as all and every of them re¬
quired in the Christian character.2
1. Miskawayh, T.A., pp.12-14. C.f. K.S., (writer's translation), pp.4-6.
*8y achievement of creation he means the use of rational soul concerning will and
choice. C.f. Aristotle, N.E., Bk.III, Ch.4.51113^^^ , where Aristotle is talking
about deliberation and choice of voluntary actions.
Izzat does not refer to the perfection of man in the 8ook of Happiness in Moral
Philosophy, which is one of the important key themes of the book. It is through this
perfection of man qua man that man aspires for his happiness and the ultimate happi¬
ness too. CIzzat, Abd al-C^z"^z» in Ibn Miskawayh, p.339.
2. Paley, W., Principles of Moral & Political Philosophy, pp.23-24.
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It seems that Paley like Miskawayh is haunted by the con¬
cept of happiness as an end of moral action. A state of
happiness is an achievement of both moral and religious
rule:
That state of happiness is not to be expected
by those who are conscious of no moral or
religious rule...1
He also refers to happiness as a result of a perfect
deed or a refined character which does not take to sins
or neglect duties:
That a state of happiness is not to be ex¬
pected by those who reserve themselves to hab¬
itual practice of any one sin, or neglect of
one known duty.2
The achievement of what is man's duty or perfection (a
man who is not taking to the life of sins), has been ex¬
pressed by Miskawayh in the Book of Happiness as the per¬
fection of man, i.e. what is expected of man qua man.
Miskawayh states that,
Some of the things which we have just enumer¬
ated could be called happiness metaphorically
and some are real happiness and some are
thought to be happiness and are not happiness
at all. This is because those ends which are
1. Paley, W., Principles of Moral & Political Philosophy, p.23.
2. Ibid.
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common to man and animals are not happiness
to us because they are not our end and per¬
fection as human beings qua human beings. As
to those ends which pertain to man qua man,
they could be called happiness, but this is
common to all people.1
The difference between the two conceptions is that Miska-
wayh thinks in terms of a Muslim character; this is why
he has to resort to Islamic Law to support his claim for
perfection and universality. The same is true of Paley;
he resorts to Christian character to assert the perfect
qualities which he claims to bring about this happy end
he is looking for. Paley sums briefly the features of
the Christian character as follows:
Add to your faith virtue, and to virtue know¬
ledge and to knowledge temperance, and to tem¬
perance patience and to patience godliness
and to godliness brotherly-kindness, and to
brotherly kindness charity.
His model of Christian character is a blend of practic¬
al, theoretical and religious virtues. This presentation
of the Christian character fits well in the method of
reconciliation of reason and revelation, although there
is a great tendency towards the Scripture as a source
of morality. This is consistent with Paley's definition
of virtue which is:
the doing good to mankind, in obedience to
1. Miskawayh, K.S., (writer's translation), p.5.
2. Paley, W., Principles of Moral & Political Philosophy, p.24.
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the will of God, and for the sake of everlast¬
ing happiness.1
He goes further to explain that,
"the good of mankind" is the subject; the
"will of God" the rule; "everlasting happi¬
ness" the motive of human virtue.2
We can see here, that perfection leads to virtue and vir¬
tue leads to happiness; this is why happiness is given
priority in the statement of the principle of utility.
Thus Paley states the principle of utility as,
Actions are to be estimated by their tendency
to promote happiness. Whatever is expedient
is right. It is the ability of any moral rule
alone which constitutes the obligation of it.3
A comparison can be drawn from Miskawayh's own life¬
style which leads him from "life of sin" (imperfection)
to a life without sin (perfection) and this leads him
to look for virtue and eventually happiness emerges as
a utilitarian end for life on earth and a transcendental
happiness to be looked for in the seach for wisdom as




a highest kind of happiness in this life.1 Transcendent¬
al happiness should also be aspired for in the life to
come.2 A contrast, however, can also be shown between
the tendency towards egoistic hedonism in Paley's ap¬
proach, i.e. the tendency towards what is expedient. At
this point Paley is not clear about 'what is expedient',
i.e. whether it is something to do with the community
at large or whether it is something to do with the indiv¬
idual alone. This, however, can be made clear if we con¬
sider what Paley has to say about human action in gen¬
eral. He says,
Mankind acts more from habit than reflection.3
As to why mankind should act from habit rather than from
deliberation, he answers,
It is on few only and great occasions that
men deliberate at all; on fewer still, that
they institute anything like a regular en¬
quiry into the moral rectitude or depravity
of what they are about to do; or wait for the
result of it. We are for the most part deter¬
mined at once; and by an impulse which is the
effect and energy of pre-established habits.*
This idea of habit is brought in by Paley to help in the
establishment of a society adaptable to the Scripture.
1. Miskawayh, T.A., pp.81-85.
2. Ibid. C.f. K.S., Passim.
3. Paley, W., The Principles of Moral & Political Philosophy, p.20.
4. Ibid.
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It is based on the moral sense theory, which advocates
intuitive, instinctive morality and pays no heed to
reason. Paley listens to reason only when it is the word
of Scripture. Paley, however, ends up with egoistic hed¬
onism, which he tries to reconcile with utilitarianism;
this is why he has been criticized by J. Plamenatz as
a pseudo-utilitarian. Plamenatz says,
Paley's reconciliation is more mechanical and
less plausible. It may be that the cause of
virtue is further from his heart, that, hav¬
ing, like James Mill, derived benevolence
from the selfish passions, he is more to keep
their origins constantly in view. It is for
this reason only that Paley, rather than Ben-
tham or James Mill, deserves to be called a
pseudo-utilitarian.1
Yet, it is difficult to consider Paley as a pseudo-
utilitarian not so much for the reason that he starts
off from selfish premises but rather because his utility
principle is irreconcilable with the concept of habit
in morality. If habit is the criterion of moral attitude
why utilitarianism? The only answer which Paley could
possibly think of is that, if God is the greatest utilit¬
arian, then I am a utilitarian too.
Miskawayh passes the experience of intuition and ration¬
ality of moral actions successfully because he, as a
philosopher, knows what is expected of him as a Muslim
philosopher, especially in the circles of the ministers
and their entourage. Miskawayh, then, opts for the
1. Plamenatz, J., The English Utilitarians, pp.51-52.
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division of faculties of the soul and eventually the div-
Jc, 7t\A t
isions of actions into spiritual and physical,/some of
our physical behaviour can be said to be habitual, i.e.
psychological reflexive actions, e.g.,
One kind is natural and originates in the tem¬
perament, as in the man whom the least thing
moves to anger or who is aroused for the
least cause, or in the man who is cowardly
in the face of the most trifling incident -
who is afraid of a noise which strikes his
ear or is terrified by the news which he
hears - or who bursts into excessive laughter
at the least thing that pleases him, or is
saddened and distressed because of the least
trouble that befalls him.1
However, some other physical actions are deliberate and
necessitate the use of will and choice, e.g.
The best of men is he who is most_capable of
performing actions proper to him /as man_7and
most strongly attached to the requirements
of his substance which distinguishes him from
other existents.2
Miskawayh then describes reflection as
"The best reflection is reflection upon what
is best." Then reflection declines from one
grade to another until it reaches the level
1. Miskawayh, X.lA.L • P • 2 9 .
2. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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of the consideration of possible things in
the realm of sense.1
Then he illustrates with examples, as follows,
the faculty which has to do with reflection,
discernment, and the consideration of the
realities of things; the faculty which finds
expression in anger, intrepidity, the risking
of dangers, and the desire for dominance,
self-esteem, and the different kinds of hon¬
our, and the faculty by which we have pass¬
ion, the quest for food, and the desire for
the pleasures derived from food, drink, sex¬
ual intercourse, and various sexual enjoy¬
ments .2
As to spiritual division of action, it belongs to the
rational soul which is concerned with the quest for wis¬
dom and happiness. This is the standard of philosophers,
i.e. like Aristotle. Miskawayh, here, seems to have
developed his own argument about Aristotle's views on
reason and intellect in F.A., as he says,
so the soul when it wishes to perceive intell-
igibles, moves to its perfection and turns
its attention to reason (in which all the in-
telligibles are present) in order that it may
obtain all matters of knowledge and become
perfect, and form complete unity with the in¬
tellect. This movement of the soul is called
vision and thought.3
1. Miskawayh, T.A., p.14.
2. Ibid., pp.14-15.
3. Miskawayh, Al-Fawz al-Asghar; see Sweetman, J.W., Islam and Christian Theology,
Part.I, V.I, p.125.
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He explains the function of the rational soul as,
The fact is that the rational soul perceives
all particulars and universals by one power,
although the method of perception is differ¬
ent. Aristotle illustrates1 this by saying
that the rational soul perceives simple in-
telligibles by a straight line, i.e., direct¬
ly, and without a medium, and composite sens-
ibles by a crooked line, i.e. by the medium
of the senses.2
This completes the picture of Miskawayh's articulation
of his reconciliatory attitude between reason, revelat¬
ion, intuition and intellection, (rational approach to
morality). Moreover, he succeeds in keeping his rational
utilitarian ends within an ethico-relgious framework,
yet he opts for a reconciliation between the two Greek
philosophers, Plato and Aristotle.
Eoth Miskawayh and Paley fit quite well in the category
which has been described by Hume3 as a justification for
a way of life. The difference between them is that Paley
tends towards universalistic hedonism4 * and Miskawayh
tends towards what can be called a rule utilitarian
approach, involving altruistic, rationalistic and univ¬
ersal features of rule-utilitarianism, i.e. it combines
1. Aristotle, De Anima, 8k.Ill, Ch.4, 429^^ .
2. Miskawayh, Al-Fawz al-Asghar; c.f. Sweetman, op. cit.. Passim.
3. Hare, R.M., The Language of Morals, p.69.
4. Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics, pp.
* Universalistic Hedonism in Paley's Christian Philosophy can be contrasted with
universalistic altruism in Miskawayh's Islamic Philosophy (C.f. Sidgwick, op. cit.,
pp.121-122).
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THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF MISKAWAYH'S UTILITARIANISM
It must be pointed out at the outset that there is no
sharp distinction between the subject matter of this
chapter and the previous ones, except that in this chap¬
ter the social and the religious will go together as
part of the same process, i.e. ethico-religious justif¬
ication of utilitarian reasoning. The ethico-religious
aspect is basic to Miskawayh's utilitarian tendency and
it is acceptable at the same time as part of Mill's
utilitarian experience and, indeed, as a human feeling
too. There are some similarities and contrasts between
the philosophies of Mill and Miskawayh:
a) They both start off with happiness as an end to be
attained and they differ as to the general principle
of happiness as a criterion of the rightness and
wrongness of actions judged by their consequences.
Mill holds the opinion that happiness is the criter¬
ion of the rightness and wrongness of actions, where¬
as Miskawayh does not; instead he refers to Islamic
Law as the instrument of guidance and correction. So
— c
the difference here is that, to Miskawayh, Shari a
Islamic Law_7 is the criterion of the rightness
and wrongness of actions. 1
b) They both accept the broad definition of happiness
1. Miskawayh, T.A., Passim.
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as promotion of pleasures and avoidance of pain, and
they shun grovelling animal qualities as resultant
consequences for happy ends.
c) They both accept the social background for what is,
in the case of Mill, a utilitarian system and, for
Miskawayh, a utilitarian tendency.
Justice is a supportive principle to their claims to
social benevolence or Rationalistic Benevolence. They
can both be categorized as rule-utilitarians without dis¬
tortion or abuse to the developed sense of R.U.
This chapter will be concerned with the comparisons and
contrasts between the two philosophers with reference
to these points. Mill's philosophy supplies the back¬
ground on which Miskawayh's philosophy will be presented
as it either compares or contrasts with Mill's philos¬
ophy. In cases where there is no argument to be made on
behalf of Miskawayh, the text will be interpreted so as
not to distort it, misuse language or abuse philosophy.
(a) Mill states his utility principle as a first, a
priori principle, partly gained by immediate knowledge,
i.e. known directly by experience; and partly empirical
knowledge, sensual knowledge, i.e. physical. Mill states
the problem as:
The creed which accepts as the foundation of
morals, utility, or the greatest happiness
principle, holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness,
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wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure
and the absence of pain: by unhappiness, pain
and the privation of pleasure.1
By happiness, he means the promotion of pleasure and the
absence of pain. Happiness is supposed to be an end and
a consequence of action.
Miskawayh's statement of the utilitarian tendency is
that,
With the help of God (exalted is He!), we
begin this discourse by stating the differ¬
ence between the good and happiness, after
quoting the words of Aristotle in imitation
of him and in acknowledgement of what is due
to him. So we say: The good, as he defined
it and according to the view of the ancients
which he approved, is that towards which all
things aim, i.e. the ultimate end. And any¬
thing which is useful towards that end is
called a good.
As to happiness, it is the good in relation
to its possessor and constitutes to him a per¬
fection. Happiness then is a good. The happi¬
ness of man may be different from the happi¬
ness of the horse; and the happiness of every¬
thing lies in its particular completion and
perfection.2
__ Q
In another proposition in Kitab al-Sa ada (Book of Happi¬
ness), he elucidates what he meant by Ultimate Happiness
and happiness as a good. He maintains that Ultimate
Happiness is the long-term perfection of man, by which
1. Hill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.257.
a i _ 15
2. Miskawayh, T.A., 3, p.69. C.f. Aristotle, N.£., Bk.III, Ch.I, 1094
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it can be said that one man is more human than another
by way of his achievement of ultimate perfection, i.e.
the qualities which distinguish man from animal.
As to the goods which are common to man and animal, this
as Miskawayh says is what people call the pleasant al-
ladhidh.1 Miskawayh here wants to distinguish between
higher pleasures which are the pleasures that distin¬
guish man from animal from lower pleasures, 'what people
call the pleasant'. It seems from this account that Misk¬
awayh and Mill agree on the final end or ultimate end,
which is the 'Greatest Happiness' for Mill, and .'Ultim¬
ate Happiness' for Miskawayh, and that it should be an
end of human actions. Mill has left the concept of pleas¬
ure vulnerable to criticism because he does not specify
what pleasures and what pains. He later decides that the
pleasures he means are human high pleasures; he agrees
with Miskawayh that animal qualities are imperfections;
he says,
It is indisputable that the being whose capac¬
ities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest
chance of having them fully satisfied, and
a highly endowed being will always feel that
any happiness which he can look for, as the
world is constituted, is imperfect. But we
can learn to bear its imperfections, if they
are at all bearable; and they will not make
him envy the being who is indeed unconscious
of the imperfections, but only because he
feels not at all the good which these imper¬
fections qualify. It is better to be a human
being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; bet¬
ter to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig are
of a different opinion, it is because they
1. Miskawayh, K.S., (Writer's translation), pp.5-6.
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only know their own side of the question. The
other party to the comparison knows both
sides.1
These actually are typical of the words used by Miska-
wayh to denote lower and higher pleasures.
Miskawayh writes,
We shall state in another place that the nat¬
ure of all _/pleasure s_7 is the same, that they
are all experienced by man only after certain
pains which affect him, and that sensual
pleasure is a deliverance from pain or suffer¬
ing. It will appear then that he who is con¬
tent to seek the bodily pleasures and makes
them his goal and his extreme happiness has
consented to place himself in the meanest ser¬
vitude to the meanest of lords, since he
makes his noble soul, wherein he resembles
the angels, a slave of the base soul wherein
he resembles the pigs, worms and the lowest
of animals that share this condition with
him.2
It appears that Miskawayh is denouncing physical pleas¬
ures, but actually he is not, all he is revolting
against is the devotion of time and energy to these
pleasures, which could have been foregone for some high¬
er aspiration. This position would bring him closer to
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.260.
2. Miskawayh, T.A., (trans, by Zurayk), p.40. C.f. Galen, The Book of Ethics, edited
by Krauss, p.34 (Arabic Text). Miskawayh is influenced by Galen's description of
pleasure which goes as follows:
"He who chooses pleasure as an end and not the beautiful, has chosen a place of a
pig instead of a place of an angel" (p.34, op. cit.).
Galen himself has been influenced by the stoic's position that knowledge... (Cont'd)
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Mill. Certainly, Mill does not take a different position
and attitude towards physical pleasures, but when it
comes to the wise and perfect choice, he would rather
choose the perfect and noble than the imperfect and
mean. Indeed, the way both Mill and Miskawayh summarize
the distinction between the higher and lower pleasures
is almost the same.
It is because of the fact that 'the other party to the
comparison knows both sides', Mill thinks that the human
being and Socrates know what it is to be noble and to
be mean. This is an explicit reference to the actual
deliberation which is taking place in the process of the
comparison between the perfect and the imperfect, the
mean and the noble. It also refers to the Socratic dic¬
tum that 'Virtue is knowledgeable'.
This is actually the starting point in Miskawayh's moral
philosophy, i.e. the teachability of virtue or morality.
On the other hand, he concludes that,
He who is content to seek bodily pleasures
and makes them his goal and his extreme happi¬
ness has consented to place himself in the
meanest servitude to the meanest Lords, since
he makes his noble soul, wherein he resembles
the angels, a slave of the base soul wherein
he resembles the pigs, worms and the lowest
(Cont'd)... and wisdom distinguishes the wise from the unwise. Mill mentions the
stoic and Christian elements in answer to an accusation made by his critics that
the kinds of pleasures presented by his Utilitarianism are Epicurean; he answers
that:
"I do not consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing
out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any
sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included."
(Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.258).
The pleasure then which makes an end or a consequence utilitarian should include
Epicurean as well as Christian and Stoic elements. Thus Miskawayh and Mill, though
chronologically separated in time, find a common source in the ideas of Plato, Aris¬
totle and the Stoics.
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of animals that share this condition with
him. 1
Again, here, there is an element of comparison which in¬
volves deliberation and there is also the knowledge
which makes one party of the comparison ignorant and the
other knowledgeable. In simple terms, both Mill and
Miskawayh are concerned about the distinction of the
human party of the comparison, and that it has certain
particular and peculiar qualities, which make the diff¬
erence between the human and the non-human in man.
As to the relation between pleasure and happiness, both
Mill and Miskawayh agree with Russell that
All judgements as to what is useful depend
upon judgements as to what has value on its
own account.2
Thus Miskawayh states that,
The noblest of actions is the one which is
not done for any other thing, but for its own
sake, and every action which is done for an¬
other end and anything else, that thing would
be nobler than the action.3
What is noblest is certainly 'good1 and every 'good',
1. Miskawayh, T.A., (trans, by Zurayk), p.40.
2. Russell, B., Problems of Philosophy, p.42.
3. Miskawayh, H. wa Sh., Problem 68, pp.180-181. (Arabic version - it has been ren¬
dered into English by the writer).
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according to Miskawayh,1 is useful. But would it be
valuable on its own account? Miskawayh's answer is that
for the action to be useful on its own account, it must
be an end on its own, without being useful for any other
end, which is the same as Russell's proposition. To Mill
the situation is not different in that, whatever prod¬
uces more happiness, should be useful and an end.2 The
connection between happiness and pleasure being: the con¬
sequence of action. Mill and Miskawayh both agree that
some pleasures are material and some are mental, and the
mental shall be pursued for their own sake, whereas the
same pleasures for Miskawayh are consequences of act¬
ions. He says,
The seeker of happiness should, therefore,
strive for the life that is delightful to him
and so be- pleased by it always, for this life
is one and is delightful in itself, and this
is why we have said that he should always des¬
ire it and keep firmly attached to it for¬
ever.3
Miskawayh elaborates on the connection between pleasure
and happiness,
As to types of life, being distinguished by
the three ends towards which men aim, are
three in number (I mean the life of pleasure,
the life of honour, and the life of wisdom)
1. This is actually the Aristotelian Miskawayh.
2. Dryer, D.P., "Mill's Utilitarianisu", in The Collected Works of J.S. Mill, edited
by Robson, p.VMX.
3. Miskawayh, T.A., p.83.
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and the life of wisdom is the noblest and the
most complete, and as the virtues of the soul
are many in number, it is necessary that
man's superiority and nobility be the result
of the most superior and the noblest of these
virtues. Thus, the life of the virtuous happy
man is a life which is delightful in itself
because all their deeds are voluntary and des¬
erve praise. Each one takes pleasure in what
is dear to him; the just man delights in just¬
ice and the wise man in wisdom. The good
deeds and ends that are attainable through
virtues are delightful and lovable. For happi¬
ness is the most delightful of all things.1
The kind of pleasure which is associated with happiness,
according to Miskawayh, is a pure pleasure, a feeling
of satisfaction for the attainment of a happy end; psych¬
ological satisfaction so to speak. For this reason any
subordinate happiness, i.e. happiness which is 'good',
to be attained, is associated with pleasure. Pleasure,
then, which is the consequence of doing a moral action
is not necessarily physical. Miskawayh, however, does
not write physical pleasures off. On the contrary, he
provides for both physical and mental pleasures in his
philosophy. In his Treatise on 'al-ladhdhat wa-al-alam'
('Pleasures and Pains'), he writes that,
If there is no perfection, there would not
have been any pleasure. If there is no pleas¬
ure, there wouldn't have been any love or
endearment, and no dispute, no desire. If
these were non-existents, there wouldn't have
been any motion. If there were no motion
there wouldn't have been any generation or
corruption.2
1. Miskawayh, T.A., (trans, by Zurayk), p.83.
2. Miskawayh, "A Treatise on Pleasure and Pain", included in BadawT's collection:
Studies and Texts in the Philosophy and Science of the Arabs, p.98 (Arabic Text).
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If perfection is a human end, then pleasure is a human
trait; a man who does not enjoy pleasure does not exist,
and does not live a human life. So the world which does
not allow pleasure, is a world of nothingness and not
a world of Being and Corruption. Miskawayh, here, has
been philosophical about degrees of pleasures, yet he
preserves the Muslim sense of pleasure, i.e. satisfact¬
ion of both body and spirit. The equivalent of this sub¬
ordination and co-ordination of pains and pleasures in
connection with happiness amounts, in Mill's philosophy,
to a combination of ultimate principles, 'Greatest Happi¬
ness' and subordinate ones in the implementation of a
utilitarian system, e.g. 'keep promises', 'don't lie'
and the like.1 Mill, by subordinate principles, is sug¬
gesting a utilitarian end, whereby the greatest happi¬
ness principle will not be the only end attainable, but
there is room for other principles to work side by side
with the Greatest Happiness principle to produce pleas¬
ures and reduce pains in the society, the Greatest Happi¬
ness principle will supply Universal Rules necessary for
society or legislation and these Rules can be instrument¬
al for changing the lower hierarchical order of rules
and moral conduct. According to R.U. one has to act in
such a way that his action may become a Universal Rule,
that is the consequence of the action. To Miskawayh, the
consequence of action ought to be an end, a happy end,
which is pleasant and beautiful. The utility of the act¬
ion constitutes this element of joy, the joy of the beau¬
tiful which is not physical but good in itself. The
praiseworthy action is good, useful, beautiful, pleasant
and it leads to a happy end.
1. C.f. Chapter III, Sect.II of this thesis, passim.
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(c) The problem, however, which faced Mill's utilitarian
principle, i.e. the Greatest Happiness is that happiness
and pleasure as consequences of actions cannot be taken
as the sole criterion of Tightness or wrongness of act¬
ions. A certain action X may lead to a consequence Y,
which is neither happy nor pleasant, yet the action it¬
self could be right, e.g. a man gave his son a medicine
for treatment, but it turned out to be the wrong medi¬
cine and the son did not get well; instead his condition
got even worse. This obviously is not a pleasant or
happy end. If this man is a utilitarian, he would have
thought that his action was wrong because the conse¬
quence wasn't pleasant and the end wasn't happy. This,
however, is not the case. A utilitarian would have arg¬
ued that the end, as far as the action was concerned,
was supposed to bring about a happy end and a pleasant
consequence. This supposition is always the motive of
the utilitarian for doing the action will bring
about a happy end. Mill's answer to such question would,
however, be that: man is to learn from experience what
to accept and what to reject and act according to prev¬
ious knowledge, but we do not expect a utilitarian to
start afresh, beginning each time he decides to do an
action.
The knowledge of the Sacred Book in Christianity, for
example, does not necessitate consulting the Bible every
time one decides to act according to the teaching of the
Bible.1 Mill is not, therefore, opting for a strict cal¬
culation of pleasures and pains or determination of
happiness as an inevitable moral end of the action. It
is something that one has to consider beforehand, yet
1. Hill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.275.
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the consequence cannot be definitely right or wrong, but
if everything goes as planned by a utilitarian they
should.
If utility, then, is not in consequence with 'what is
good' or 'what is right', why then be a utilitarian at
all?
The question which should be answered by both Mill and
Miskawayh, is: are the good, and the principle of util¬
ity, i.e. the maximization of happiness, contradictory?
Dr. Z. Ibrahim in his series, Philosophical Problems
/~*The Moral Problem J argues that,
It is not strange that: when everything dis¬
appears in that grey dye which we call (util¬
ity), then human life should become low and
mean, without there being room for a search
for something else that goes beyond grovell¬
ing material luxury.1
This has been said in criticism of classical utilitarian¬
ism, i.e., Mill's Utilitarianism. It can be argued, how¬
ever, that:
a) Utility is not just a search for material happiness
or material pleasure, it is also an instrument for
change, social and moral, the rule of the law,
1. Ibrahira,Zakariyya, Al-Mushkila al-Akhlaqiyya (The Moral Problem), p.178.
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general discipline, personal benefits, and social re¬
form.
b) It is observable that in all these cases, there is
a relation between means and ends in which utility is
a maxim of practical life.1
Moreover, the relation between the good and utility in
the case of Mill's system is a relation of consequence,
because if the good or 'what is good' is material, then
utility should be material, though it can be both mater¬
ial and spiritual. On the other hand, Mill preserves a
place in his utilitarianism for Christian morality, this
is why utility can go beyond the grey dye of materialism
for some spiritual aspiration.2
Miskawayh, on the other hand, following in the foot¬
steps of Aristotle, would argue that, the goods can be
natural (material) as well as non-natural (spiritual),
although this is an Aristotelian definition of 'what is
good', yet, it does not contradict the sense of good in
q
Islamic Law (Shari a) , because what is good linguistic¬
ally and philosophically can either be naturalistic or
idealistic (spiritual), which is something to do with
absolute good - or ultimate end as far as Miskawayh is
concerned. As such, then, utility can be material, what¬
ever dye it is, dealing with the material part of life
1. Hartman, N., Ethics, Vol.1, Ch.X, pp.149-151.
2. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.273. He argues that, "If he meant that utilitar¬
ianism does not recognize the revealed will of God as the supreme law of morals,
I answer, that a utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God,
necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of
morals, must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree".
This is really reminiscent of the religious philosophy of Paley. Mill here is sup¬
porting religious utilitarian view more than Paley. It also confirms that religious
utilitarian trend in Miskawayh is not uncommon.
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and also spiritual, giving satisfaction to man's drive
towards the absolute. 'The Good', however, which is unan¬
alysable, can only be attributed to divine good, i.e.
cannot be explained in terms of what is human.
Miskawayh's argument for absolute good supported by ex¬
ternal goods goes as follows,
Divine happiness - even though it is as noble
as we have stated and even though its life
is more delightful and noble than any other
life - is still in need of other external
kinds of happiness in order that it may be
manifested through them; otherwise, it will
be hidden and invisible.1
It seems clearly here that Miskawayh provides for both
material and spiritual pleasures as an integral part of
happiness, which is the desired end. It is not, then,
true that all utility can do is to add a materialistic
dye to whatever end or consequence of action we aim at.
But materialistic or non-materialistic, naturalistic or
non-naturalistic, the human good is certainly useful.
To Mill, the utilitarian system cannot work in a vacuum;
it needs a social background to sustain its claim to
universality. To supply this background Mill, from the
very beginning, expands the concept of happiness to in¬
clude the greatest happiness of all; he also provides
for the sacrifice of personal and private happiness for
1. Miskawayh, T,A., p.84. These, however, are not the original words of Miskawayh.
He is actually quoting Aristotle. C.f. Aristotle, N.E., Bk.X , Ch.7, 1177^29—35 _
1178 .
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the welfare of society, yet he holds the view that
sacrifice would be too high a price for the system if
it were not important nor necessary in the first place.
Thus, he talks about the universality of the principle
of utility,
According to the Greatest Happiness Princi¬
ple, as above explained, the ultimate end,
with reference to and for the sake of which
all other things are desirable (whether we
are considering our own good or that of other
people) is an existence exempt as far as
possible from pain, and as rich as possible
in enjoyments, both in point of quantity or
quality; the test of quality, and the rule
for measuring it against quantity, being the
preference felt by those who in their oppor¬
tunities of experience, to which must be
added their habits of self-consciousness and
self-observation, are best furnished with the
means of comparison.1
But how can this apparently happiness-oriented end, be
at the same time a universal end?
Mill elaborates on this, saying,
This being, according to the utilitarian
opinion, the end of human action, is necess¬
arily also the standard of morality; which
may accordingly be defined, the rules and per¬
cepts for human conduct, by the observance
of which an existence such as has been des¬
cribed might be, to the greatest extent poss¬
ible, secured to all mankind; and not to them
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, pp.262-263.
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only, but so far as the nature of things ad¬
mits, to the whole sentient creation.1
From this argument, it can be proven that the end which
is necessarily the standard of morality, is a kind of
naturalistic end, i.e. a materialistic end, because it
is liable to experimentation and observation. But the
standard of morality drawn from these observations, sub¬
jective observation, will not make utilitarianism an
objective system. To make up for this defect in the sys¬
tem, Mill appeals to moral rules as a universal guide
for behaviour, not for a single individual, but for all
mankind. This point brings Mill's utility up to the pres¬
ent day use of Rule-Utilitarianism, which describes the
consequence of action as a universal-rule to be adopted
by all mankind.
Miskawayh, in comparison with Mill, makes the kind of
virtues that are directed to ultimate happiness* happiness
which is an end of man qua man and his perfection,
attainable only by people in a city, i.e. attainable by
association alone. Miskawayh explains this point,
Furthermore, a person is said to possess one
of these virtues and is praised for it only
when it goes beyond him to others.2
This altruistic attitude constitutes the social back¬
ground for the attainment of happiness. The virtues
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.263.
2. Miskawayh, T.A., (Zurayk trans.), p.16.
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which are goods to those who possess them, are useful
because they lead to a happy end and a pleasant end too.
Pleasure to Miskawayh, in this context, does not mean
a material or bodily pleasure; it means: the pleasure
of achieving the end, i.e. a utilitarian oriented pleas¬
ure, the pleasure which accompanies happiness. Companion-
ableness can be achieved by a utilitarian method, i.e.
by way of association to attain the happiness of all.
Miskawayh writes:
But virtues are not non-existences; they are
actions and deeds which are manifested when
one participates and lives with other people,
and has dealings and various kinds of assoc¬
iation with them. Indeed, we teach and learn
the human virtues by the aid of which we live
and mingle with other people, so that we may
attain, from and by these virtues, other
kinds of happiness when we pass to another
state which does not exist for us at present.1
This social spirit makes it inevitable for virtues to
go beyond the individual to others in society and it
also makes the good which ensues from these virtues a
useful good, and it must be a useful good since it must
go beyond the possessor of virtue to other members of
the society.
Miskawayh, however, goes beyond the naturalistic good
and material happiness to ultimate good and spiritual
happiness or complete happiness; this is a kind of trans¬
cendental happiness and eternal wisdom. Thus he says,
1. gjs^awayh, T.A., (Zurayk trans.), p.26. C.f. Aristotle, N.E., Bk.X, Ch.8,
1178 ; Miskawayh seems to have quoted Aristotle.
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Further, you should know that one does not
need, when in the company of the good spir¬
its, i.e. those that are free from bodies,
any of the kinds of bodily happiness which
we have mentioned, but only the happiness of
the soul, that is, only the eternal intelli-
gibles which in fact constitute wisdom. Thus,
so long as man is man, he cannot have com¬
plete happiness unless he achieves both
states and these can be completely obtained
only by means of the things which lead to
eternal wisdom.1
By things which lead to eternal wisdom, Miskawayh means,
material or external goods, i.e. useful things (' ashya'
nafic a). He adds that man can be either in a state per¬
vaded by bodily things attaining material pleasure and,
yet, at some time aspiring for spiritual things and look¬
ing forward to them, or, on the other hand, in a state
pervaded by spiritual things and yet, at the same time,
observing lower things and learning from them.2 This is
typical of the Aristotelian state of mental ecstasy,
where man lives according to reason and enjoys the best
and pleasantest life, because reason is the essence of
man. Therefore, the life of reason is the happiest.3
Miskawayh's concept of happiness is more or less a re¬
plica of the Aristotelian concept of happiness, which
is, in a sense, living the essence of man, i.e. the life
of reason or wisdom. It is not also far from the sense
of good in Plato's Republic, which is desired for its
own sake and for its utility.*
1. Miskawayh, T.A., (Zurayk trans.), p.75.
2. Ibid., pp.75-76.
3. Aristotle, N.E., Bk.X, Ch.7, 1178a5"8.
4. Plato, Republic, Bk.II, 357^ °
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Such pleasure is expected of altruistic universal ends,
which are done for the sake of complete happiness of man¬
kind in this life and also involves a transcendental as¬
piration for higher pleasures and happiness in a life
of wisdom and a life to come in the hereafter.1
Miskawayh's altruism does qualify as a universal doc¬
trine, being supported by his concept of happiness; they
can work together to produce a Rule Utilitarian system,
—c
in which Shan a is the Universal Rule, whose ends and
aims are designed by the Law Maker, i.e. God, who is
— Q
called in Islam Al-Nafi , the Benefactor or the Useful.
He can be the Greatest Utilitarian, in the sense that
he requires His Rules to be Useful and Universal. This
is not to delete the intrinsic moral qualities of 'use¬
ful', 'good', 'bad', 'right', 'wrong', 'praiseworthy'
and 'blameworthy', etc.; e.g. the 'Good' which pertains
to God is absolute (in Moore's terms unanalysable, but
only in this context), but the good which pertains to
man is both moral and naturalistic. Unlike the universal-
istic hedonism of Paley, which, having fallen short of
altruistic elements to establish a utilitarian system,
appeals to God as the Greatest Utilitarian, who determ¬
ines the distribution of happiness to fill the gap be¬
tween man's selfishness and his aspiration for universal
principles; Miskawayh's utilitarian trend depends on
Islamic Rules as universal principles designed to fit
the rational altruistic qualities of man, who is resp¬
onsible for the implementation of the Rules. If the
designer of the rule is also the maker of man, who knows
his nature because he created this nature, then the
Rules can be universal by appealing to the nature of man
1. Miskawayh, T.fl., pp.76-77.
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and his capacities and perfections, as well as appeal¬
ing to the Law Maker, in this case, it is Allah the
Greatest. This is obviously what has been done by Misk-
awayh. In effect, what Miskawayh has done is similar to
Mill's appeal to human experience and experiments, i.e.
the historical development of man's consciousness of his
perfections and pertinent human qualities.
Miskawayh summarizes this blend of God-given Laws and
Rules and man's own research on earth to bring about
peace, love and happy ends, as follows,
Common people, virtuous people and the pro¬
phets, peace be upon them, were keen to lay
down laws and rules for people so that con¬
gruence and coherence which are the cause of
love and intimacy, occur among them, so that
they can share in the goods and that a form
of unity may happen to them, which is the
cause of every virtue, and because of which
companionableness takes place in the city,
this is the cause of better life and the
enjoyment of life and goods which are needed
in this life.1
This, then, is the background of the universal rule,
which has been laid down by the Maker of man; this is
why Miskawayh adds later, in an answer to a question
about the aim and end of the soul in this world, that:
Man is the rational soul when it uses organic
instruments which are called the body so that
it can produce actions deliberately.2
1. Miskawayh, H. wa Sh., Problem 67, pp.178-179 (Arabic Text).
2. Ibid., p. 181.
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Needless to say that deliberation in actions pertains
to the nature of man, i.e. to produce human actions de¬
pending on human experience. This is basic to Mill's
utilitarian system since he counts on previous human
knowledge and education, especially the bringing up of
children as a basis for teaching the children how to
cope with the happiness of others, i.e. an altruistic
feeling. 1
This is what Miskwayh sets himself to do in writing his
books: 'The Refinement of Character1 (Tahdhib al-Akhlaq)
— Q __ __
and 'The Book of Happiness' (Kitab al-Sa ada) or (Tartib
c — —
al-Sa adat). To be precise, most of his books are de¬
voted to the refinement of character in a virtuous city.
The mention of a virtuous city necessitates the mention
of the king of virtues, the guardian of virtues, i.e.
justice, which is considered by both Mill and Miskawayh
as the backbone of the utilitarian system (or tendency
or trend in the case of Miskawayh).2
Miskawayh, in his Treatise on Justice, defines justice
as that virtue which constitutes the (1) natural, (2)
conventional, and (3) divine, parts of justice. Natural
justice is a kind of a balance between different forces
of Nature, e.g. the balance between dry and wet lands
on earth. This is a blend of Chemical and philosophical
knowledge displayed by Miskawayh to answer a question
1. Mill, J., Utilitarianism, pp.268-269.
2. Although this tendency can be extracted from different texts and works of Miska¬
wayh, yet, it does not form a system, i.e. a recognized system as Mill's. In order
to make it look like a system one has to extrapolate.
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by his friend, al-Tawhidl, on the nature of justice.1 As
to conventional justice, it is of two kinds: (1) partic¬
ular and (2) general. The general is that which is
agreed upon by all people, like transactions in gold and
such commercial deals. The particular one is agreed upon
by people of different nations and different countries
which concern the people of that particular nation or
that country. In such cases, Miskawayh maintains that
people are not obliged to follow a universal law, but
they can have their own particular laws as befits the
circumstances. There is also voluntary justice, which
is found in man. This is a peaceful co-operation between
the faculties of the soul, to prove superiority of the
health of the soul over the health of the body. Divine
justice exists in metaphysical things and is separated
from matter.2 It is observable here that, in an answer
to the question about justice in al-Hawamil wa - al-
Shawami1, Miskawayh postponed the lengthy answer to
write this treatise, which is more or less, as Khan
says, a display of Greek knowledge on the subject of
justice.
Nevertheless, in T.A. Miskawayh tries to reconcile his
Greek philosophy with his Islamic background. The out¬
come of this reconciliation is a kind of a utilitarian
trend; he states this tendency as follows:-
By Justice, I mean equality which we have
1. Miskawayh, An Unpublished Treatise on Justice, edited by Khan, M.s.,C.f. comments
and footnotes on pp.1-11.
2. Ibid., pp.31-32. C.f. in the last line of a footnote on the treatise Khan says,
"The sources of this treatise are mostly Greek" p.32.
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discussed earlier. This is why we have said
that the happy man is the one who has the
chance in his childhood to become familiar
with the Law (Shari a) , to give himself up
to it and to get accustomed to follow all its
commands, and who, when he attains the stage
in which he is able to comprehend motives and
causes, takes up the study of philosophy and
finds it in agreement with what had become
ingrained in him by habit, with the result
that his judgement becomes firm, his insight
penetrating, and his determination effective.1
The Law that is the revealed law of Islam, Sharica, Misk-
awayh says prescribes universal justice, but man can
choose to act in accordance with benevolence with his
fellow human beings. Then Miskawayh talks about love and
friendship which help bring about a unified collectiv¬
ity; he writes,
These people / who spoke thus about love_7had
in view the virtue of unification which is
realized in a collectivity. Indeed, this is
the noblest end for the people of a city. For
if the citizens love one another, they will
be in close relation, and each man will wish
for his companion what he wishes for himself.
Their numerous capacities will become one,
and none of them will fail to arrive at a
sound opinion or a right action.2
The efforts of this collectivity will be directed to¬
wards the establishment of a virtuous city; Miskawayh
says,
1. Miskawayh, T.A., p.115.
2. Ibid., p.118.
* This is exactly how Aristotle ends his N.E.; Miskawayh, although not... (Cont'd)
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In all that they want to do, they will be
like the person who wants to move a heavy
weight by himself and is not able to do so,
but if he is assisted by others he can then
set it in motion. Indeed, the manager of the
city aims, in all his measures, at binding
its people by ties of affections. If he suc¬
ceeds in attaining this aim in particular,
he will achieve all the goods which will be
difficult for him, or for the citizens to
achieve individually. 1
And thus the happy end will be brought about as Miska-
wayh says,
He will then overcome his rivals, build up
his country, and live happily with his sub¬
jects.2
In all this, Miskawayh is not relying on utility alone,
but he is also keeping an eye on a strong belief, which
occurs as a result of religious desire directed towards
the Face of God.3
Mill, on the other hand, agrees with Miskawayh on the
universality of law and the importance of justice to the
utilitarian system to distinguish between morality as
such and expediency.
(Cont'd)... deviating from Islamic morality, could have written proper Muslim
Ethics if he were to substitute the concepts of love and friendship by the broad
concept of brotherhood in Islam, which would have been the right concept for a socio-
ethical change, e.g. the French Revolution centuries later used the concept of frat¬
ernity to effect a social change in 18th century France.




To Mill, sympathy is vital (friendship in Miskawayh's
philosophy) for human beings as well as for all sentient
beings. He states very strongly that,
Human beings are capable of sympathizing not
only with all human beings but also with all
sentient beings.1
Not only that he goes further to recommend Kant's univ¬
ersal rule,
Act so that the rule of your conduct might
be adopted as a law by all rational beings,2
as a universal rule that should be adopted by all ration¬
al beings to benefit their collective interest.3
In elucidating the problem of the legitimacy of inflict¬
ing punishment, Mill's philosophy, strangely enough, is
very Islamic. Mill elaborates on the issue by saying,
Again when the legitimacy of inflicting pun¬
ishment is admitted, how many conflicting con¬
ceptions of injustice come to light in dis¬
cussing the proper apportionment of punish¬
ments to offences. No rule recommends itself
so strongly to the primitive and spontaneous
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.249.
2. Korner, S., Kant, p.134.
3. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.249.
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sentiment of justice as the lex talionis, an
eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.
Though this principle of the Jewish and the
Mohammedan law has been generally abandoned
in Europe as a practical maxim, there is, I
suspect, in most minds a secret hankering
after it; and when retribution accidentally
falls on an offender in that precise shape,
the general feeling of satisfaction evinced
bears witness to which this repayment in kind
is acceptable.1
In these terms, Mill seems to be recommending the applic¬
ation of principles embodied in the revealed laws of
Judaism and Islam as being latent in human conscious¬
ness. On the other hand, Miskawayh, who accepts the re¬
vealed law of Islam, seeks a rationale for this practice
in terms of Greek philosophy. Thus there is a consider¬
able agreement between the two philosophers in so far
as this point is concerned.
Mill divides justice into individual and collective and
makes the criterion of preference between the two,
social utility alone.2 He also provides room for laud¬
able injustice, i.e. when moral requirements which are
regarded as a result of social utility are superseded
by an important social duty; in such cases it is allow¬
able to steal and to kidnap.3 The equivalent of this in
Islamic law is called "necessity law", i.e. necessity
allows concessions with regard to prohibited things
(al-<jarurat tubifr al-mahzurat) . Although Miskawayh does




not actually mention this, it can be understood implicit¬
ly in his adoption of the universality of Islamic Law.
Mill thus concludes his book on Utilitarianism with a
chapter on the connection between utility and Justice.1
Miskawayh concludes with justice 'Love and Friendship',2
to safeguard the principle of Justice. Indeed, both Mill
and Miskawayh end up with a recommendation for a vir¬
tuous city which, at the same time, safeguards the sanc¬
tity of the principle of justice.3
1. Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism, p.321.




A student of Islamic philosophy would observe an effort
exerted by Miskawayh to reconcile revealed knowledge and
rational knowledge. This attitude has been accompanied
all through by a sense of purpose, an aim and an end
which Miskawayh sometimes calls the 'useful'. A book
like Tahdhib al-Akhlaq was written by Miskawayh for a
particular purpose, i.e. so that moral behaviour becomes
like a spontaneous moral response, i.e. dispositional.
The Kitab al-Sac ada ]_ Book of Happiness / deals with the
problem of moral improvement which is the aim of Tahdhib
al-Akhlaq and was written for the same reason, i.e. the
acquisition of virtues though the study of the science
of ethics, which is part of the study of philosophy. It
is the practical aspect of philosophy.
What Miskawayh wants to do is to prove the teachability
of virtue. He proves that the good is useful and tries
to demonstrate that the useful is liable to instruction
and learning, i.e. that virtue can be teachable and that
the way to go about doing it, is through philosophy.
The efforts towards moral improvement add up to some¬
thing more than individual morality. Miskawayh is call¬
ing here for a social practice of morality, whereby man
practices his human qualities. Thus man is distinguished
from animal by this social awareness of the other. It
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is to these social-human qualities that Miskawayh attrib¬
utes 'goodness' and 'usefulness' of character. This is
the element of utility in the moral philosophy of Misk¬
awayh. As has been mentioned before, 'goodness' produces
what is useful and this, in turn, leads to happiness as
an end or a consequence of moral action.
But this utilitarianism, classical utilitarianism so to
speak, is threefold: The rational element represents the
method and attitude underlying the utilitarian practice.
The religious tendency, which is basic to.a reconciliat-
ory method, i.e. religious 'prescriptions' and Islamic
laws do not contradict the verdict of reason, as far as
morality is concerned. The social element, however, is
common to all aspects of utility, especially to these
elements of Miskawayh's moral philosophy. Moreover, it
supersedes all other elements, for it is pregnant with
altruistic and universalistic qualities. The utility of
these qualities in Miskawayh's philosophy does not ne¬
glect the intrinsic values of these qualities nor does
it nullify their cash-values. By intrinsic values, I
mean the moral qualities qua moral qualities, unaffected
by external gains or losses. By cash-values I mean moral
qualities as they are affected by external gains or
losses. But Miskawayh's ethics, in general, is governed
by a means end mechanism, geared towards the achievement
of happiness, particular happiness, pertaining to the
good of man and universal happiness pertaining to man
qua man, i.e. all human beings. Afterwards comes ultim¬
ate happiness, which is also an ultimate end, an end
beyond which there is no end; this is a kind of trans¬
cendental happiness which has been borrowed by Miskawayh
from Neo-Platonic sources.
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One of the problems, which Miskawayh's philosophy poses,
is that man needs to practise the perfection which per¬
tains to man, in order to attain the happiness which is
designated by God for man. This I consider as a util¬
itarian end because it is composed of the goods of man,
which are also useful, and this, again, is subdivided
into particular goods, i.e. the good, which pertains to
each and every individual, and the universal good, which
pertains to mankind. This division of the good would
label the utilitarian tendency in Miskawayh's philosophy
as a rule-utilitarianism, because it is based on the max¬
im that the action, which produces the greatest happi¬
ness, is the action which is done as a universal rule
for all mankind. The reward of happiness is not necess¬
arily a material joy or pleasure. The distinction of
pleasures can be classified in the same category as
'goods' or 'happiness' for that matter, i.e. the class¬
ification depends on the nature of man (man's perfect¬
ion). The pleasures which pertain to man's nature and
his perfection are the mental pleasures; this is why the
study of ethics, practical philosophy ends up with a
study of theoretical philosophy (wisdom) j_ frikma _J . 1
Again the hierarchy of pleasures, goods and different
kinds of happiness is congruent with the epistemology
of Miskawayh (his theory of knowledge), i.e. the recon¬
ciliation of religion and reason or reason and revelat¬
ion. Within the context of this epistemology, priority
is given to the qualities at the top of the hierarchy,
i.e. of pleasures; mental pleasures are preferred to
bodily, physical or material pleasures, because mental
pleasures are pleasures which pertain to the nature and
1. Aristotle, N.E., BkX, Ch.4, 11753^.
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perfection of man, whereas the others are animal pleas¬
ures, i.e. animals can be as good at them as man. The
'goods' and different kinds of happiness and addressed
to the kind of pleasures they satisfy, e.g. the goods
which satisfy our bodily pleasures are not our ultimate
goal or the ends (supposed ends) of our actions. So are
the kinds of happiness which give us bodily satisfaction
and lag behind in giving us mental satisfaction; they
should not be our ends or consequences of our actions,
as far as Miskawayh is concerned.
Man's happiness should be directed towards his perfect¬
ion and towards the qualities which add up to his per¬
fection. These could be taken to include universal Is-
—c
lamic principles extracted from the Shari a, e.g. jus¬
tice, rational benevolence, altruistic feelings, etc.,
and subordinate particular principles, which cannot be
dispensed with in daily practice, e.g. 'keep promises',
•don't lie', 'don't steal', etc.
His social attitude is always directed towards a 'vir¬
tuous city' (Madina Fadila) which includes virtuous
citizens. In fact, there wouldn't have been any virtuous
city or virtuous citizens if there wasn't a social life.
Virtue cannot be viable unless it goes beyond the self
to the other. Companionableness is the backbone of the
virtuous city. Miskawayh owes his universal social qual¬
ities to the sense of Islamic reason which permeates his
utilitarian tendency.
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As to the question of how a viable comparison can be
drawn between a medieval Muslim philosopher and three
modern philosophers, it can be answered that, the encyc¬
lopaedic learning of his time, made it easy for him to
acquire the expected standard of learning available
then. This broad background encourages Miskawayh to
write fluently about miscellaneous subjects and to sup¬
port his philosophical arguments with biological, cos-
mological as well as geographical evidences. The compar¬
ison, however, is a combination of different elements
in the philosophy of Miskawayh. It has been divided into
three different aspects in the thesis, namely:
(a) the rational aspect of his philosophy which is com¬
pared with Hume's utilitarian trend as a way of
moral reasoning.
What actually characterizes this trend of Hume's is the
minimal role of reason in the drawing of the map of our
moral conduct. Morality depends on our passions and sen¬
timents. It has been shown that Miskawayh's use of reas¬
on is not uniform; there are times when he would depend
on the usefulness of moral behaviour as a measurement
of the Tightness or wrongness of actions, e.g. a doctor
who does a particular action for professional reasons
and does a different action for humanitarian reasons
would be judged as to be right or wrong according to the
actions which conform with his essence as a man, i.e.
in this case, the action which would be taken to repres¬
ent human qualities is the right action, i.e. the action
done on humanitarian grounds. The reason why this action
is right and not the other, is the usefulness of the sit¬
uation to the production of the greatest happiness.
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Both Hume and Miskawayh depend on human nature as a crit¬
erion of moral approbation and disapprobation. Hume
takes moral approbation to depend wholly on human sent¬
iments and passions, whereas Miskawayh thinks that reas¬
on is important to the development of moral approbation.
Reason, to Miskawayh, means an amalgamation of rational
Platonism and intellectual Aristotelianism.
(b) Added to the above is the religious aspect of moral¬
ity, which provides room for a comparison between
the religious aspect of Miskawayh and. the religious
utilitarianism of Paley.
It has been found that both philosophers adhere to the
ethico-religious approach to morality; and that they
both opt for reconciliation of reason and revelation.
(c) The religious reconciliation leads to the social as¬
pect of utility, without which there wouldn't have
been any virtue or morality.
This usefulness ensues from the social utility of the
actions. This also leads back to the essence of man. It
is the common nature of man through different times and
generations. This is why the comparison between Mill and
Miskawayh shared a sound similarity between the two phil¬
osophers. They both rely on Rational Benevolence as a
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basis for universal altruism. In the case of Miskawayh
he derives some of his arguments for universality from
Islamic Law. He has been supported in this claim by
Mill, who endorses retributive Jewish-Mohammedan Law,
as he names it, which call for re-payment in kind, e.g.
eye for an eye.
It has also been shown that Mill has room in his philoso¬
phy for a revealed knowledge and practical religious
morality.
This is also true about the philosophy of Miskawayh,
which is based on reconciliation between reason and rev¬
elation. Mill argues that revealed moral conduct would
fulfil the requirement of utility in a supreme degree.
This can be understood as a concession made by Mill to
Christian morality, i.e. in a utilitarian system, relig¬
ious values enjoy a high status, because they satisfy
the utilitarian end. It has also been shown that justice
plays a great role in supporting universal principles,
i.e. it supplies universal laws which pertain to human
nature and, at the same time, adds some auxiliary, sub¬
ordinate principles and laws that apply to daily moral
practice.
It is hoped that by establishing the evidence that there
is a utilitarian tendency in the philosophy of Miska¬
wayh, it would also be shown that Muslim philosophy like
Western philosophy, is a human endeavour and, as such,
it belongs to human knowledge at large, i.e. it is not




THE BOOK OF HAPPINESS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
BY IBN MISKAWAYH
1. Praise be to God Who bestows His bounties on
the creatures and has distinguished His friends with a
special share of grace. I praise Him for the super¬
abundance of His wisdom and I ask Him to make me thank¬
ful for His favours. Blessings be upon His Prophet and
his offspring.
Now, it is incumbent on a person who has been
distinguished by God with great determination and has
been endowed with sound deliberation and who has given
himself true precedence in every virtue and who through
his sound judgement has participated in every truth, to
aspire to what his teacher,1 may God help him in the
attainment of truth and make the achievement of goals
easier for him, has aspired to, so that he can ascend
by degrees to the highest pinnacle of wisdom and obtain
the sweetest of its fruits.
Since I knew his aspiration for the real sci¬
ences and his natural disposition towards wisdom, I have
1. Abu ^ayyan mentioned the fact that Ibn Miskawayh had an argument with Abu al-Fadl
Ibn al- Amid and his son, Abu al-Fath, about the similarity between nature and arts which
is part of the subject matter of this book. This is why it is possible that by 'his
teacher' here he means Ibn al- Amid Abu al-Fadl, the litterateur, who also has con¬
nections and arguments with logicians and philosophers. (al-Tawhidi, Abu Hayyan, al-
. I •
Imta wa-al-Mu1anasa, Part 2, p.39.)
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have continued to go along with him in one thing after
another of those matters of wisdom which he used to re¬
quire as time and circumstances allowed until the pur¬
pose of a wise man, a purpose supported by his own
efforts and also by the aim of a philosopher, an aim
which he endeavours to achieve by effort, came upon me.
He asked me about the different kinds of happi¬
ness which occur to people according to their different
grades, what they are and how much they differ in order
that his resolution should be directed towards the upper¬
most of them and his efforts aimed towards the farthest.
2. I promised him that I would write this down
in a memorandum which would be available to him at any
time.
In order, also, that he might observe (having
read it) the great things which they were ambitious to
achieve and which they elevated their souls to reach.
And I shall begin that with the help of God.
I will mention the happiness which is applic¬
able to man, what it is and how it is, and what the
happiness is, which is common to all people qua people;
what part of it is achieved by those who make efforts
of various kinds; whether these kinds of happiness are
different or the same; whether they are piled one on top
of the other till we ascend to the one of the highest
grade; whether they are ascending to one on top and what
this one is. Is there any other happiness beyond this
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which Man should not expect to achieve and should have
no craving for? Or do all kinds of happiness terminate
at this end so that we stop there like the stopping of
the finite after which there is no (further) goal? Is this
the great (happiness) for which Man with all his dignity
and high worth has been prepared for? Can it be attained
without effort and exertion or without practical know-
__ 0
ledge (gina a) and experience, without taking the road
followed by wise men who took to it and incited wise men
to follow suit? Is it possible to summarize what they
elaborated and wrote on voluminously?
If that is impossible, is Man's lifespan suff¬
icient for attaining this purpose through practical
_ q
knowledge (sina a)? Do people differ in what they ac¬
quire of it?
3. Is it close to some of them and distant for
others? And if they do differ, how long does it take the
cleverest of them to learn it when some of his work dis¬
tracts him and he devotes attention to it? What is the
quality (sifa) of this clever man during this prescribed
period? And how many books are essential? And what art
is indispensable? And what is the shortest way to the
end which he could attain with the utmost reflection?
Before we start talking about this great happi-
1. $inaC a as used in this text refers to practical wisdom and practical wisdom,
according to Aristotle, is deliberation about what is good and expedient for man.
(Aristotle, N.E., 8k.VI:Ch.4, 1140a^ It also means science.
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ness we shall make some introductory remarks about it...
this is similar to nature, and this is a view which is
correct by analogy and is free from distortion. It is
obvious if we contemplate all tools used in crafts that
almost every one of them is derived from what is natur¬
ally similar to it. It is not possible that there should
be a craft tool which has no purpose or benefit. More¬
over, it is not possible that one craft tool should take
the place of another so that it performs its purpose and
its total function (kamal) completely and truly. Thus,
with regard to the saw, although we can use it for some
of the work done by the adze, it is not ■ possible that
it will perform everything that the adze can do complete¬
ly.
Likewise are all instruments; each has its own
total function (kamal) and purpose, by which it becomes
complete. Excellence will be attributed to it and it
will be truly praised, if it is found with a total func¬
tion and if that purpose, for which it exists and was
made, can be realized by it. If the craft, which has
been preceded by nature, has this attribute, then it
will be most appropriate that nature, which is superior
and powerful, will also have this attribute, and it is
necessary that it does not do anything vainly or have
an instrument without a purpose and a total function
which pertains to it; or that no part of it would take
the place of another and perform its action perfectly,
because the first (tool) will then be useless and vain.
Some of this wisdom from nature is considered a clear
exposition for him who contemplates the organs of the
body, because all organs of the body are its natural in¬
struments; for it performs with every one of them a
special function, which cannot be completed or fully
effected by another.
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Thus, the heart which is the source of motion,
produces heat for it, which is the cause of life. Pulsat¬
ing veins stem from the heart, along which the power of
the heart flows to other parts of the body, and the life
of the whole body is thus effected.
Likewise is the brain, for the nerves which
stem from the brain perform the same function as the art¬
eries to the heart, in that they connect the brain to
the rest of the body. They generate sense and voluntary
motion. Likewise are all parts of the body- and the other
organs, like the stomach, spleen, gall-bladder and intes¬
tines. Likewise are all the other visible tools (i.e.
organs of the body), despite their large number. None
of them can be thought to be dispensable, nor does it
exist without a perfect (function) (tarnam) which is pec-
— c
uliar to it. Whoever looks into the book Manafi al-
A cda' 1 will come to know great wisdom and will realise
much of what I have just referred to here.
5. If nature, which comes first, is in this con¬
dition the soul is similar to it. Then how much more
appropriate it is that the soul should be more worthy
of the position and more deserving of wisdom. That is
because the soul uses animals of different kinds as in¬
struments and it prepares every one of them with a spec¬
ial function which no other animal can perform.
__ C C ~
1. Manafi al-A daf (the uses of the organs) is written by Aristotle and it is called
De Partibus Animalium (On the Parts of Animals). (See McKeon, R., Introduction to
Aristotle, pp.253-266).
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Just as an adze cannot do the work of a saw
as the example we mentioned before. Since we have presen¬
ted what we intend to present in the introduction, we
will repeat it by saying: If it becomes clear to us that
every existent has a perfection which pertains to it and
an end for which it has been created, then it is incum¬
bent on Man who is the most honourable creature in this
transient world to be more worthy of this (attribute)1 and
to have his own perfection, completion and purpose for
which he has been created. When philosophers pondered
over the end of Man and the perfection for which he has
been created, they found that he has two perfections,
a short-term perfection and a long-term perfection. A
likeness taken from the craftsmen's tools is the hammer
whose short-term perfection is to flatten solid bodies
and whose long-term perfection is to make a ring. An ex¬
ample also from the natural tools is the stomach whose
short-term perfection is to contain food, digest it and
prepare it for nutrition and whose long-term perfection
is to compensate for the consumption of the body so that
it will continue surviving.
6. Likewise is Man; his short-term perfection is
to perform actions thoughtfully and deliberately and to
arrange them as reason dictates. As to his long-term per¬
fection, we shall make it clear in our forthcoming eluc¬
idation.
When philosophers pondered over the power of
deliberation and discrimination they found that they
1. Reading ei'fi instead of
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originate from a power higher than them and then follow
continuously one after another until they come to an end
beyond which there is no end. It is known that if there
were an end for every end there would be an infinite num¬
ber of ends and the existence of the infinite in this
world is impossible. When they reached the end of ends
and they made sure that there was no way beyond, they
stopped there and desisted from research and they knew
that the ends below it were arranged before it just like
steps and stairs. When they pondered over the end of Man
and his short-term perfection they found that people dif¬
fer and they also saw that, despite their differences,
people do not doubt the fact that they have an end but
they differ as to what end it is. Every one of them has
set an end to himself which he endeavours to achieve and
he calls it his happiness, like the one who seeks pleas¬
ure or wealth or health or dominance or knowledge. They
come to differ because they did not observe the long-
term perfection, I mean ultimate happiness. If they knew
it and made it their objective they would have directed
the other ends towards it as the goldsmith does, for
7. when he knows the ultimate perfection of the hammer, I
mean making a crown or a ring or a bracelet, he chooses
the direct path and flattens the solid body to that end.
Some of the things which we have just enumerated could
be called happiness metaphorically and some are real
happiness and some are thought to be happiness and are
not happiness at all. This is because those ends which
are common to Man and animals are not happiness to us
(because)1 they are not our end and perfection as human
beings qua human beings. As to those ends which pertain
to Man qua Man, they could be called happiness but this
meaning is common to all people. Some of these kinds of
1. Reading V3'ii and not
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happiness which pertain to Man are common to all people,
as we have said, and they all share in it, some pertain
to individual men and some pertain to a special group
(khagg) ; it is that to which all kinds of happiness
ascend and there they all stop because all kinds of
happiness exist for it and are because of it. It is the
final purpose and the ultimate perfection.
By the will and help of God, I will illustrate
these divisions (between different ends). As to that
which is common to all men and all animals, it is eat¬
ing, drinking and the different bodily comforts, I mean
(by those comforts) the elimination by the body of super¬
fluities and the like.
This is what people call the pleasant. Many
8. people direct their goals to that end. Until I illus¬
trate clearly that this is not happiness and nor is it
the perfection of Man or the end for which he has been
created, I will say of it in convincing clear words that
animals have a share in these things equal to Man's
share; indeed, their appetites to eat, drink and copul¬
ate are greater and more constant than Man's appetites,
and they are stronger (than men) in them. Then ignorant
people who are more beast-like are stronger in this res¬
pect than virtuous people. It is obvious then that this
is not the ultimate end of Man nor his perfection as a
human being. As to common happiness for Man qua Man, it
is as we mentioned before, the performance of actions
according to deliberation and discrimination. According
to what reason dictates, this meaning is a happiness
which is accessible to every man. Anyone can partake of
it and have a share in it as much as his grade of human¬
ity allows and according to the amount of his appreciat-
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ion of beauty and ugliness and his acquisition of grades
of virtues and vices and the degrees of praiseworthiness
and blameworthiness. This is the situation where it can
be said X is more human than Y. Every nation and every
generation have a proportion of this happiness in which
they share, even if they differ as to the part of happi¬
ness they practise. He who falls short of this level com¬
pletely and has no share of it, should not be called a
human being except in the way in which we call a por-
9. trait a man by way of simile on account of the drawing
alone. This meaning is given to all people by (that)
first natural disposition and they differ as to how they
use it. As to the happiness which pertains to every in¬
dividual, it only pertains to a man of learning or a man
of practical knowledge and they differ in the acquisit¬
ion of happiness according to their different grades in
theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge and accord- .
ing to the conditions in which they perform their act¬
ions as judgement and discrimination dictate. The happi¬
ness of the wealthy person and the happiness of the poor
person, even if they differ as to their different circum¬
stances, both agree in the order of actions. The happi¬
ness of the wealthy person is manifested in the distrib¬
ution of money and spending it properly, I mean he
should use it where it is necessary and as it is necess¬
ary and with whom it is necessary. The happiness of the
poor man is manifested in patience and perseverance in
the manner and condition in which it is appropriate and
with whom it is appropriate.
Likewise are the kinds of happiness which per¬
tain to men of theoretical knowledge and practical know¬
ledge, and the happiness of the skilful doctor is not
like the happiness of an excellent clerk (katib). The
happiness of him who knows many arts is not the same as
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the happiness of him who knows only one art. I mean even
if they discipline their actions in the same manner they
still differ as to the different subjects they are tack¬
ling. After all, every one of them has actions which per¬
tain to him as a man of a theoretical knowledge or a
practical knowledge and actions which pertain to him as
a human being. He will never obtain the happiness which
10. pertains to him unless he obtains the happiness which
is common to himself and others. For example, if a doc¬
tor performs a good action as a doctor and if he per¬
forms otherwise as a human being, that part of happiness
which occurs to him as a doctor will be erased by that
which he does as a human being, and even if it is not
erased completely, there will remain only a small part
of it according to measurable quality; i.e., we measure
his humanity in relation to his medicine and happiness
can be ascribed to him according to the result of the
measurement. Likewise we can measure all kinds of happi¬
ness according to each theoretical knowledge and each
practical knowledge. As to the kinds of miseries which
contrast with these kinds of happiness, we forbear to
mention them because they can be known from their oppos-
ites as is shown in logic, that contradictions are known
together in the same condition, and every person should
be guided in accordance to his class and grade to the
happiness that pertains to him in the highest and best
way possible that he could afford. This is a position
which pertains to men (who perform) divine policies and
their deputies and it is found in divine legislation.
Philosophers wrote voluminously on it also. Those who
need further information may get it from their books be¬
cause what we have referred to here is enough. If there
were not many and different kinds of happiness the truly
happy one would have been a single individual, the one
who knows all the parts of philosophy and understands
11. all practical sciences has an abundant share of all
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wisdom, if this were the case the existence of other
people would have been a triviality, without an end or
perfection. People would have been miserable and there
would have been no need for praise (and blame)1 prayers
and rebukes would have been ruled out, training and man¬
agement would have been nullified. This is contrary to
what has been stated and established by scholars and wit¬
nessed and perfected by minds.
happiness are many and exist differently . in accordance
with (their) many interests. As to ultimate happiness
we shall mention it after showing that none of these
kinds of happiness is the perfection or the end. This
is because they are of two sorts, one is set up horizont¬
ally and one is set up vertically. Let us take as an
example of this form 'the professions because they are
clearer and more obvious. As for those which are set up
horizontally, they are the ones which are thought not
to be arranged one under the other, such as commerce,
carpentry, dying and weaving and the like. They are as
if set up on a flat surface and they are acquired from
different principles and they end up with different pur¬
poses. As to those which are set up vertically, they are
the ones that are arranged one under the other such as
the profession of saddle-making which is ordered below
the profession of knighthood and the profession of
knighthood is ordered below the profession of war and
the profession of war is ordered below the profession
of kingship and the profession of kingship is ordered
below the profession of divine legislation. I mean that
It has been made clear that people's kinds of
1. Reading
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divine legislation secures for people the practices
which organize their affairs and lead them towards their
happiness as we have mentioned before.
12. Some (of these professions) are dominant and
some are subordinate. Now we shall go back to (the
point) where we digressed and say: When some philosoph¬
ers saw the difference among people in their ends, some
people thinking that their end is pleasure and striving
toward it with all their actions, some thinking that
their end is wealth and prosperity, others thinking that
it is health and safety and others that it is other
things similar to these, they (the philosophers) thought
about them and then (found) that the exponents of those
which were set up horizontally differ about them. This
is because those of them who believe in pleasure or
wealth or dignity, when they have found satisfaction and
have achived their aim, alter their opinion. When the
seeker after pleasure has satisfied his pleasure and
after that is bent on more of what he supposed was happi¬
ness, it becomes great misery and abundant evil for him.
Happiness is also called misery, because if a man (liv¬
ing a life) of luxury catches a disease, he will come
to think of happiness in terms of health. And if a heal¬
thy man has been humiliated he will come to think of
happiness in terms of dignity. It is known that happi¬
ness is dignity and it is also known that dignity is
immutable and does not change, and a man of dignity will
not change and become miserable by that by which he be¬
came happy. These things might cause destruction sooner
or later to those who have them, like the person who
dies because of his wealth or because of his search for
dignity and authority and irresponsible indulgence in
13. pleasure. As for those which were set up vertically it
is known that the higher of them is better than the
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lower, (while at the same time) serving what- is above
it because it is required for the sake of it and its
cause, for example, money which is an instrument for
attaining one's needs, is only required for the health
of the body and the health of the body is only required
so that one may attain the ultimate happiness or (lesser
degrees) of happiness below it. This is why health for
its own sake is ruled out.
Aristotle organized genera of happiness as
follows:1
(1) Happiness of the soul
(2) Happiness of the body
(3) Happiness outside the body and in the surroundings
of the body.
As to the happiness of the soul, it is the acquirement
of sciences and knowledge and wisdom. Wisdom is the best
of the three because it is desired for its own sake not
for any other purpose.
As to the happiness of the body, it is some¬
thing like beauty, good health and sound temperament.
These are desired for themselves but they may be desired
for some other purpose, because by them the actions and
virtues of the soul can be completed.
1. Aristotle, N.E., Bk.X:Ch.7, 11773-117831-5.
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As to the happiness which is outside the body,
it is something like intelligent children, friends,
wealth, nobility and various kinds of dignity.(This was J
made clear in the book of Ethics (Nicomachean Ethics).2
Happiness which is outside the body is incom¬
plete, but happiness of the soul is perfect and com¬
plete. Man may obtain the two kinds of happiness, the
one which is outside the body and happiness of the body
by luck. But he cannot attain the complete happiness
without hard work and exertion of effort. This is be¬
cause the classification and detail of these (genera of)
happiness is in a necessary order and acquiring them
14. afterward, is not possible without long reflection, much
discrimination and constant practice. As for the ultim¬
ate happiness, it cannot be attained by everyone, nor
does everyone who seeks it achieve it. This is because
the employment of these kinds of happiness and reflect¬
ing on which of them is a servant by which their chief
can be reached and ascending in them by degrees until
the highest of them is reached is something which is
only attained by a very small number of individuals.
When it happens to the odd individual, through his eager¬
ness and his hard work and his sound judgement and his
intelligence, that he has ample means and has leisure
time and many other means which can rarely be acquired
simulataneously, such a man who has reached this grade
from our predecessors had pointed it out and led wise
men and students of wisdom to it. And those who obtained
a greater amount than what their predecessors have men¬
tioned have also pointed out the additional portion
1. eil (This was) is missing in the text.
2. C.f. Aristotle, N.E., Bk.I: Ch.4, 1095al5_3°.
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which they found. Finally a great deal of it has been
assembled which is of great importance.
Aristotle is the first one to set up the final
end as an ultimate purpose and he initiated a clear path
to it, he made the attainment of the final end a prac¬
tical science to be learnt and applied gradually.1
We shall mention this practical science and
how he taught it and the fact that there is no path to
acquiring ultimate happiness in a short way when we com¬
plete this chapter if God wishes.
As the fact is that human happiness is com-
15. pleted according to judgement and that things which are
distinguished by intellect are different, as we pointed
out before, the happiest of men must be the one who has
attained the highest degree of it, and has perceived its
end beyond which there is no end, by whatever way it is
approached.
The end of ends cannot be reached until the
grades which are below have been passed as we showed be¬
fore. This is why the best deliberation is that which
leads to the best object of deliberation. And the best
object of deliberation is the one that does not need an¬
other deliberation on another object of deliberation and
at no time leads to anything other than it but is de¬
sired for itself and never for anything else. When
1. Aristotle, N.E., Bk.VI: Ch.12, 1144a30"35.
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discernment and discrimination come to an end, ultimate
happiness occurs. The sign of the one who reaches this
grade is that he is always active, optimistic, strong
in hope, steadfast, not disturbed or concerned about
worldly affairs except in a very small degree if com¬
pared with the conditions of other people.
Externally, he conforms with other people and
treats them as (equals)1 but internally he is quite diff¬
erent and is cheerful and happy through his own soul and
not through other things. This state is inseparable from
him and it does not change, because people's joy exists
for them for the most part as an accident and from the
outside. When the thing giving joy disappears or
changes, it becomes despondency and sorrow. For example,
one who is joyful because of wealth or a loved one or
attaining one of the worldly pleasures or one who is
pleased with sons or power etc., etc. - all these come
from sources external to the body and are liable to dam¬
age, changeable with changing circumstances which are
inevitably changing because they are from the world of
generation and corruption and subject to its laws of
change.
The happy man whom we described and whose
state we have mentioned is happy in himself because he
sees things which do not change nor do they alter ever
not is this possible for them. He sees all that he sees
with the eye of a person who does not make mistakes or
errors and does not accept corruption and he is certain
that he is moving from one (aspect) of his exist-
1. Reading instead of
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ence1 to enter the other most perfect (aspect) of his
existence. He is like a person treading a route to a
country which he knows and loves with his soul and when¬
ever he complete a day's journey towards it or comes a
stage closer to it, he becomes more active, more confid¬
ent and more happy. This state of confidence and certain¬
ty does not occur by narration without involvement
Q _
(mu ayana) and nor is it complete by accounts without
personal witnessing and the soul only relies on it after
acquisition of certainty.
Those who reach it are of different classes,
and similar to that is the person who sees with his phys¬
ical eye, for people differ in their vision with this
eye. There are some who can see distant objects clearly
and there are some who cannot see things close up, ex¬
cept as one sees something behind a veil. The difference
between these two states is that the longer the sensory
17. eye, it prolongs its gaze and continues its scrutiny of
perceptible things, the more it becomes tired and weak.
This other eye is the opposite, since it grows stronger
by exertion and grows by prolonged use in clarity and
quickness of perception, and continues to grow in sharp¬
ness of sight until it perceives that which it thought
was imperceptible and inconceivable.
Returning to our previous discourse on happi¬
ness, we say that common human happiness which we men¬
tioned before are given to us and inborn in us and they
are the powers by which we distinguish good and bad act¬
ions and by which every one of us is able to acquire a
1. wahid wujuduh: as such this has no meaning, but the context seems to indicate
this meaning.
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good character if he does not have one.
If, however, he has a bad character they will
enable him to change it to the opposite voluntarily.
Then he must become accustomed to it and repeat actions
appropriate to it until this becomes (as if) a natural
character (actions which pertain to the opposite charac¬
ter, i.e. the good one). This is the first degree which
must be observed and striven towards and efforts must
be made towards its acquisition as we have explained pre¬
viously that man becomes more humane by this. If we exam¬
ine (the states of) most people we find that these are
of two categories:
(1) The first one is that whose doer is not to be blamed
or praised;
(2) The second one is that whose doer is to be blamed
or praised.
We are not concerned with those (states of) happiness
whose doer will not be blamed or praised and we will not
call it happiness. Let us forget then about this categ¬
ory.
18. As to the other category whose doer will be
blamed or praised, we endeavour to acquire the praise¬
worthy one and call it happiness.
These states (in this last category) can be





By accidents I mean accidents of the soul such
as: appetite, anger, pleasure, joviality and mercy and
the like.
As for actions, man is praised if they are
good and is blamed if they are bad.
As for accidents, they will be praised if they
occur appropriately and will be blamed if they occur un¬
appropriated .
As to rational distinction it will be praised
if it is good and will be blamed if it is bad. The bad¬
ness of rational distinction can be caused by one of two
things:
Either (1) Not to be able to distinguish what one re¬
ceives ;
or (2) to have false belief about things.
The goodness of distinction also can be caused
by one of two factors:
Either (1) To be able to distinguish what one receives
or (2) to acquire (knowledge of) the reality of things
and to have a true belief in them.
It is necessary according to this (advice)1 that
if we are really keen about happiness and if we are to
go further to its highest degree that we should ponder
1. Reading^-O^' instead of ^ ^11 .
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over this first step and that our actions should be good
and our accidents should be appropriate and that our dis¬
tinction should be good and sound.
We know that these three states may occur to
a man by luck without efforts or striving and that he
may acquire them without deliberate choice but we do not
19. call it complete happiness since happiness can only be
acquired by Man's own choice and personal endeavour. He
may choose them but in some things and at some times,
and this again cannot be called happiness because happi¬
ness will not occur to Man unless he chooses it for its
own sake and not for any other things. I mean he should
prefer good actions because they are good, not for the
reason that he wanted to be praised or to benefit from
doing them or for any other reason. Likewise he should
prefer with regard to accidents that they should occur
for him as appropriate and with regard to rational dis¬
tinction that it should be good throughout his life.
Man will not be able to acquire these states
with these conditions unless he is in a constant mood,
which either cannot be eradicated or is very difficult
to eradicate. This mood in relation to rational distinc¬
tion is called 'mental power', or in relation to accid¬
ents it is called 'character', while as to actions they
should originate from these two (aspects of the constant
mood). Aristotle has clarified this and touched upon it.1
As for the excellence of mind and the power of distinc¬
tion, he acquires them from logic which is a practical
science by which man, when he has grasped it, knows the
1. Aristotle, N.E., Bk.VI: Ch.4, 1139bU-Ch.13, 1145311.
- 215 -
grades of arguments and the correction of ideas concern¬
ing every existent as it should be and which cannot be
otherwise. We shall describe them later.
As to accidents of the soul he acquires them
from Ethics in which we shall clarify how man acquires
good character in whatever he thinks of until there does
not occur to him anything but the good, beautiful and
praiseworthy actions and until it becomes an attitude
and (similar to a) natural disposition in all matters.
20. It has been made clear there that this is possible and
not impossible as some people have presumed. If it is
not possible we would not be able to correct children
and youths. The acquisition of these two, i.e. mental
power for the correction of distinction and the virtuous
attitude, which is (similar) to the natural disposition
from which actions originate appropriately, is (the ac¬
quisition of) the two parts of wisdom. This is why the
philosopher divided philosophy into two parts, theoret¬
ical and practical, neither of which can be used instead
of the other for the acquisition of happiness. He who
gains strength in both of them is the complete happy man
and the virtuous philosopher. And the one who is stron¬
ger in one of them and weaker in the other, his strength
and weakness can be classified as either theoretically
strong and practically weak or practically strong and
theoretically weak. The reason for weak practice after
strong theoretical knowledge is weak determination. (By
weak determination) I mean that since he knows instinct¬
ively or by rational distinction that a particular pleas¬
ure will be followed by a particular harm, whether ill¬
ness or blame by others or a bad consequence, he does
not refrain from it.
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The cause of the weakness of determination is
the lack of ethical training; concerning this, we have
mentioned that books have been compiled which provide
man with (the knowledge of) a virtuous faculty and dis¬
position, man acquires a faculty and virtuous attitude
by repeating praiseworthy actions and making them habit¬
ual so that they became natural.
As to the other aspect (of wisdom) in which
the practical part is strong and theoretical is weak,
it will not be experienced except by those who listen
21. to philosophers and believe in their statements and imit¬
ate their good actions, taking them in good faith even
though they cannot verify their validity by reflection
and then to endeavour (to implement them). This is the
rank of the unquestioning believer. Men like them will
be much happier than the first group.
Their example is like that of someone who
accepts what the physician prescribes and what he for¬
bids and consequently he gets well and becomes healthy.
And the example of the first group is like a knowledge¬
able physician who does not use his knowledge in curing
himself and so he gets ill and his knowledge turns out
to be useless to him.
Those who are in this rank are called slaves
by nature because he who is not able to curb his desires
in the way that distinction makes necessary is a slave
by nature even if he is free by divine law. On the con-
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trary, he who is able to (curb^his desires is free by nat¬
ure even if he is a slave by divine law. As to the
person who follows his desires and who does not know the
harm that ensues after satisfaction of desires, this
sort of person is not expected to practise good actions
and he cannot stop doing bad actions easily. This person
should definitely be punished as it is stated in the div¬
ine laws. The person who is weak in both respects is a
beastly man whose portion of humanity is considered in
proportion to his weak faculties ( i.e. the weaker the
faculties the lesser is his portion of humanity).
philosopher is the one who has a strong mentality and
sound discernment and who is able to know the realities
of things in all existents. He also has strong determin¬
ation to implement his knowledge and then he continues
in the same line in these two things, i.e. knowledge and
practice. It has become clear from the above that the
theoretical part should precede the practical part be-
22. cause it is by excellence and power of distinction that
he obtains the correctness in everything which he wants
to know.
(1) That which is known but not practised and
(2) That which is known and practised,
the practical sciences likewise are classified into two
accordingly. I mean by that which is known and not prac¬
tised something like the knowledge that God Almighty is
one, and that He is eternal and the creator of thec »
world. An example of that which is known and practised
is good conduct in transactions and skill in professions
and generally actions which are done from deliberation
It has become clear that the perfectly happy
Since knowledge can be divided into two kinds:
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and frequent practice. Books have been written on these
two sciences to explicate what they are and to facilit¬
ate their acquisition. Since in these two parts there
is what is aimed at in itself and desired for its own
sake and there is what is useful for what is desired in
itself, the science is divided again into two other
parts.
The science whose end is directed towards know¬
ledge only is intended for the perception of truth, and
true belief and absolute certainty; this is preferred
for its own sake, not for anything else. Likewise is the
science which is aimed at for good practice and virtuous
character. These together are, as we have said, the two
parts of wisdom. Each of them is called wisdom rightly
and truly. As to the other sciences which are useful in
relation to these two parts (of wisdom), they could be
called wisdom metaphorically but in reality they are
not. They are sciences which demand deliberation and fre¬
quent practice so that skill in it may become manifest.
23. Wise men call these (the sciences which are not part of
wisdom) cleverness and they do not call it wisdom. These
are like the professions which lead to wealth, pleasure
or leadership.
He who wants to perfect his humanity and at¬
tain the thing for which Man is created, to perfect him¬
self and to partake with philosophers in that which they
favoured and directed their efforts "towards it; he
should acquire these two sciences. I mean the two parts
of wisdom, the theoretical and the practical, so that
he can get to know the reality of things by the theoret¬
ical part and good deeds by the practical part.
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As to the arrangement of these two sciences
and how to practise them to achieve the two above-
mentioned ends, (the two ends being the reality of things
and good deeds as mentioned earlier), it is according
to what Aristotle, the philosopher put forward.1 He is
the one who organised wisdom systematically, classified
it and laid down a method which can be followed from
beginning to end, as Paul mentioned in his letter to
Anushirwan2 saying that wisdom before this philosopher
was dispersed like all other useful things which have
been created by God and God makes their utility depend¬
ent on Man's nature and the power He has given him to
obtain these (useful things). Like medicines which are
scattered in different countries and mountains, which
if they are collected and compounded, will produce use¬
ful medicine.
Likewise Aristotle collected what was scatter¬
ed of wisdom and he classified each thing in its similar
form and located it in its proper place and he extracted
from this a perfect medicine to cure the souls from the
24. illnesses of ignorance. Part of this classification was
that he looked into the two parts of wisdom, the theor¬
etical and the practical and he found that the theoret¬
ical part can be either in things which are material or
in things which are immaterial. Each of these groups is
also divided into two, since some of those which are
material are subject to generation and corruption and
some are not and some immaterial things are derived from
1. Aristotle, NJE^, Bk.VI: Ch.4, 4, 1139b11- Ch.13, 1145a11.
2. Paul is a Persian philosopher and logician. He wrote a book on the logic of Aris¬
totle in Syriac and Anushirwan Kisra is a Persian sage who wrote short moral adom-
itions in Persian.
c —
(C.f. Izzat, cAbd al-cAziz, Miskawayh, op.cit., pp.205f and p.361.)
(See also Miskawayh, Jaw"id3n Khird, op.cit., pp.45, 49, 61, 182).
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material things but exist only in fantasy and do not
have an existence outside it. Some other immaterial
things are not derived from material things but they
have an existence of their own outside fantasy. These
are the four primary divisions of the theoretical part
(of wisdom).
Material things have some (properties) which
are common to them all and some (properties) which per¬
tain to some of them only. Some of these (properties)
pertain to eternal things and some pertain to transient
things. Some of the (properties) which pertain to trans¬
ient things are common to all of them and some pertain
to some of them.
What pertains to some of these (transient)
things includes those which pertain to things on the
earth and some of them pertain to things inside the
earth. What pertains to things inside the earth includes
things which pertain to entities which do not have souls
and things which pertain to entities which have souls.
The things which have souls include properties which
have senses and properties which do not have senses.
25. Aristotle has written a book on each of these
divisions. His books contain all that he has written
about these matters perceptually and conceptually and
nothing escaped him.
As his attention was directed to the correct¬
ion of volition regarding all these matters and to give
certainty and satisfactory arrangements regarding them
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all and to safeguard against mistakes of error concern¬
ing intelligibles, he was forced to research into the
grades of arguments and look into things regarding which
he could not make mistakes and felt certain that he
would not fall into falsity and think it truth and think
truth falsity. What are the grades of these things? He
composed a science and laws for these things by which
the grades of these things and their degrees of certain¬
ty and other (stages) can be known, so that man can
tread the path of correctness in everything which he des¬
ires, so that his approach to wisdom may be different
from that of the holders of other doctrines in (their)
imagination and fancies. These people committed mistakes
unwittingly or perhaps wittingly moving from one idea
to another, never feeling sure that the false idea which
occurred to them the first time may not occur to them
the second time. They are always mistaken or doubtful
and perplexed. If man knows the things about which he
may make mistakes, he will guard against them and he
will be sure of the things in which he has found truth
and has not made a mistake.
If it seems to him that he has overlooked some¬
thing, he will go back to the laws of the science and
know the place where he has made the error immediately
26. and correct it easily. He can correct that view for him¬
self and for others as well and thus he changes the
other's idea and finally exposes it to him. This is the
science of logic. The closest example I can find in
other sciences is the science of metrics and the science
of grammar, each of which is similar to logic in one as¬
pect. This is because there are verses metres of poetry
which are correct and someone who is not an expert may
make a mistake and think that they are faulty or may
think that faulty verses are sound, and if he goes back
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to the rule of the science he will know the place of the
doubtful (word) and he will be able to correct it as it
should be. He will then establish the place of error,
if there is one, and will mend what he has missed (be¬
fore). A science which is also related to logic in anoth¬
er way is the science of grammar because the relation
of the science of grammar to words is like the relation
of the science of logic to meanings. As grammar directs
the tongue towards correct language and gives the laws
by which desinential inflection is known, likewise logic
directs the mind towards the corrections of the meanings
and gives the laws whereby truth can be recognised. Al¬
though the grammarian's purpose is to correct words, he
also looks into meanings to correct meanings by it. The
grammarian looks into words themselves in the first
place and then he looks into meanings accidentally and
in the second place. The logician on the other hand
looks into meanings themselves in the first place and
then he looks into words accidentally and in the second
place; now the aim of the philosopher (Aristotle) in the
27. science of logic becomes clear.
The one who is ignorant of this science will
necessarily be unable to check the correctness of him
who is correct, how he is correct and in what way he is
correct, neither will be be able to check the negligence
of he who is negligent or makes mistakes, how and where
he is negligent or makes a mistake.
He will be perplexed as to different opinions
and he will declare some of these opinions correct with¬
out confidence and declare some of them false without
understanding and will suspend judgement towards some
of them, not knowing how to judge. He will not be sure
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that what he declares correct today will not be affected
tomorrow by something which will make him rescind it and
doubt it, or what he declares false may not turn out to
be true at another time. He regards what he holds to be
true as possibly false, and what he holds to be false
as possibly true and he may finally come to a view con¬
trary to both of these positions either because of a per¬
sonal impression emerging from his first belief or be¬
cause of someone else's opinion.
And when someone (puts forward)1 an argument and
presents it through his skill (in argument) who claims
perfection in knowledge and culture and he does not have
any means to test him, he can either have good faith in
him and accept him or suspect him and reject him. In
both cases, he is bound to receive some impressions
which makes him think that something is true ana some
other thing is false. Logic will show these positions
to him, confirm the correct to him and show him why it
is correct and show the false to be false and why it is
false. We are then forced to verify our concepts by log-
28. ical laws which eradicate the mistakes surrounding us
and correct the words which refer by agreement to these
concepts in order that other people may not fall into
the same mistakes. Both of these are called the science
of logic, but the one is studied for itself and the
other accidentally as we have shown. When Aristotle pon¬
dered over the grades of arguments which convince the
mind (nafs) and wanted to arrange them and to make a
scientific law for them in order to arrive at the real¬
ity of things by them, he divided them as he divided the
sciences which we have explained before. He found that
1. Reading instead of
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the kinds of syllogisms and propositions which we need
to correct an idea or to reach a desired fact either by
ourselves or through other people are divided into three:
(1) Absolutely true and certain without any doubt,
(2) Absolutely false and doubtful,
(3) Partly true and partly false.
This third class can be divided into three parts:
(1) Its truth is greater than its falsity.
(2) Its falsity is greater than its truth.
(3) Or the two matters are equal.






He (Aristotle) has written a book on each of
the five divisions and a science which deals with this
method by laws by which no-one can deviate from the ess¬
ence of that which is desired and no-one can go back
from it and it cannot be subject to suspicion or doubt,
and he called it Apodictics (Kitab al-Burhan) (Analytica
Posteriora).
As for the syllogism which is fallacious, it
is the one in which we imagine things to be in a form
in which they are not in reality. An example of this is
what happens to the eye when it perceives, for what oc¬
curs to the soul vis-a-vis the intelligible on percept¬
ion is what occurs to the eye vis-a-vis the sensible on
perception. One may imagine something fallaciously and
then proceed to action on the basis of that imagination
and the actions will be bad and ugly. He (Aristotle)
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composed a book on the different aspects of imaginat¬
ions, when they occur and how they occur and he called
it the Book of the Poets and the Poetical Art (Kitab al-
C — c c
Shu ara' wa-al-Sina a al-Shi riyya) (Poetics) (Poetica).
As to whose truth is greater than its falsity,
it is the syllogism which rests on generally accepted
premises, not intrinsic and not substantial to the des¬
ired conclusion and not essential to the conclusion. Man
should seek to produce strong probability either of his
own or of others so that he can obtain the desired con¬
clusion even if it is not certain.
Aristotle has written a book on this art and
he shows the different aspects of these probabilities
and whence and how they are true and whence and how they
are false and he called it al-Jadal and the Science of
Dialectics (Topics) (Topica).
As to (the syllogism) whose falsity is greater
than its truth, it is the one which erroneously supposes
the false to be true and the ignorant man to be a know-
30.1edgeable one. This mistake occurs in different ways and
categories.
He (Aristotle) composed a book in which he
shows facets of deceptions, falsities and mistakes, how
they occur and whence and he called it the science of
sophism, which is deceptive wisdom (hikma mumawwaha) in
the Greek language. It is derived from sophia ( suf) which is
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deception and deceit. Thus its meaning is deceptive wis¬
dom. Whoever is able to deceive and be deceitful in ord¬
er to make people believe that he is a philosopher when
he is not, is a sophist; there is not, as (some of) those
who professed Islam, a man in ancient times called Soph¬
ist! who used to repudiate the reality of things and who
had followers supporting his creed and they named it
after him. This is a baseless assumption, since there
was no man in ancient times who was called Sophista and
nobody was named after him and no particular people ever
supported his particular creed. This is analogous to the
science of dialectic (jadal), for a man is called a dial¬
ectician (jadall) without there being a man called 1 Jad-
al' .
As to (the syllogism) in which its falsity is
equal to Its truth it is that by which one attempts to
persuade, in any topic, and to make the listener accept
what is said to him and believe it in some way or other.
This is less than strong probability. He (Aristotle) com¬
posed a book in v/hich he showed the different aspects
of persuasion, whence they occur and how they occur and
he called it the Book of Rhetoric (Kitab al-Khijtaba)
(Rhetorica).
These are the five books of logic. When Aris¬
totle pondered over syllogism he found that some parts
31. of it are common to all these arts and some of them are
particular to each of these arts. Aristotle composed a
book on the first general syllogism which is common to
these five arts and he called it Analytics (Kitab al-
Qiyas) (Analytica Priora). This book exists in the old
translations (in two parts), one called Analytics (Kitab
al-Qiyas) and the other The Book of Analogy (Kitab al-
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al-Burhan) (Analytica Posteriora).
The Aristotle looked into syllogism and he
found that it is composed of words and meanings. The sim¬
plest syllogistic proposition is the one which is com¬
pounded of two words and the simplest syllogistic mean¬
ing is the one which is compounded of (two proposit¬
ions). Most of (these syllogisms) are unlimited. The
parts of the propositions which are compounded of two
words are necessarily single words. Necessarily then,
this science is divided into eight parts by way of anal¬
ysis. When Aristotle tried the division by way of syn¬
thesis, he started off with single words which refer to
genera of single meanings. Aristotle composed a book on
this and he classified these words into ten genera of
meanings then he divided each one of them into different
species and he called it the Book of Categoriae (Kitab
al-Maqulat) which is known as the Book of Categories
(QatIquriyas). Then he wrote a second book in which he
mentioned the compound propositions and he called it the
(Bari Irmij .iyas) (Peri Hermeneias) 1 (De Interpretat¬
ion) . Then he wrote a third book, the Kitab al-Qiyas,
which we have mentioned above and he shows in this book
the laws of propositions which demonstrate the syllog¬
ism, which are common to the five kinds of argument and
32. he called it the (Analytica Priora). Then he wrote a
fourth book called Al-Burhan which is the Second Analyt-
ica (Analytica Posteriora). He shows in this book the
laws of syllogisms which are not mistaken and cannot be
mistaken. These are the certain (syllogisms). Then he
wrote a fifth book in which he mentioned the syllogistic
1. Hermeneutics.
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laws which are derived from generally accepted premises,
how questions and answers can be formulated according
to this method and he shows in it the laws by which this
art is accomplished in the best possible way and he call¬
ed it Topica (Tubiqa), which is Kitab al-Jadal. Then he
wrote a sixth book in which he mentions the laws of
those matters in which the truth is mistaken and con¬
fused, and those things to which the misrepresenter has
recourse, and shows the things which reveal their decep¬
tive nature and how we can avoid them, and he called it
Sophistica (Sophistica Elenchi) (Sufistiq), i.e. decep¬
tive wisdom. Then he wrote a seventh book in which he
mentions the laws of the things which are convincing by
rhetoric and mentioned all the means whereby this art
can be attained so that Man will become more perfect and
effective and he called it Rhetorica (Rituriq).
Then Aristotle wrote an eighth book in which
he mentions the laws which govern imaginative words and
enumerated all the means by which art can be attained
and divided them into their species and categories and
he called it Poetica (Furifrlqa) , i.e. poetry, so that
this science may be perfected in these divisions. His
first objective was to obtain demonstration but classif-
33. ication and arrangement necessitated the afore-mentioned
division. For the things which are known by way of dem¬
onstration are little in comparison with that which is
known by the other (kinds of) syllogisms, and it was in¬
cumbent on him to organize them and to know their differ¬
ent methods.
Some of the methods are methods of demonstrat¬
ion and some of them defend it and support it. As to the
three (books) in the preliminary stages of this science,
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they are the ones which lead to it. The other four are
the ones which defend it so that it may not be confused
with what is not demonstration. The best of these books
is Apodictics (Kitab al-Burhan) (Analytica Posteriora),
because it is the first objective and it necessarily
falls in the fourth part (i.e. book) as mentioned above,
while the remaining books are composed either as intro¬
ductions and preludes to it or as defences of it.
As to the three books which precede Apodictics
they are the introductions and as for the four books
which follow it, they protect it, distinguish it and de¬
fend it against the methods which might be supposed to
lead to the end which it itself leads to. Nevertheless
if one aims to be a strong dialectician or a fluent rhet¬
orician or a creative poet, he will move towards what
he seeks and acquire one of the books in which the laws
of the art have been classified in order that he may
attain the highest degree and the uppermost grade in
that art. However if one restricts oneself to the four
books, that will be enough for him to learn wisdom, to¬
gether with the books which come after these books. They
are the books which we enumerated and explained how the
philosopher (Aristotle) divided them. Then one would
begin with the books on material things which are on
34. natural matters and leave to the end the books on ab¬
stract things from matter because natural things are per¬
ceptible and they are closer to us and we are used to
them and we know them better. We can ascend from
(their knowledge of) them to (the knowledge of) things
beyond. Aristotle wrote a book on this art in which he
classified things common to all natural objects, those
which are undergoing the process of becoming and those
which are not undergoing the process of becoming and he
called it Al-Samac al-TabiCi (Physics). He (Aristotle)
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also wrote a book on things which are not undergoing the
process of becoming and he called it The Book of the
Heaven (Kitab al-Sama') (De Caelo). Then he divided all
things which are undergoing the process of becoming. He
wrote a book on things which are common to all these and
he called it the Book of Generation and Corruption
(Kitab al-Kawn wa-al-Fasad) (De Generatione et Corrupt-
ione). Then he wrote a book about things pertaining to
earth, those which have souls but do not have senses and
he called it the Book of Plants (De Plantis).1 He then
wrote a book on things which have souls and do have
senses and he called it the Book of Animals (Kitab al-
Hayawan) (De Partibus Animalium) The History of Animals.
When he wanted to ascend from natural objects i.e. mat¬
erial objects to immaterial things he found between
these two stages, there are things common to both phys¬
ics and metaphysics, and he composed his book on the
Soul (De Anima) and his book on Sense and Sensible con¬
cerning these things. Then he wrote his books on meta¬
physics which he called after the alphabet and they are
the books known as Alif, Ba' , etc.2 Some of them have
been translated into Arabic and some have not been trans¬
lated. However the books which have been translated into
Arabic are adequate and completely sufficient. When Aris-
35. totle finished these great works on theoretical wisdom
and arranged them in this order, he did the same thing
in the practical part (of wisdom). He (Aristotle) div¬
ided it into things which pertain to man himself and
things which pertain to other subjects. This second div-
1. "De Plantis is of all the Corpus, that which has had the most peculiar history.
Aristotle seems, from references by himself, to have written a book on plants, but
it had perished by the time of Alexander Aphrodisias, and the extant work is trans¬
lated from a Latin translation of an Arabic translation of a work whose probable
author is Nicolaus of Damascus, a peripatetic of the time of Augustus". (Ross, W.D.,
Aristotle, p.12).
2. These are sections of Aristotle's metaphysics, i.e. books A till... Book N.
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ision is divided into two; one concerning the management
of the house and the other concerning the management of
cities. He composed a book on each of these arts. As to
the book concerning things which pertain to man himself,
it is his book on ethics which is a great work and of
great benefit. It teaches how man can acquire virtuous
talent and a praiseworthy disposition from which good
actions and acceptable deeds emanate. As to his books
on house and city management, they have not been trans¬
lated into Arabic except for part of his book on city
management1 - this is our view - and it has been mention¬
ed in the index of his books. In addition to these
books, he has treatises and books which he called Memo¬
randa (De Memoria Et Reminiscentia)2 , and they are many
as mentioned and related in the index of his works. He
has written books on education3 as well, but they have
not been translated (into Arabic). However, in the sys¬
tem which has been translated into Arabic and the order
in which they have been arranged, there is great suffic¬
iency and complete satisfaction for him who wants to per¬
fect himself and aim at his end so that he can reach it
quickly. As to the amount of time laid down for the per¬
son who wishes to learn wisdom as it has been set by
this sage who has been generous and beneficient to us,
it is in proportion to the person's care and interest
36. and other accidental aids, i.e. the person's being clev¬
er, having a retentive memory, being able to find books
and a teacher to start the lessons with him, and having
sufficient means so that he is not distracted from his
endeavour, and the removal of the obstacles which man
does not take into account, in the accidents and troub-
1. This is part of Aristotle's Politica.
2. This is part of Aristotle's Parva Naturalia which is a collective work on psych¬
ology (see Ross, Aristotle, p.11).
3. This is part of Rhetorica (Rhetoric).
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les of life, diseases of the mind and body or their
occurrence together, or the fear of the common people
at one time and the fear of the ruler at other times,
and the scrutiny of the townspeople. As someone once
said, the people are the enemies of that which they do
not know. They commonly conspire against people of vir¬
tue and show enmity to those who differ from them in
their doctrines and purposes, and direct abuse and ill-
treatment towards them. If he (the one who wants to gain
wisdom) is free from these accidents and if the dispos¬
ition and causes (for success) which we have mentioned
are combined in him, he will reach his goal by a short
path and will be free from the troubles of his fellow
human beings and he will gain the stored-up treasures
(of wisdom). It will take him approximately between ten
and twenty years to acquire this knowledge, assuming
that worldly affairs distract him to a certain degree.
For we cannot imagine that a person will isolate himself
and totally devote himself to knowledge and not give his
body comfort and his soul a share of good and noble
pleasures. If he were to do that he would lose his way
and be prevented from reaching his end.
Some of Aristotle's disciples and teachers of
his books think that the teacher (of others) of them
should start with the books of Ethics so that he may
refine his soul first and become purified of the impurit¬
ies of appetites. This will lessen its agitation by the
accidents which come to it (the soul) and it will be
37. able to accept wisdom and acknowledge to some extent the
the abandonment of indulgence in appetites and the leav¬
ing of bodily pleasures and know that most of these
pleasures are despicable and base so that he can keep
clear of them.
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Then he should look into some of mathematics
to get to know the method of demonstration and acquire
proficiency in and familiarity with its methods. He
should leave going deeper into the study of it to anoth¬
er time because he has yet a distant aim and a slow jour¬
ney before him. Then he should look into logic which is
a useful instrument for all the things he is aiming at.
Then he should look into physics and metaphysics in the
order we mentioned before.
If man reaches this final stage he will come
to know the reality of things and he will be able to put
them in their right places. Then his soul will form the
(right) concepts of them, and if the soul forms concepts
of the true facts of things he will be able to under¬
stand them completely rationally. If he understands
things rationally, he will be able to form mental images
and the images of accidents in natural things i.e. chan¬
geable objects, will disappear from his mind and he will
obtain the images of mental eternal things. The mind
will be united with these mental eternal images and they
will be one and the same thing.
It is in the nature of the mind that its part
becomes a universal as this becomes clear to him when
he reaches it. When his soul departs from his body he
will go to the second existence which is his final end
38. and his ultimate perfection. This state (of perfection)
is very difficult to imagine, far from our daily observ¬
ation and experience and one cannot talk about it, nor
can it be attained in a way other than the one we illus¬
trated. If we try to take similes for this state (of
perfection) from every day experience there will be con¬
tradictions and impossibilities in these examples
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because the example bears no relationship to what it re¬
presents. This is why we have not employed any. In any
case I have composed a treatise (kalam) on this (state
of perfection)1 in which I have tried my best to make
it clear as possible. If this section comes to the atten¬
tion (of a reader) and is reread carefully and it makes
possible (the understanding) of what comes after it.
Then I know that it has (made) the impression which I
intended in the first place, through the will and help
of God.
There is no strength except by Him, He suff¬
ices us and is our best guardian. May peace be upon His
Prophet Muhammad and all his family.
The Book is finished by the help of God the Exalted.
1. Reference here is made to Miskawayh's Treatise on al-Ladhdhat wa-al-Alam.
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